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This dissertation explores the development of racial and economic liberalism in twentieth-century
America. It tells the story of how trade unions and racial advocacy organizations were working
together—as well as fighting with each other—in national legislative and administrative debates over
industrial policy amidst the consolidation of the New Deal political order. The role racial advocacy
organizations played in these debates, and the different ideological and strategic positions they took, are
often neglected in histories and analyses of the Civil Rights Movement. Existing accounts have paid
significant attention to the development and origins of the efforts to end segregation, pass anti-lynching
legislation, and end the poll tax, many of which took placed in the courts. By analyzing the opportunities
racial advocacy organizations and labor unions had to build coalitions to influence industrial policy, this
project sheds light on important efforts to press for social democratic political projects through the
elected branches. These projects were notable in that they embraced both racial and economic goals,
rooted in deep ideological differences among racial equality advocates in twentieth-century politics.
Specifically, this analysis focuses on the internal debates and consistent tension among and within racial
advocacy organizations and unions in balancing anti-discrimination goals with broader structural
economic change. While the opportunities to pursue these coalitions expanded following the New Deal
period, labor’s staggering defeat in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act led to rifts and changes that ultimately
steered racial advocacy organizations away from structural economic change and toward a narrower set
of racial demands rooted in the courts.
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ABSTRACT
TANGLED FATES: CASTING RACIAL AND ECONOMIC EQUALITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA
Katherine Rader
Rogers Smith

This dissertation explores the development of racial and economic liberalism in
twentieth-century America. It tells the story of how trade unions and racial advocacy
organizations were working together—as well as fighting with each other—in national
legislative and administrative debates over industrial policy amidst the consolidation of
the New Deal political order. The role racial advocacy organizations played in these
debates, and the different ideological and strategic positions they took, are often
neglected in histories and analyses of the Civil Rights Movement. Existing accounts have
paid significant attention to the development and origins of the efforts to end segregation,
pass anti-lynching legislation, and end the poll tax, many of which took placed in the
courts. By analyzing the opportunities racial advocacy organizations and labor unions had
to build coalitions to influence industrial policy, this project sheds light on important
efforts to press for social democratic political projects through the elected branches.
These projects were notable in that they embraced both racial and economic goals, rooted
in deep ideological differences among racial equality advocates in twentieth-century
politics. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the internal debates and consistent tension
vi

among and within racial advocacy organizations and unions in balancing antidiscrimination goals with broader structural economic change. While the opportunities to
pursue these coalitions expanded following the New Deal period, labor’s staggering
defeat in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act led to rifts and changes that ultimately steered racial
advocacy organizations away from structural economic change and toward a narrower set
of racial demands rooted in the courts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In June 1934, the NAACP Board of Directors commissioned a committee and
charged it with charting a new course for the organization, appointing board member
Abram Harris to be the chair. Harris was an economics professor at Howard University,
where he worked to advance a “class, not race” agenda as part of a “radical cadre” at the
university.1 Given his political orientation, Harris might seem like an odd choice to chart
a new direction for an organization focused on racial advancement. And the report that
Harris presented to the NAACP Board in October of 1934 did, indeed, offer an
alternative vision for the organization. It called for the NAACP to shift its focus away
from civil rights and liberties and instead develop a much more robust economic
program, centered on jobs and economic opportunities for African Americans:
Instead of continuing to oppose racial discrimination on the job…the Association
[should] attempt to get Negroes to view their special grievances as a natural part
of the larger issues of American labor as a whole.2
Rather than viewing Jim Crow, racism, and discrimination as the primary targets for the
organization’s work, the report called for a complete “reformulation of the Association’s
ultimate objectives.” To Harris, this meant striking at the root of imbalances in the
economic system and fighting alongside labor unions. The NAACP and other racial
advocacy organizations were not the only institutions, according to Harris, that needed to

1
Jonathan Scott Holloway, Confronting the Veil: Abram Harris Jr., E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph
Bunche, 1919-1941 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 85–86.
2
Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences,
Major Speeches, and Special Reports, Folder: 001412-009-0661, Mar 07, 1935 - Jun 30, 1935, page 5.
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change. One of the major endeavors of his re-imagined NAACP was a massive reeducation of Black and white workers.3 Ultimately, the Board opted not to pursue the
direction Harris proposed, and much of the organization’s legacy came to be defined by
the focus on discrimination that he cautioned against.
On one level, Harris’s report is a testament to the long history of debates over the
significance of race and class in American politics. Indeed, questions over how to best
promote racial equality have been inextricably tied up with questions about the politicaleconomic system. But beyond this, Harris’s report and his call for racial advocacy
organizations like the NAACP to ally with unions and fight to restructure the economy
also reflected the particular historical moment in which they existed.4 Although it was not
successful in shifting the direction of the NAACP, Harris’s report still represents a much
broader set of political possibilities sparked by the rupture of the Great Depression and
the rise of the New Deal political order. At the same time that the NAACP was
considering this new direction, A. Philip Randolph was organizing the first-ever trade
union of Black workers, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), taking
advantage of new legal opportunities provided by the New Deal’s sweeping changes in
industrial policy. But the National Urban League was crafting its own alternative to the

3

Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences,
Major Speeches, and Special Reports, Folder: 001412-009-0661, Mar 07, 1935 - Jun 30, 1935, 119-122.
4
In this dissertation, I use the term “racial advocacy organization” to refer to those groups that were
advancing projects aimed at improving the lives of African Americans. These cover a broad set policy and
political aims and involved a variety of tactics.
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kind of militant political education and action Harris was suggesting: a version of trade
unionism that aligned with their more business-oriented approach to “racial uplift.”5
These examples show how racial advocacy organizations were contending with a
reshaped political-economic landscape. They attempted to intervene in national debates
over policy and administration on behalf of Black workers and the under-employed and
unemployed in the 1930s and 1940s. These battles are less familiar than the Civil Rights
Movement’s legal campaign against segregation in public accommodations or legislative
fights to pass anti-lynching legislation and abolish the poll tax. But what is clear from
Harris’s report is that a massive legal campaign against segregation and discrimination
was anything but a foregone conclusion in the mid-1930s.
In fact, racial advocacy organizations were actively debating how to balance work
on race-specific issues with political efforts to radically restructure the economy in the
1930s and 1940s. They consistently worked in coalition with those fighting to pull the
center of the Democratic Party to the left and towards a more expansive social
democracy. Critically, this loosely defined social democratic coalition understood
industrial policy—those policies and regulations that govern workers, organized labor,
and employers—to be the key vehicle for progressive economic transformation.
Industrial policy also encompassed some of the most radical ideas and policy innovations
implemented or attempted during the development of economic liberalism under the New
Deal: national economic planning, federal jobs programs, publicly owned enterprises, and

5

Touré F. Reed, Not Alms But Opportunity: The Urban League & the Politics of Racial Uplift, 1910-1950
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 96.

3

state support for labor union organization and collective bargaining. These policies
shaped and were shaped by the growth of trade unions and workers’ movements and the
incredibly strong and well-organized opposition to their organizing efforts.
Industrial policy was also central to broader economic policy debates, particularly
in determining the government’s role in the economy. There was broad consensus that the
New Deal was a transformative moment in American politics, creating a window of
opportunity for new political visions to emerge. In particular, the economic collapse of
the Great Depression coupled with the partisan shift in power and the election of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt created an opportunity for a new set of political-economic ideas to
emerge. These were ideas about what kind of role the government should play in
regulating and managing the economy.
Some of the most progressive of these ideas led to massive expansions in the
federal government, creating programs for economic relief, a baseline set of social
welfare programs, and massive growth in trade union membership. This economic
liberalism became the foundation of a new Democratic Party, which led to significant
partisan change, both in terms of ideology and political constituency, and a new political
order lasting from 1930-1980.6 Others paint a less rosy picture of economic liberalism,
arguing that the ideas that shaped the New Deal were a series of compromises that fell
short of a transformational political-economic doctrine. They emphasize the relatively
short window of opportunity and subsequent foreclosing of opportunities for more
6
David Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and
1940s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and
Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
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progressive and redistributive economic ideas to take hold, which led to a more moderate
version of economic liberalism in the postwar period.7
Many scholars have also argued that whatever version of political-economic ideas
the New Deal represented, it did not confront racial and other inequities. Instead, the New
Deal Democratic Party chose to sidestep major civil rights issues, such as anti-lynching
and poll tax legislation. However, racial advocacy organizations were active and critical
participants in the development of economic liberalism, particularly in efforts to craft
industrial policies and create a state that would actively create employment opportunities
and protect workers. This dissertation explores the development of racial and economic
liberalism in twentieth-century America. It tells the story of how trade unions and racial
advocacy organizations were working together—as well as fighting with each other—in
national legislative and administrative debates over industrial policy amidst the
consolidation of the New Deal political order. The role racial advocacy organizations
played in these debates, and the different ideological and strategic positions they took, are
often neglected in histories and analyses of the Civil Rights Movement. What follows is a
discussion of these two major claims and a discussion of this intervention in existing
accounts of economic and racial liberalism.

7

Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1995); Reuel Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law, and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ira Katznelson, “Was the Great Society a Lost
Opportunity?,” in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 185–211.

5

Rethinking Racial and Economic Liberalism
Most scholarly accounts of racial liberalism and economic liberalism in the
twentieth-century construct the two as separate and often conflicting concepts. Those
who explore the development of racial liberalism tend to focus on explicitly race-based
advocacy, such as dismantling Jim Crow segregation and passing anti-lynching
legislation, culminating in a set of legal and political victories in the 1950s and 1960s.
Those who explore economic liberalism consider various political-economic ideas that
shaped the distinct mode of partisan and institutional governance that emerged in the
early 1930s and lasted in many important respects until 1980.8 On the whole, economic
liberalism created a more robust set of state institutions and protections for the working
class.
The tension and conflict between racial and economic liberalism are rooted in the
assessment that, whatever version of political-economic transformation economic
liberalism ushered in, its primary limitations were rooted in the capitulation to existing
social inequities. Such accounts portray the New Deal as acquiescing to or attempting to
sidestep racial, gender, nativist, and other social demarcations. By design and by default,
many were excluded from the benefits that resulted from the broad expansion of the
federal government.9 Racial liberalism, defined in terms of these race-based exclusions,

8

Fraser and Gerstle, The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980; Plotke, Building a Democratic
Political Order; Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: State of the Union A Century of American Labor
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race,
Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000).
9
Kimberly Johnson, “The Color Line and the State: Race and American Political Development,” ed.
Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman, The Oxford Handbook of American Political
Development, December 2015; Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal

6

was not part of the New Deal transformation. Rather, the Democratic Party incorporated
racial liberalism into its platform and ideology through a slower process of partisan
realignment. It was not until the Great Society of the 1960s, which included social
welfare reforms and civil rights legislation that economic liberalism and racial liberalism
became twin commitments of the Democratic Party coalition.10
But this segmentation of racial and economic liberalism is rooted in a relatively
narrow view of how race operates in American politics. The standard view of racial
liberalism, as formulated by political scientist Eric Schickler, focuses primarily on efforts
to address the poll tax and the white primary, anti-lynching legislation, and adding antidiscrimination clauses to federal laws. Schickler effectively demonstrates that when
African Americans left the Republican Party of Lincoln and became a key constituency
within the Democratic Party (particularly in Northern cities), they gained more leverage
and power to push these civil rights planks onto the broader party agenda.11

Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Cybelle Fox, Three Worlds of Relief: Race,
Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal, Princeton Studies
in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012); Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a
National Issue, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare:
How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Ira Katznelson,
Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013).
10
Eric Schickler, Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2016); Hans Noel, “The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the
Civil Rights Realignment,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (2012): 156–73; Edward G. Carmines and
James A. Stimson, “Issue Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change,” The
American Political Science Review 75, no. 1 (1981): 107–18.
11
Departing from the standard realignment story, which focuses on national elite-level transformations,
Schickler emphasizes that shifts at the local and state level that spurred the partisan realignment and fusion
of economic and racial liberalism, rather than existing explanations for partisan realignment that argue that
the changes took place among elites at the national level. According to Schickler, it was not until the CIO
and African Americans put pressure on state-level Democratic Party officials that these issues came to be
important planks on the Democratic Party agenda. Schickler argues this was primarily because the CIO’s
version of industrial unionism, which was an alternative to the craft-organizing model of the AFL, brought

7

However, this set of issues did not encompass the totality of political efforts to
address racial inequality at this time. To be sure, these were critical issues for many racial
advocacy organizations and African Americans. But the idea that they constituted a
complete and coherent agenda for all African Americans is misleading, at best. In the
1930s and 1940s, there was no Civil Rights Movement in the terms we recognize today,
which means that efforts to group a set of political projects organized in those terms are
somewhat artificial.12 The fact that the mass influx of African Americans into Roosevelt’s
New Deal Democratic Party predated the party’s transformation on racial liberalism in
itself should suggest that racial liberalism does not capture the full spectrum of racial
politics in this period. Perhaps the most significant of Schickler’s findings is that African
Americans in the 1930s and 1940s were more supportive of the New Deal’s federal jobs
and social welfare programs than their white counterparts.13
This general enthusiasm for programs associated with economic liberalism did not
stop many racial advocacy organizations, particularly the NAACP and the National
Urban League, from highlighting the barriers for African Americans seeking to access
these programs. They both supported these programs and pressed for their benefits to be

CIO-affiliated unions into contact with Black workers in low and semi-skilled industrial jobs. This is not to
say that Black workers in all cases were welcomed into the CIO fold with open arms, but rather the
industrial unionism approach meant that organizing Black workers could not be sidestepped as readily as it
was in the AFL’s craft union approach. The CIO championed a version of “political unionism” that went
beyond the mandate to organize particular workplaces and fought for social democratic programs that
would improve the lives of working Americans. As a result, they became a powerful force within the
Democratic Party and were instrumental in pushing civil rights onto the agenda. Schickler, Racial
Realignment, 27-28, 52-54, 146-8.
12
For this reason, I avoid the “Long Civil Rights” formulation and in this dissertation use phrases like
“racial advocacy organizations” to describe political battles aimed at securing racial equality before the
1950s-1960s Civil Rights Movement.
13
See Figure 6.2 on page 140 of Schickler, Racial Realignment.
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more fairly distributed across the population. The federal jobs, social security programs,
and relief expenditures these organizations supported and fought to improve were
transformative for many Black and white Americans in ways that should not be
overlooked or understated in analyzing African American politics during this period.14
While Schickler’s account provides insightful documentation of efforts to press for racial
democracy, it does less to explore the origins of the commitment to economic liberalism
among African Americans and how those political preferences influenced political and
coalitional work.
This is certainly not to suggest that the political efforts Schickler and others have
called core components of racial liberalism were not also important political goals and
projects of African Americans in those decades. Indeed, many of these efforts, for
example, the anti-lynching campaign led by the NAACP in the early twentieth century,
played a key role in forging the modern American state’s commitments to civil rights.15
But scholars should be cautious in using “racial liberalism” as a stand-in term for a
seemingly coherent and unified set of Black political interests. The remedy is not simply
to increase the number of issues included in the umbrella term “civil rights.” Rather, this
dissertation argues that legislative and bureaucratic politics presented opportunities for
coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and trade unions to coalesce around a set of
social democratic political projects outside of those contained in Schickler’s definition of

14

This critique does not necessarily challenge Schickler’s causal narrative, that as civil rights advocates
become a clear Democratic Party constituency, they are better able to press the civil rights issues he is
interested in within the party.
15
Megan Ming Francis, Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State (Cambridge University
Press, 2014).

9

racial liberalism. These projects were notable in that they embraced both racial and
economic goals, rooted in deep ideological differences among racial equality advocates in
twentieth-century politics. While they were ultimately unsuccessful in strengthening the
left-flank of the New Deal coalition, their efforts are instructive in the kinds of
ideological positions and contextual factors that can facilitate or thwart these coalitions.
These efforts, particularly these instances of coalition-building, are often
overlooked in accounts that focus on the civil rights legal campaign. This is partly
because the legal context did not lend itself to forging these coalitions, for reasons that
will be addressed later in this discussion. The success of the legal campaign against
segregation and the massive rights revolution it sparked in the 1960s have further
contributed to this segmentation of racial and economic liberalism. The shift to the courts
ultimately led to the development of labor rights and civil rights legal regimes that were
not compatible and, in fact, foreclosed the kinds of alliances that had been forming to
press for structural economic change.16 In addition, the legal strategy favored an
increasingly popular set of ideas that figured racial inequality as a distinctly
individualistic and psychological phenomenon, not a historically contingent idea rooted
in institutions.17 The emergence of the court-focused Civil Rights Movement and the
legal attack on segregation in public accommodations and education have been welldocumented. These accounts focus on the landmark legal victories like Brown v. Board

16

Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law, and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism; Paul Frymer, Black
and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008); Francis, Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State.
17
Leah N. Gordon, From Power to Prejudice: The Rise of Racial Individualism in Midcentury America
(University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2–3.
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of Education, documenting the breakdown of the “separate but equal” legal doctrine
through reliance on arguments rooted in these psychological and individualistic
explanations for racism and prejudice, without much consideration of the underlying
political-economic system.18
But this legal pathway was far from a foregone conclusion or inevitable path for
civil rights, which also underscores the need for broader and more entwined accounts of
racial and economic liberalism. Recent scholarship has taken a particular interest in
understanding the alternative legal paths, particularly those that included labor unions and
embraced broader critiques of the economic system. Legal historian Risa Goluboff
emphasizes that while Jim Crow was a pervasive and debilitating system for African
Americans, the subsequent dismantling of segregation in educational facilities and other
public accommodations did very little to change the economic opportunities available to
African Americans.19
Redistributive and economic rights-based arguments have always had difficulty
gaining traction in the courts. Goluboff and Sophia Z. Lee have shown that during the
1940s and 1950s, prominent racial advocacy organizations and government agencies
attempted to carve out constitutional protections for economic rights for African
Americans through the courts. Lee demonstrates that during those decades, the NAACP
devoted significant legal attention to workplace discrimination cases in the 1940s and

18

Risa Lauren Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2007), 4–6.
19
Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights; Risa Goluboff, “’Let Economic Equality Take Care of
Itself’: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s.,” UCLA Law Review
52 (2005): 1393–1486.

11

1950s instead of challenging the Plessy v. Ferguson separate-but-equal doctrine. It tried
to overturn the “state action” doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to create
more substantive constitutional protections for private employees. Lee argues that these
arguments were more substantive and materially consequential than civil rights activists’
campaign to desegregate public accommodations, as they aimed at securing “well-paying,
skilled jobs and a collective voice at work.”20
Goluboff also focuses on this legacy of employment discrimination cases that
predated Brown v. Board of Education and the legal attack on Jim Crow. Goluboff
highlights an alternative legal strategy to attack the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state
action” doctrine, which pressed for racial equality through a more expansive reading of
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude. The Civil Rights
Section of the Department of Justice pursued this Thirteenth Amendment strategy in the
1940s and 1950s. Along with a small group of legal scholars, Goluboff argues that
because these Thirteenth Amendment legal struggles encompassed both racial and
economic oppression, they were more reflective of the issues African Americans were
facing than those that only focused on desegregation in public accommodations.21

20
Acceptance of the “state action” doctrine resulted in Black workers having no constitutional or legal
recourse if they were excluded from labor unions and private employment. Sophia Z. Lee, “Hotspots in a
Cold War: The NAACP’s Postwar Labor Constitutionalism, 1948-1964 Vol. 26, Pp. 327-377, Summer
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However, both Lee and Goluboff ultimately conclude that these alternative legal
pathways and workplace discrimination cases were eclipsed by the attack on the separatebut-equal doctrine using the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1950s and 1960s.22 Their
focus on the NAACP’s critical role in crafting this new legal agenda is entirely
reasonable given its prominent role in the legal campaign. But the NAACP was far from
the only organization engaged in debates over how racial equality and economic change
should interact. In forging both its earlier and later legal strategies, the NAACP was in
coalition, and sometimes competition, with a range of other racial advocacy and labor
organizations.
These coalitions are not visible in court-based accounts, such as Goluboff’s and
Lee’s. In fact, the ascendance of the Fourteenth Amendment strategy and the attack on
segregation in public accommodations actually worked to drive a wedge between labor
and racial equality organizations. As legal historian Reuel Schiller and political scientist
Paul Frymer have both argued, employment discrimination and labor rights developed
into competing legal doctrines in the postwar period. Labor organizations wanted the law
to protect majoritarian governance, the principle that unions should operate based on the
will of the majority. Ensuring this principle was essential for challenging employers’
power and building a strong labor movement. But unions generally tried to resolve their
disputes outside the courts, which they perceived as a “malign influence” that aligned
with businesses interests more readily than labor. They also supported the establishment
22
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of federal agencies like the NLRB, which allowed for workplace disputes to be resolved
through arbitration involving both parties, and an arbiter agreed to by both sides.23
Employment discrimination law, on the other hand, was “profoundly
antimajoritarian” by nature. Many of these cases sought to challenged internal union
policies and collective bargaining agreements that disadvantaged Black workers but had
the support of the majority of union members. Frymer argues that the administrative
systems for resolving industrial disputes, primarily the National Labor Relations Board,
did not offer any vehicle for resolving workplace discrimination issues. Instead, the
NLRB adhered closely to the legislative intent of the NLRA to protect white, blue-collar
workers.24 It was precisely these issues, then, that dragged unions back into the courts and
away from administrative agencies designed to resolve disputes through adjustment
processes.25
Both Frymer and Schiller clearly demonstrate that while the courts came to serve
as effective battering rams against union practices of discrimination, their interventions
significantly weakened unions. For example, in the 1944 case Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Black workers who
brought suit against a discriminatory railway union. The case was a major victory in an
emergent civil rights’ legal agenda. But the case also became “a prolific source of
litigation in cases having nothing to do with race discrimination.” Instead, it became a
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tool for courts to supersede union autonomy and intervene in internal union affairs.26
Both scholars insist that there was not any sort of natural or inevitable divide between
labor and civil rights, but rather one that developed as the result of tactics adopted by
both labor and civil rights organizations in postwar battles. Frymer concludes that a
fragmented bureaucracy was incapable of dealing with workplace discrimination and
union integration, so the courts had no choice but to step in.
Thus, as the postwar liberal consensus developed, the legal system became
increasingly capable of addressing workplace discrimination, on the one hand, and
increasingly incapable of addressing economic inequality on the other. Successes in
combating racial discrimination in the workplace did not lead to more redistributive
politics. In fact, they weakened unions and the labor movement.27 But while the legal
frameworks that developed did not foster coalitions aimed at pursuing racial and
economic goals, this was not the case for the elected branches. Workplace discrimination
cases were just one aspect of racial advocacy organizations’ engagement with workplace
issues and industrial policy. The analysis that follows indicates that there was a range of
significant efforts to build civil rights and labor coalitions in legislative and
administrative battles over industrial policy in the 1930s and 1940s.
Racial and Social Democracy in Industrial Policy
Taking a broad view of the political contestation over efforts to secure racial and
economic equality, this dissertation draws upon the framework developed by political
26
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scientist Preston Smith II to describe two primary approaches to racial equality in
housing politics in the 1930s-1940s in Chicago. The first approach, what Smith calls
“racial democracy,” emphasized “equal access to housing aid and housing markets for
racial minorities.” The political projects contained in Schickler’s version of racial
liberalism in addition to the legal battles against segregation, which centered racial
discrimination and race-based exclusions and violence, fit within this description of
“racial democracy.” The second formulation Smith describes, “social democracy,”
focused on increasing broad access to decent housing that was not contingent on the
ability to pay for it. In other words, social democratic aims went beyond addressing
disparities and disproportionate access for African Americans and towards economic
restructuring as an essential part of racial equality.28 Recalling Abram Harris once more,
this second form aligns with his call for the NAACP and other racial advocacy
organizations to take a broader view of the structural economic issues affecting labor and
the working class as a whole in order to address the plight of both Black and white
workers.
According to Smith, efforts to secure racial or social democracy are not
necessarily antagonistic. For example, he finds that the two often “work well (and work
best) in tandem” in the case of housing policy. However, the failure to make analytical
distinctions between the two, particularly when one goal is sacrificed for the other, can
lead to “policy catastrophe.” Critically, the assumption that eliminating racial
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discrimination would end class stratification in housing led to a “flawed approach to
housing provision” and a limited policy response.29
Smith’s typology of racial and social democracy is a fruitful starting point for an
exploration of the contours of racial and social democratic approaches to the development
of industrial policy in the 1930s and 1940s. In this period, some racial advocacy
organizations made racial democracy their central focus by opposing discrimination in
employment. They frequently advocated for fair employment and anti-discrimination
clauses to be placed in New Deal legislation, like the National Labor Relations Act and
the Social Security Act. They argued that these provisions should be applied to the
federal government, employers, and labor unions alike. However, as the opening
anecdote indicates, others argued that racial advocacy organizations should push for
federal jobs programs, full employment, and greater protections for labor unions to
change the balance of power between labor and capital. These two competing visions
were actively debated within and among racial advocacy organizations during the 1930s
and 1940s. The question of where to put organizations’ energy and political weight was a
matter of great debate and disagreement. Many organizations and individual leaders
changed their views and positions on which efforts to pursue based on changing political
circumstances.
The crucial element that this dissertation explores is whether they viewed labor
unions as partners or opponents. Differences in perceptions of trade unions affected how
racial advocacy organizations were weighing the racial and social democratic approaches.
29
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Racial democratic efforts frequently positioned organized labor as a target rather than an
ally – highlighting the racially exclusionary dimensions of hiring practices, seniority
rules, and auxiliary union structures that excluded Black workers. Those committed to a
more social democratic approach called for broader protections (rather than restrictions)
for workers and unions, in addition to broader public works and employment programs.
These efforts led racial advocacy organizations to see their fates aligned with labor.
During the 1930s and 1940s, there was consistent tension among and within racial
advocacy organizations and unions in balancing anti-discrimination goals with broader
structural economic change. These debates raised important strategic and tactical
questions, especially in response to changing political circumstances. But they were
rooted in different ideological and political-economic commitments within and among
these organizations.
Existing accounts that have come closest to describing these debates have focused
mostly on the efforts to secure fair employment, particularly during World War II
through the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Political sociologist Anthony
Chen connects the development of affirmative action policy in the 1960s to the fight for
fair employment in the middle of the twentieth century. Fair employment, which sought
“equal treatment of individuals in the labor market,” was very different from the courtbased regulatory system that relied on written plans for integration and “factual
predicates” of discrimination rather than concrete incidents of exclusion. But Chen’s
central claim, which is very much in line with this account, is that the emergence of
court-based affirmative action was not an inevitable conclusion. Instead, he traces
18

important fair employment struggles, including the national FEPC and state-level
equivalents, to explore how this alternative mode of social regulation worked.30 Chen
attends more closely to these political developments than Frymer, who argues that the
FEPC had limited long-term effects on political development for labor and civil rights.31
However, consistent with the view of racial liberalism as contained to a narrow
set of race-specific issues, Chen’s account does not contextualize the fair employment
fights within the broader landscape of racial and economic justice struggles. Most
critically, he does not include a robust consideration of the role played by labor unions. In
his conclusion, Chen argues that unions failed to make a more concerted push for social
democratic policy. Yet, their role in supporting, and at times limiting, the work of fair
employment is underexplored. This project considers fair employment and the FEPC into
the context of industrial policy more broadly. Further, parting ways with both Chen and
Frymer, this account also highlights the coalitional politics of the legislative and
bureaucratic pathways for labor and civil rights. While Frymer and Chen both point to the
fractured and dispersed federal authority over fair employment in the 1940s as a
weakness, the legislative and administrative pathways also created more opportunities for
viable coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and labor unions than in the courts.
Consistent with Smith’s conclusion, it was not that the case that racial and social
democratic political efforts were incompatible. In fact, during these decades, the most
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promising and fruitful coalitions were built through legislative and administrative action
around efforts to secure both racial and social democratic change. However, the
possibility for clearer and more decisive action through the courts in response to issues of
racial discrimination in employment ultimately shifted racial advocacy organizations’
attention to legal battles that focused more squarely on racial democratic goals. Frymer
argues that court intervention was necessary because segregation and discrimination
issues were rampant in organized labor, even in the more progressive unions. The
fragmented bureaucratic system was ill-equipped, according to Frymer, to force
integration in unions.32
This assessment of organized labor speaks to a broad literature examining civil
rights and labor unionism. Scholars like Frymer argue that federal intervention was
necessary because labor unions were unable or unwilling to push integration within their
own ranks. Some have argued that this resistance to change racial policies within labor
unions resulted from white workers’ racial attitudes. According to historian David
Roediger, the working class developed in tandem with a “sense of whiteness,” which
meant that white workers’ racial affinities effectively cut off organizing efforts that could
have built a broad cross-racial working class.33 The instances of Jim Crow segregation
that Roediger and other scholars in this vein have pointed to are not in question. Others
have challenged the transhistorical framework Roediger develops based on his
accounting for the Civil War and the antebellum period.
32

Frymer, 46.
David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class, New
Edition (London: Verso, 2007), 7.
33

20

As articulated by political scientist Cedric Johnson, the primary problem with
Roediger’s framework is that it perpetuates the falsehood that “racial affinity is
synonymous with political constituency.” Roediger’s framework implies that no further
parsing of historical circumstance is necessary to conclude that white workers’ racial
identification has and will continue to hinder interracial organizing efforts.34 Specific
instances of successful cross-racial organizing efforts in specific union locals in the 1930s
and 1940s also seem to disprove Roediger’s framework. Robert Korstad and Nelson
Lichtenstein’s examination of civil rights struggles in union locals and communities
provide examples of such organizing and alliances, especially on the shop floor.35
Further, a study of contemporary racial attitudes of union members by political scientists
Paul Frymer and Jacob Grumbach finds that union membership and affiliation are
associated with significantly lower levels of racial resentment among white workers than
their non-union counterparts.36 Thus, the successes of these efforts should cast doubt on
both the accuracy, and utility, of Roediger’s transhistorical framework.
Further, accounts of the significant failures of mass, interracial organizing efforts,
most prominently Operation Dixie in the South, also indicate that the prejudice of
individual white workers, or even groups of white workers, was not the central or only
cause. Political scientist Michael Goldfield argues that the CIO rightly understood the
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South to be key to transforming the nation’s political-economic framework and launched
the Operation Dixie campaign in 1946 in order to organize masses of Black and white
workers in key Southern industries. The CIO’s failure in Operation Dixie, Goldfield
argues, was due to the insufficient resources committed to the project and strategic
miscalculations and priorities. While challenges organizing workers along racial lines and
opposition from adherents to Jim Crow segregation were partly to blame, the failure of
Operation Dixie cannot be solely explained by white hostility to interracial organizing.37
Similarly, historian Kevin Boyle argues that the reason the UAW-CIO failed to
build a cross-class multiracial, working-class coalition was not because it lacked the
vision or commitment to civil rights. Rather, it was because of “the complex interaction
between labor’s goals and the context in which they were pursued,” and the distance
“between what labor wanted and what it could achieve.”38 In short, these accounts
provide compelling explanations for the failures of the interracial organizing efforts that
were shaped by specific political context and circumstances and could not be explained
solely as the result of the affinities of white workers.
My account includes some consideration of the South and the particularities of its
political-economy. However, it does not place the failure of Operation Dixie nor any of
the successes of CIO organizing efforts at the center of the story, although those
narratives are instructive for better understanding the formation of those particular labor
coalitions. Instead, my analysis points to another important reason why the actions and
37
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decisions of labor hampered the formation of durable coalitions of organized labor and
racial advocacy organizations. Over the course of national industrial policy development
in the 1930s and 1940s, the leadership of both the AFL and CIO became increasingly
resistant to government interference in collective bargaining. This included federal efforts
to integrate union locals or otherwise implement anti-discrimination provisions within
unions, but their objection was not expressly discriminatory. Instead, it was part of an
effort to preserve unions’ autonomy over their internal functions. Organized labor was
one of the forces that increasingly pushed against efforts to promote a corporatist or
tripartite system of industrial relations in the United States. The government would have
been a much more active mediator of industrial disputes. Instead, the state, pressured by
labor unions, increasingly retreated to a less active convener and facilitator role.39
The dissertation draws on these accounts of efforts to build interracial alliances in
locals and unions to develop an analysis of the interactions between civil rights and labor
activists in national political institutions during the New Deal and postwar period.40 The
focus is not on how particular integration efforts worked on the shop floor but on how
those experiences and others trickled up to influence coordination and collaboration
between labor unions and racial advocacy organizations in industrial policy debates at the
national level. The entrance of the CIO created many more opportunities for Black
39
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workers to join unions. But the competition between the AFL and CIO, in addition to the
fact that both associations chose to prioritize their autonomy in collective bargaining,
ultimately hindered their ability to build alliances with racial advocacy organizations.
The resulting narrative should not be seen as privileging class over race or
developing a romantic portrayal of the lost possibility of interracial organizing in the
1930s and 1940s. Instead, this analysis explores the contexts in which labor unions and
racial advocacy organizations sometimes worked together and were sometimes at cross
purposes in this period. The set of factors that caused these alliances to break down
resulted in a weakened labor movement and a civil rights movement rooted in the courts.
These dual developments are evident through an examination of the concrete debates
over policies and agencies and the strategic and ideological positions unions and racial
advocacy organizations staked out.
Chapter Overview
To sketch this broader argument, what follows is an overview of the key
developments in industrial policy that frame the changes in New Deal and postwar
liberalism and how racial advocacy groups and labor unions approached issues of
discrimination and economic transformation as part of a social democratic coalition. This
account joins a large body of scholars who have considered the contours and durability of
the New Deal political order and extends this literature by analyzing how coalitions of
racial advocacy organizations and trade unions were operating in this context.
Opening with the economic collapse that caused the Great Depression, coupled
with the partisan shift in power with the 1932 election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the
24

next three chapters analyze the rupture created that ushered in a new set of politicaleconomic ideas to emerge in the mainstream of political debates. These were new ideas
about the extent to which the government should intervene in the economy resulted in
major changes to economic and industrial policy during the first and second waves of
New Deal lawmaking in 1933 and 1935. Debates over who should be the focus of these
major changes involved labor and racial advocacy organizations. This economic
liberalism became the foundation of a new Democratic Party, which led to significant
partisan change, both in terms of ideology and political constituency, and a new political
order that lasted, in some form, until Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980.41 The major
industrial policies and programs implemented in the 1930s and 1940s, and the responses
by trade unions and racial advocacy organizations, are considered in the chapters
summarized below develop this argument more fully.42
Chapter Two sets the stage by describing how racial advocacy organizations were
considering racial and social democratic approaches on the eve of the New Deal
transformation. It analyzes key debates among racial advocacy organizations that
informed their early interactions with the New Deal transformations in industrial policy.
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Most centrally, there were tensions between those who argued that organizations
committed to racial justice should be focusing on issues particular to African Americans
(“special grievances”) and those who thought the target of racial equality work should be
the economic conditions that structured many forms of inequality. On multiple occasions,
racial advocacy organizations, social welfare organizations, and political parties (like the
Communist and Socialist Parties) convened in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s to consider
these options.
Many promoted a way forward for racial justice organizing that focused on
building closer alliances with organized labor in order to challenge the economic system.
At one such meeting of the Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR), some
participants argued that the “special grievances” approach was fading in favor of the
economic focus. The fact that representatives of organized labor were not part of these
early convenings reveals some of the sources of tension between these approaches, and
how best to address the exclusion of Black workers from many trade unions was a
frequent topic of debate. These tensions left open the question of whether the sorts of
interracial, cross-class alliances that some racial advocacy organizations were promoting
could actually represent an effective alternative to focusing on discrimination,
segregation, and the “special grievances” of African Americans.
Chapter Three examines how the debates outlined in Chapter Two informed racial
advocacy organizations’ interventions in discussions over competing visions of industrial
and economic policy as part of the first wave of New Deal policy-making in 1933 and the
implementation of those policies. These debates highlighted the barriers that Black
26

workers still had face in order to join many labor unions, but some promising avenues
opened up for future coalition-building. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
and the accompanying agency, the National Recovery Administration (NRA), were the
first and most significant attempts to enact broad industrial planning.43 For the most part,
the industrial planning enabled by these acts failed, and the vision for specific code
boards to set standards for wages, hours, and pricing for particular industries led to a
chaotic and fragmented structure.44 This chapter examines one particular consequence of
these fragmented code boards: the ongoing efforts of representatives of major industries,
like cotton textiles, to exclude categories of workers from the NRA’s workplace
protections. The National Negro Congress (NNC), an early left alliance of racial
advocacy organizations and labor, challenged these exclusions using a combination of
racial and social democratic arguments.
The debates over the NRA’s cotton textile board’s codes provide early evidence
that racial advocacy organizations and labor unions could coalesce around a shared vision
and resist conservative arguments to limit industrial protections for workers. For
employers, these exclusions represented a means to divide workers, prevent the
establishment of universal labor standards, and limit the scope of labor law. Exclusions
were typically directed at the most vulnerable and disadvantaged workers, which meant
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that Black workers were frequently excluded. But attributing these exclusions only to
racial prejudice obscures how these types of exclusions (including the ways in which they
adhered to racial prejudices and the Jim Crow system in the South) were one of many
tactics employers used to oppose and limit New Deal policies that sought to protect
labor—recognizing the importance of this issue, organized labor sided with the NNC in
opposing worker exclusions, espousing a vision in favor of universal labor protections.
The second agency considered in this chapter is the Public Works Administration
(PWA), which represented a less dominant thread of New Deal political-economic
thought. It created a set of public works programs that could stimulate the economy
through deficit-spending and job creation.45 The PWA was one of the first agencies to
explicitly use the federal government to break down barriers to entry for Black workers
seeking employment. These efforts were led by Harold Ickes, a former executive of the
Chicago NAACP, and Robert Weaver, who had one foot in Ickes’ office and the other in
the National Negro Congress (NNC). Weaver was an important and influential member
of Roosevelt’s Black cabinet. Ickes instituted a quota system to ensure the hiring of Black
workers for a relatively small number of construction projects, which had limited shortterm but little lasting success. However, the experiment with quotas in the PWA sparked
debate among many racial advocacy organizations. They voiced different perspectives on
whether quotas were a viable instrument for promoting racial equity and considered
whether the federal government could be an effective partner in working towards that
goal. However, the PWA did not offer an opportunity for racial advocacy organizations
45
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to build closer ties with organized labor in part because its focus was on the AFL craftbased building trades that had some of the most intractable barriers to admitting Black
members.46
The lessons of the NRA and PWA, for both racial advocacy organizations and
labor unions, were carried forward into the next phase of New Deal political
development. Chapter Four moves back to the legislative arena, considering two major
developments in industrial policy that were part of the second wave of New Deal
legislation in 1934 and 1935. These were the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act
and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. These acts, and the massive organizing they
sparked, increased Black membership in unions by fivefold.47 Racial advocacy
organizations, informed by their experiences with the PWA and NRA, advanced a variety
of different ideological and strategic positions in debates with regard to the passage and
implementation of these laws. Again, a critical point of contention that divided these
organizations was whether they cast trade unions as allies or opponents. The NAACP and
NUL pressed a racial democratic anti-discrimination line, framing unions as the target of
policy intervention and calling for the government to make more explicit provisions
against discriminatory trade unions. Others, like the Communist Party (CPUSA) and
allied organizations, decried the NLRA and trade unions for acquiescing to, rather than
challenging capitalism in ways that hurt working Americans, including Black Americans.
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These groups also criticized the AFL for its craft-based organizing approach, which left
industrial and Black workers on the sidelines.
A. Philip Randolph took a different approach to the union question, which created
considerable distance from the CPUSA and other left tendencies. As the leader of the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), Randolph aligned with other railway
unions in debates over the Railway Labor Act amendments. Further, the BSCP, under
Randolph’s leadership, pursued a more accommodationist strategy by affiliating with the
national AFL, despite discriminatory practices among many AFL locals. Thus, in this
period, the discriminatory practices of some labor unions continued to challenge
coalition-building; nonetheless, new legislative and organizing opportunities helped
materialize some coalitions and partnerships among racial advocacy organizations and
trade unions.
Another example of coalition-building emerged in debates over the creation of
social welfare programs in Social Security Act of 1935, which is the final subject of
Chapter Four. Many of the programs this act created were tied to employment in ways
that, once again, led to exclusions. Efforts to develop an unemployment insurance
package sparked especially intense debate. Several scholars have explored how these
programs adhered to, and in some cases exacerbated, existing racial, gender, and nativist
divisions.48 However, less often noted are the ways that the principles of anti-
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discrimination and racial inclusion were components of a broader push for a more
progressive alternative to the SSA: the Lundeen bill. Among other things, the Lundeen
bill proposed a much more robust federally financed and administered unemployment
insurance program than the SSA, which delegated significant authority to the states to
administer the new programs. This coalition backing the proposed bill included the
Communist Party, the National Urban League, and rank-and-file unionists from within
the AFL. It was an early example of an interracial coalition formed to advance racial
equality as part of a broader social-democratic agenda.
Chapter Five considers the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, the last
piece of industrial policy in the New Deal era. The context for the debate over this
legislation was the economic crisis in 1937 and 1938, which in some ways rivaled that of
the Great Depression just five years prior, and resulted in an increased interest among
many New Dealers in using the FLSA to “harmonize” the economy, and particularly
industrial relations.49 Proponents of the bill spoke to their interest in a version of
associationalism or corporatism, wherein the government played an active role in
mediating and stabilizing the interactions between business and labor.50 In addition,
organized labor, particularly the major labor associations, the AFL and the newly-formed
CIO, were resistant to some of the expansions of the administrative state proposed in the
initial bill. While labor unions had been broadly supportive of the federal agencies
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created to handle industrial disputes under the RLA and NLRA, they had become
increasingly concerned about federal expansion into collective bargaining, which they
saw as a threat to their autonomy. The efforts of employers and industrialists to extend
and expand classes of worker exclusions to limit labor protections under the NIRA and
NRA was another major source of tension in the debates over the FLSA. With regard to
this issue, both racial advocacy organizations and organized labor resisted these
exclusions, arguing once again for a more universalist conception of labor law.
World War II was another massive political-economic rupture, creating
opportunities for those pushing for both economic planning and racial equality. Chapter
Six considers how these opportunities played out in administrative politics. To support
the war efforts, the federal government implemented price controls and worked to curb
industrial unrest and strikes during the war period, primarily through the War Labor
Relations Board and Office of Price Administration. These actions represented the most
significant efforts at industrial planning up to that point.51 Meanwhile, racial advocacy
organizations, seizing an opportunity presented by the war, pressed for fair employment
in the massively expanding war industries. A new organization headed by A. Philip
Randolph, the March on Washington Movement (MOWM), pressured the president into
creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) through executive order.
This chapter analyzes the changing coalitional politics that resulted from
establishing the MOWM and the two most prominent cases before the FEPC, focused on
the shipbuilders union on the West coast (the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers)
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and the Southern railroad industry. These two cases dealt with discrimination within the
labor movement. They targeted particular unions, leading to tensions in efforts to forge
labor and racial advocacy alliances in defining and supporting the work of the FEPC. In
the context of the broader attacks from conservatives on the work of the FEPC, however,
racial advocacy organizations and labor unions (particularly the CIO) rallied behind the
agency and pressed Roosevelt to maintain his commitment to fair employment. At the
same time, however, under Randolph’s leadership, the MOWM moved away from the
interracial organizing efforts that had been the model in the 1930s, restricting
membership in the organization to Blacks, and pushing out communist sympathizers and
radicals. Labor and racial advocacy organizations united in opposition to conservatives
seeking to destroy the FEPC. However, the ultimate resolution of the southern railroad
case in the courts foreshadowed the emergence and prominence of a litigation-based
strategy for civil rights that was not built on collaboration with organized labor. Even so,
it was not the end of racial advocacy organization’s struggle for economic justice.
The United States emerged from the war as the world’s leading economic power.
Both business and labor were anxious to be rid of those wartime constraints on strike
activity and prices. But many New Deal liberals were worried that conversion to a
peacetime economy would lead to another economic collapse. The swell of soldiers
reentering the workforce could lead to a surge in unemployment. Similarly, lifting price
controls could lead to a massive spike in inflation. There were efforts to translate this
concern into policy that would fulfill the social-democratic promise of the New Deal,
most notably in efforts to pass the Full Employment bill in 1945. Chapter Seven analyzes
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this bill and attempts to create a more robust role for government in promoting and
managing a full employment economy. The strongest advocates for government
strategies to promote full employment were liberal and labor organizations, including
many racial advocacy organizations. The goal of full employment was at the center of a
social-democratic agenda that included national healthcare and public housing programs,
a higher minimum wage, and some civil rights commitments. However, the resulting bill
was much more limited than the social-democratic reformers had hoped and reflected a
weakened version of New Deal liberalism.52 As proponents insisted throughout
Congressional debates, the bill did not actually create any jobs. Rather, it created
mechanisms for the federal government to support private sector employment. It was a
far cry from the direct federal investment in jobs programs during the New Deal. But
even in this watered down-form, the Full Employment bill and other efforts to press
forward social-democratic policy failed.
The first reason for the declining strength of a more robust social democratic
policy agenda in the postwar period was external conditions. The ominous warnings
about skyrocketing unemployment failed to materialize, which reduced the urgency for
measures to promote full employment. The second critical reason was that the consensus
or median position of New Deal Democrats had consolidated around a much milder
version of economic liberalism than that of the social democratic coalition. This new
consensus supported a less progressive tax system, a diminished welfare state, less robust
minimum wage laws, and significantly less union political power than the more left
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representatives of the New Deal labor movement and racial advocacy organizations had
envisioned.53 The more centrist New Dealers pushed for the final version of the Full
Employment bill, which contained much weaker promises to commit federal power and
resources to unemployment programs.
Racial advocacy organizations joined with labor unions, religious, and other
social welfare organizations to push for the Full Employment bill. This was the clearest
crystallization of a coalition committed to a social-democratic program including full
employment, union and worker protections, broader social insurance programs, and many
other elements of a centrally planned economy. However, this coalition was most
ideologically united at the precise moment it was most politically vulnerable. In the mid1940s, the dramatic partisan realignment that was well underway left this social
democratic coalition vulnerable to conservative assaults on central planning and
collective bargaining rights in the courts, Congress, and executive branches. Opponents
of both the social democratic coalition and the ascendant centrist New Deal liberals
began to cohere around a new strategy to roll back the New Deal state. In debates over
the Full Employment bill, large corporations and conservative members of Congress
argued that by codifying a set of unfair labor practices for employers but not unions, the
Wagner Act had created an unequal system of industrial relations, and unions were
getting “special privileges.”
These attacks took center stage in debates over the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,
which is the focus of Chapter Eight. Under the guise of “equalizing” the version of
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industrial relations created by the Wagner Act and bolstered by Republican victories in
the 1946 midterm elections, conservatives mounted a legal, administrative, and
legislative assault on collective bargaining rights. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
significantly curtailed unions’ political power. Most significantly, the law made the
closed shop illegal and outlawed a variety of strike and pressure tactics that had been
labor’s primary sources of power in negotiations with management. It also shifted major
disputes in industrial relations back to the courts. Truman and the New Deal coalition
failed to fulfill the 1948 campaign promise of overturning the law, meaning that TaftHartley remained (and remains) the standard for industrial relations signals. This signaled
a critical political and ideological shift. Racial advocacy organizations, particularly the
NAACP and the BSCP, joined organized labor in opposing Taft-Hartley and pressed for
its repeal in the following years. Senator Taft and other conservatives attempted to
generate Black support for the law by arguing that the prohibition of the closed shop
would make it more difficult for unions to discriminate against workers. The NAACP’s
labor department, in particular, was very public in opposing this characterization.
Despite consistent efforts by the social democratic coalition and campaign
promises by Democratic presidential and congressional members in subsequent years,
opponents of Taft-Hartley lacked both the strength and the political will to forge a new
standard of industrial policy. And despite the efforts of racial advocacy organizations to
oppose Taft-Hartley, following this episode, many organizations shifted their focus to
legal strategies that challenged segregation in public accommodations instead of securing
jobs and broader economic change. This work did not lend itself to collaboration with
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labor unions and, in many cases, served to divide the interests of these two groups. One
of the major consequences of the postwar realignments in the New Deal democratic
consensus plus conservative attacks was that the locus of both labor and civil rights fights
shifted back to the courts – to a terrain where legal doctrines were at odds. The individual
rights-based claims could be made much more seamlessly in the courts, and to greater
effect than the messy, chaotic work or long-term coalition building to effect legislative or
administrative change.
While Democratic Party rule continued beyond the late 1940s, the failure to enact
a real full employment measure in 1946 coupled with the staggering defeat organized
labor suffered in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 show that not only had conservative
opponents launched a national offensive but that the liberal impulse had moved a great
deal from these social democratic reformers’ vision.54 The conclusion (Chapter Nine)
includes a brief consideration of how the Great Society’s focus on poverty, and
particularly Black poverty, relied on opaque assessments of broader industrial and
economic policy that ultimately did very little to foster coalition-building among racial
advocacy organizations and labor unions.55
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CHAPTER 2: CONTESTED RACIAL POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL ORDER
In 1936, the prominent Black economist John P. Davis made a provocative
statement about the state of African Americans in the U.S. economy by claiming that
“today we find ourselves subject as other groups of workers and farmers, to economic
exploitation within a capitalist nation, but as well doubly exploited because of the
accident of race.”56 Davis was advancing a structural economic interpretation of racial
inequality that treated racial inequality as the result of the capitalist system, and racial
prejudice and discrimination as a secondary or double disadvantage. Further, he thought
racial inequality should be addressed through political efforts at worker organizing, the
trade union movement, and broader economic change. But in this period, this node of
racial equality politics was in tension with two other tendencies: Black separatism and the
legal campaign against segregation. Analyzing the debates among these competing
visions as they played out in the NAACP and a new organization, the Joint Committee on
National Recovery (JCNR), underlines the importance of the structural economic
interpretation for early organizational development and for framing interventions into
New Deal policy-making debates.57
This chapter outlines several critical moments in the 1930s when an emergent
group of racial equality organizations were debating these various nodes of Black
politics. The debates highlighted here begin before the Great Depression and continue
into the early years of the New Deal transformation and are critical to understanding how
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racial advocacy organizations were navigating the political developments of that period.
Examination of this period and this vision for an economic-based civil rights movement
has led to the development of a literature examining a “Long Civil Rights Movement.”
These accounts have enriched an understanding of struggles for racial equality in these
early decades. They have also challenged interpretations that treat the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s as something that appeared out of thin air.58 However,
critics of the “Long Civil Rights” formulation have argued that it has tended to flatten the
differences in political orientation among different groups, reducing these efforts into a
homogenous movement and blurring the distinctions between organizations involved.59
Organizations like the NAACP, one of the most prominent racial advocacy
organizations of the twentieth century, loom large in accounts of this period, primarily
because of their prominence in later organizing efforts. This is not to suggest that the
NAACP did not play a critical role in this period. In fact, this account will begin by
considering how debates over the structural economic approach to racial equality politics
were being debated within the NAACP. Between 1930 and 1935, the NAACP convened
two major conferences with other racial advocacy organizations, the First and Second
Amenia Conferences, and produced two internal reports, the Margold and Harris Reports.
These events reveal that tensions over the structural economic, separatist, and
segregationist approaches animated extensive discussions over the future of the
organization and of racial equality politics more broadly.
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Further, this chapter also documents these currents of this debate outside the
NAACP, broadening this examination to include other organizations that were engaged in
debates over how best to promote racial equality. Early experiences under the New Deal
led to the formation of the Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR), which later
became the National Negro Congress. In 1935, a convening of racial advocacy
organizations, social welfare organizations, and left-oriented political parties came
together to consider how they could use the New Deal rupture to advance the cause for
racial equality. Their discussions covered a wide range of topics, but the most important
elements of the convening concerned the tensions among the structural economic,
separatist, and segregationist approaches.
Existing scholarly accounts have argued that racial advocacy organizations
primarily sought to amend New Deal legislation to include anti-discrimination provisions
that would eliminate racial disparities in new programs.60 But the JCNR debates highlight
that racial advocacy organizations were also deeply enmeshed in broader conversations
about the underlying economic systems that were shifting during the New Deal period.
Understanding the contours of the JCNR debates and the resulting influence on the
National Negro Congress, which developed out of it, foreshadow the ways that racial
advocacy organizations went on to intervene in debates over New Deal policy, which will
be the subject of Chapters Three, Four, and Five. The JCNR focused on developing
strategies that could advance Black and other vulnerable workers’ position and change
the fundamental organization of the economy in the of the New Deal.
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A Radical Vision for the NAACP
In 1916, just after Booker T. Washington’s death, W.E.B. Du Bois and NAACP
Legal Committee chair Arthur Spingarn invited Black leaders from around the country to
come together and try to unify an agenda for racial equality. For Du Bois and Spingarn,
Washington’s death created a vacuum and opportunity to “bring out tremendous elements
of strength into a more…solid structure.” Spingarn hosted this First Amenia Conference
at his estate near Amenia, New York. The meeting did not produce any concrete
proposals or consequences for the NAACP, or the other organizations involved; there
were not even any published documents or takeaways from the meeting.61 But the
meeting did set the stage for major debates within the organization in the next several
decades, leading into the New Deal period. These debates highlighted key ideological and
strategic differences in racial politics in the early twentieth century.
Washington and the Tuskegee Institute he created were examples of one node of
this racial politics, focused on racial uplift and accomodationism.62 But during this period,
support for Washington’s vision for harmonious race relations through accommodation
was fading. As head of the Black separatist movement, Marcus Garvey argued that
economic advancement for Black Americans would only be possible if African
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Americans set up their own channels of economic development.63 Du Bois, then an
NAACP Board member and editor of the NAACP’s magazine The Crisis, became
increasingly sympathetic to this position during this period. Others within the NAACP
were working to develop an NAACP legal strategy that would challenge, rather than
accommodate, segregation. They sought to document and challenge disparities and
inequities in access to public accommodations, largely by developing a strategy to
confront the Plessy v. Ferguson separate-but-equal doctrine directly.64 Related to their
legal campaign, the NAACP was also engaged in a competition with the Communist
Party (CPUSA) over the representation of the Scottsboro Boys, a famous case in
Alabama where eight young men were put on trial for the alleged rape of two young
white women.65
One final node of racial politics, which will be explored in this chapter, pressed
for more social-democratic change and called for strong partnerships with organized
labor to radically transform the economic system. While existing scholarship has
generated robust accounts of many of these nodes of racial politics, less attention has
been paid to this final set of political projects. Further, while existing accounts have
focused on other efforts and their consequences and failures, the ideological tensions
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those efforts revealed have not been documented as closely. The different nodes of racial
politics discussed above represented more than strategic differences and priorities; they
reflected different interpretations and approaches to racial equality. As the NAACP was
considering the structure and focus of the organization moving forward, it was also
deeply enmeshed in a debate over how and whether to incorporate labor and a more
social-democratic vision for the organization.
1932 NAACP Annual Meeting
In 1932, the NAACP was in the midst of many organizational transitions, many of
which were debated during that year’s Annual Meeting. The organization was feeling the
effects of the Great Depression very acutely, with dwindling membership and finances
leading to difficult conversations about the organization’s priorities. Most importantly,
Walter White was appointed to be the Executive Secretary of the organization in 1931, a
role he held until 1955. White’s first test came just a month after being appointed when
the organization intervened in the volatile Scottsboro case. The case brought the NAACP
into direct conflict with the Communist Party, with both groups vying to represent the
nine young Black men accused of raping two white women in Scottsboro, Alabama. The
initial shoddy defense and hasty convictions of all the defendants led both the NAACP
and the International Labor Defense (ILD), the Communist Party’s legal arm, to fight to
represent the young men in their legal appeals. Ultimately, the ILD secured the right to
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represent the defendants, and the entire episode put the NAACP on the defensive in terms
of its position as the leading racial advocacy organization of the time.66
These major changes meant that the 1932 Annual Meeting involved significant
conversations about the future of the organization. It was a time of great transition for the
organization. Most centrally, the meeting featured a discussion of a new report
concerning the NAACP’s legal strategy (the Margold Report), a public critique of the
organization by Du Bois, and a call for another Amenia-style conference.
The Margold Report was written by a white attorney Nathan Margold, a former
U.S. attorney and protégé of Felix Frankfurter (who would be Supreme Court Justice
from 1939 until 1962). The NAACP received a grant from the Garland Fund to explore
an equalization campaign against segregation, and Margold was appointed to draft a
report outlining the legal options and feasibility of such a campaign. Equalization
represented a somewhat milder challenge against segregation, seeking to secure equal
funds rather than challenge separate-but-equal on its merit. Margold submitted a lengthy
draft to the NAACP in May of 1931, which was also discussed at the 1932 Annual
Conference. The report documented disparities in public accommodations, particularly in
transportation, housing, and education. Margold focused primarily on education, arguing
that it held the most potential for a legal campaign targeting segregation. In the report, he
laid out a “fresh and innovative” approach to challenging the “separate-but-equal”
doctrine in education, which became the NAACP’s blueprint for its legal work.
Importantly, Margold’s report did not recommend the equalization approach, which the
66
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Garland Fund had requested. Instead, he argued that there was a political opportunity for
a direct assault on the separate-but-equal doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson.67
But Margold stopped short of proposing a clear and concrete set of actions that
should spring from his recommendations in the report. The person who made the most
explicit argument for a path forward for the legal campaign was Charles Houston, the
dean of Howard Law School. He laid out a more concrete set of next steps for the legal
campaign, most centrally stating that the “black lawyer was central to the next phase of
the movement.” Houston took up this mantle and began to recruit a new crop of Black
lawyers to the NAACP.68
The conflict with the ILD and the tensions over the Margold Report reflected
internal divisions within the organization. While scholars like Sullivan and Tushnet have
classified these divisions as more strategic than ideological, the 1932 meeting also
featured undercurrents of ideological divisions in the organization that would become
more prominent in the following years. Around this time, figures like Du Bois were
beginning to push these ideological fissures to the fore. From his position as Director of
Publications and Research and Editor of the NAACP’s journal The Crisis, Du Bois gave
a controversial speech at the 1932 Annual Meeting, “What is Wrong with the NAACP,”
in which he raised several critiques of the organization and called for a redirection of
efforts, programs, and resources. Du Bois argued that the organization suffered from a
“highbrowism” that had manifested in an emphasis on the Black middle-class and no
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attention to salient class divisions among African Americans. This focus on the middleclass, according to Du Bois, also led to an outsized focus on civil rights battles over
struggles over labor. He argued that the organization needed to acknowledge these class
divisions and decide whether it stood with the “privileged aristocracy of the world, which
by its ownership and monopoly of capital is controlling the political and social
development of the masses of men,” or with working people seeking to forge a “new
industrial democracy” which would “direct the division of wealth in accordance with the
wants and wishes of those who create it.”69
According to historian Beth Tompkins Bates, “complaints like Du Bois' expressed
the views of a minority within the organization who questioned the NAACP's mission
and agenda and tried to get the old guard to wean themselves off their dependency on
white patronage.”70 This assessment aligns with Houston’s call for a dedicated legal team
of Black lawyers and suggests that the racial politics of the organization itself were in
flux. But Du Bois was also drawing out deeper ideological differences among the
leadership of the organization. By drawing attention to class differences among African
Americans and focusing on a new form of industrial democracy, Du Bois makes clear
that the organization was divided between visions of racial and social democracy. These
significant questions and debates were important for deciding the direction of the
organization.
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At that point in time, Du Bois’s assessment of the need for a more economic,
class-based view of the struggles among African Americans led him to embrace a version
of Black self-determination which sought accommodation to the segregationist system.
Du Bois’s endorsement of segregation to the extent that it would improve black’s
economic position pushed the issue to the fore of the NAACP’s agenda.71 However, his
endorsement of this idea had also prompted criticism from the left flank, including one of
his former proteges George Streator.72
The Second Amenia Conference
One final result of the 1932 Annual Conference was that continued debate over
the direction of the organization and racial equality organizing more broadly sparked
calls for a second conference in the style of Spingarn’s 1916 Amenia Conference.73 The
meeting was hosted, once again, by the NAACP’s Legal Committee, led by Joel
Spingarn. This Second Amenia Conference had a clearer mandate to connect the
problems of African Americans to broader national problems.74 It also highlighted the
growing belief, which had been articulated by Du Bois in 1932, that racial oppression
was best understood as a consequence of economic exploitation, a view that fused
elements of racial and social democracy. Attendees of the meeting included Ralph
Bunche, Sterling Brown, Abram Harris, and Charles Houston from Howard University,
Frances Williams and Anna Arnold from the YWCA, Juanita Jackson from the Young
71
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People’s Forum, and leaders of the National Urban League and NAACP. As Sullivan
called them, “the epitome of the ‘talented tenth.’”75 But the conference also included a
younger cadre of recent college graduates that the NAACP was frequently accused of
excluding.76
Scholars have shown that many participants in the meeting “argued that race
leaders had focused too narrowly on the so-called Negro question, leading them to
overlook the relationship between the poor working conditions thrust upon AfroAmericans and ‘black economic social and psychological depression.’”77 Further,
participants “called for an alliance between middle-class leaders and working-class black
Americans and an end to reliance on white patronage.” But the conference, once again,
stopped short of setting a clear agenda.78 Sullivan argues that this resulted from the
younger participants’ lack of knowledge about what the NAACP had done and their
desire to “junk the old policies” without a clear vision for what to replace.79
The continued friction over organization’s future direction, among other issues,
ultimately did have one clear consequence: Du Bois left his post as head of The Crisis
and member of the board in 1934. At the June 1934 Board of Directors meeting, when Du
Bois formally resigned from his position, the reason he gave for his departure was that
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the Board had restricted The Crisis, as an official arm of the NAACP, from publishing
material critical of the organization’s work. 80 Du Bois charged that NAACP leadership
sought to reestablish control over the organization’s major publication and restrict the
nature of content put forward. Du Bois had been using The Crisis to advocate for a
version of self-determination and Black separatism that relied on segregated institutions
as a way to grow black businesses and institutions. Sullivan argues that Du Bois’s
positions ultimately forced the NAACP to sharpen its opposition to segregation,
ultimately leading the organization to reject self-determination and Black separatism.81
Du Bois may have been one factor influencing this development, but the
NAACP’s investment in the Margold Report and the influence of the Garland Fund
suggest that the NAACP was already far along this path. At the same May 1934 NAACP
Board meeting, Charles Houston was appointed by the Board to replace Margold as
special counsel. Scholars like Tushnet argue that Houston’s appointment, coupled with
the NAACP’s recruitment of young, Black lawyers in the 1930s, represent a crucial step
forward in their legal battle against segregation, because “the emergence of a new
generation of lawyers facilitated the transition within the NAACP.”82
Both Sullivan and Tushnet’s accounts suggest that the primary rift in the
organization was between Du Bois’s self-determination and the preference for a direct
attack on segregation. But there was another position emerging that called for an
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economic program markedly different than the one Du Bois proposed. In June 1934, the
Board established a committee for “planning and studying the future program of the
Association.”83 They appointed Abram Harris, a Marxist economist from Howard
University, who was critical of Du Bois for endorsing Black separatism. Harris was
charged with developing a program for the organization, picking up where the Second
Amenia Conference’s vision and recommendations left off.84 The “Report on the Future
Plan and Program for the NAACP,” which Harris presented to the Board in September
and October of 1934, did precisely that.85
The NAACP’s Harris Report
The major convenings of the NAACP discussed up to this point help to
foreground central debates over the emergent segregation-focused agenda and the Black
separatist agenda within the organization. Scholars like historian Beth Tompkins Bates
have focused on the changes the Harris Report called for in the organizational structure,
namely decentering the role of the national office and empowering the local branches to
be hubs of economic and political education programs. But what Bates emphasizes far
less is the major shift in ideological position and radical change in mission the report
called for.86 Like Du Bois, who argued that the economic position of African Americans
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was tantamount, the NAACP’s 1934 “Report on the Future Plan and Program for the
NAACP” also focused attention on economic conditions. While they shared an economic
critique of the organization, however, the Harris Report rejected Du Bois’s idea that a
Black “nation within a nation” and a separate Black economy would effectively bridge
racial and economic justice concerns.
The opening line set the tone and stakes of the Harris Report, charging that “the
work of the Association in the economic field has been conducted as an incidental phase
of its civil liberty program.”87 Du Bois had also charged that the organization had
prioritized civil liberties over economic issues. But the first section of the report made
clear that they were proposing a very different economic agenda. Consistent with Harris’s
Marxist orientation, the report identified the failed promise of liberalism as the source of
persistent inequality. Most significantly, while liberalism claimed to guarantee and
protect economic and political liberties, property was only protected once it was
acquired:
[Democratic liberalism] did not create the conditions which made the acquisition
of property open to all members of society. In fact its principles were based upon
a state of industry and economic relations which presupposed the great mass of
men to be non-propertied workers whose chances for obtaining property became
increasingly difficult and whose economic status was made increasingly
precarious by technological and financial changes that resulted in periodic
unemployment and loss of income.88
Thus, Harris argued, political equality and economic inequality were fused under the
banner and guise of liberalism, and few individuals were privileged enough to take
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advantage of those economic freedoms. In tracing the accumulation of wealth, rise in
corporate power, and increasing monopolization of major industries in the late nineteenth
century, the report made the provocative claim that full citizenship and civil liberties
would not profoundly affect the economic status of African Americans. The failure to
pull the working class out of the Great Depression was further evidence of the
“bankruptcy of liberal reformism.”89 This was a repudiation of both approaches that
favored a sole focus on dismantling Jim Crow as well as Black separatism and a clear
argument for a more social-democratic approach.
But the report’s recommendations also called for the abolition of Jim Crow and
reducing prejudiced attitudes among black and white workers, consistent with the racial
democratic legal and political work the organization had been investing in. In Harris’s
words, the “adoption of the economic program” did not have to mean an end to this work,
but rather for “a reformulation of the Association’s ultimate objectives.” He argued that
opposition to discrimination and segregation “on the job and in pay and various
manifestations of anti-Negro fooling among white workers” were in fact “special
grievances [and] a natural part of the larger issues of American labor as a whole.90
In line with this assessment, the report underscored several key recommendations.
First, it emphasized that reeducating working-class African Americans on the history of
industrialization would highlight their shared interests with white laborers. Second, it
called for forging a strong interracial liberal-labor coalition to push for important
89

Ibid, 119.
Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences,
Major Speeches, and Special Reports, Folder: 001412-009-0661, Mar 07, 1935 - Jun 30, 1935, 119.
90

52

legislative initiatives, notably old-age pensions, unemployment, and sickness insurance.
Third, it sought to transform the local and state branches into centers for “economic and
political education and agitation.”91 The report did acknowledge the problem of “racial
chauvinism” within the union movement. However, it argued that the solution was an
education program that emphasized the interconnected interests of white and black
laborers.92 These recommendations largely endorsed a social-democratic vision of change
centered on a critique of liberal capitalism as the source of black economic inequality and
proposed labor solidarity as the remedy. To that end, it called for a broad program of
reeducation and union organizing as an alternative to the legal campaign and an
invigorated branch structure to lead this work.
The Board debated the Harris Report at both the September and October meetings
in 1934. Their discussions mainly focused on the report’s implications for the
reorganization of the national and local branches and the financial impact of
implementing a new economic program. Ultimately, they decided to shelve the report
rather than discuss or enact the structural, programmatic, and ideological initiatives it laid
out. Certainly, the departure of Du Bois from the Board and organizational leadership
lessened the support for an economic program, even though his vision was not the same
as Harris’s.93 This decision also reflected the NAACP’s shift toward the fight against
segregated institutions, and particularly education. And it was interpreted by activists at
the time and by contemporary scholars to be a concession to a particular version of class
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politics. Ralph Bunche, a professor at Howard University and participant in the Second
Amenia Conference, argued that this decision confirmed the organization’s middle-class
bias over the “masses of Negroes.”94 Historian Judith Stein argued that this “new theory
of education was an ideology that stemmed from a part of the black petit-bourgeoisie, not
the masses.” Education was an aspiration for the poor, but the masses of African
Americans “rarely made education their principal strategy for survival.” 95
At this historical moment, the NAACP was developing into one of the most
prominent national racial advocacy organizations, a status that it would solidify through
its leadership in the legal campaign of the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights Movement. As
such, many scholars and historical accounts have focused on these internal debates in
order to reconstruct how the NAACP’s legal agenda developed. As this section makes
clear, these internal debates over the future and course of the organization also involved
debates over a structural economic agenda and more social-democratic principles. In
looking solely at the NAACP for evidence of an economic agenda for civil rights and its
subsequent decline, it may appear that this path ended in these debates at the end of the
1930s. While it was true that a more radical left contingent had been pushed out of the
organization, many of the individuals who had been involved in these debates moved into
different organizations where they continued to press these ideas. The ideas encompassed
most clearly by Harris were the subject of another set of interracial organizing efforts in
response to the New Deal.
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The Joint Committee on National Recovery and the National Negro Congress
While the NAACP was considering the possibility of an economic program and
strategy in the mid-1930s, other collections of racial equality advocates were building
interracial coalitions to push for a more equitable economy, in line with the Harris
Report’s conclusions. Part of this activism was driven by the devastating effect the Great
Depression had on African Americans and the inability of the NAACP approach to
address hunger and homelessness. As historian Eric Gellman has argued, “black
nationalists, Communists, Socialists, and other filled some of this void by orating on
street corners and marching against spreading hunger and homelessness.”96 Given this
focus and the ideological orientation, these groups were not focused on the courts and
segregation. Instead, they sought to intervene in New Deal policy and administrative
debates. The next chapter will analyze the specifics of this advocacy work. However, it is
f useful to understand the context that gave rise to this new organization, the National
Negro Congress (NNC), and how it arrived at a different set of ideological and strategic
priorities than the NAACP.
The NNC, which existed from 1936-1937, was a network of organizations that
served as “the black vanguard of the Popular Front.” The coalition was “broadly defined
as interracial, labor-based alliances of radicals and liberals in America who united to
expand New Deal reforms and beat back what they saw as an alarming growth of
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fascism, both at home and abroad.”97 The NNC evolved out of several prior efforts to
intervene in New Deal debates. The first iteration launched in 1933 when two Black
economists, John P. Davis and Robert Weaver, formed a new organization called the
Negro Industrial League in order to represent the interest of black workers focused on
representing African Americans in debates over New Deal industrial programs in the
National Recovery Administration (see Chapter Three for a further discussion of these
efforts).98 Following these efforts, Davis renamed the organization the Joint Committee
on National Recovery (JCNR) “to signify and amplify the organization’s wider scope.”99
To this end, Davis’s first project was to convene a group of organizations and political
actors in a conversation about the status of African Americans under the New Deal.
In 1935, Davis and his co-leader George Edmund Haynes of the Federal Council
of Churches convened the first meeting of the JCNR for “The National Conference on the
Economic Crisis and the Negro.”100 The event was co-sponsored by Howard University
and included about twenty organizations, spanning a wide range of political and
ideological perspectives, including representatives from the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters (BSCP), the NUL and NAACP, and representatives from the Communist,
Socialist and Workers Parties. It also included prominent academics, notably Albion
Hartwell and Ralph Bunche, in addition to several government officials, notably A.
Howard Myers, an administrator of the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Like
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Bunche and Du Bois, several of those involved had been key participants in the
NAACP’s Second Amenia conference and other discussions within the NAACP. Many of
the JCNR participants readily embraced the economic focus Du Bois and Harris had been
pressing for several years prior at the NAACP. And while the NAACP participated in the
conference, many of the individuals and organizations involved were critical of the
NAACP’s middle-class orientation and broader ideological position and political
strategies. One participant, Howard professor Emmett Dorsey, argued that the NAACP
was not capable of developing a coherent economic program “because such a program
must necessarily stress labor solidarity and fundamental social reforms. Such a program
is incompatible with the Association’s middles class and thoroughly racial
philosophy.”101 Du Bois, who had just recently vacated his NAACP post, similarly argued
that while there was interest in enacting an economic program at the NAACP, there was
little agreement about what form it should take.102
These assessments of the NAACP led participants like Dorsey and Ernest
McKinney, a representative of the Workers Party, to argue that the NAACP’s influence
over the fight for racial equality was waning. Dorsey claimed that “in the face of the
steady crystallization of reaction, the N.A.A.C.P.'s one-time militancy is rapidly
evaporating and its ideology is become increasingly tenuous.”103 In McKinney’s view,
“the day is rapidly passing and has almost passed in which such groups as the N.A.A.C.P.
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and the National Negro Business League can play any progressive role at all for the black
worker.”104 Many participants also argued that Booker T. Washington and the Tuskegee
Institute, like the NAACP, provided inadequate solutions to deal with the serious
challenges that capitalism posed for black workers. In sum, the majority of JCNR
participants were of the belief that the future of racial advocacy organizing lay outside the
NAACP.
The meeting covered a range of topics and proposals for addressing Black
economic inequality and revealed sources of tension and disagreements among the
participants. A special edition of the Journal of Negro Education published in 1936
elaborated the statements from meeting participants. An introductory Editorial Comment
called attention to the fact that Black workers were among the hardest hit by the Great
Depression. They were three to four times more likely to be unemployed than their white
counterparts and had received relief in the “American fashion,” meaning little or none at
all. The introduction also outlined the major positions on the paths forward discussed at
the meeting. First, they could stick with the New Dealers, for “despite some of the
obvious but "unavoidable" defects of the New Deal, it still offered the greatest possibility
of escape from the Negro's admittedly crucial position.” The second way out, advocated
by the “left-wing group” of Communist, Socialist, and Workers Parties, was to unite with
white workers and establish a “real New Deal,” where profit was not the “main motive of
and basis for the production and distribution of goods.” The third way out agreed with
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the “left-wing group” on the need for broad organization but argued it could be done
through trade unions in the existing political-economic system. The final way out had
little faith in partnerships with white laborers and instead called for African Americans to
organize as a group to “secure wide economic independence through exchange of
services and the exchange and manufacture of goods."105
As is clear from this summary of the participants’ positions, the legal campaign
against segregation was not among the possible paths actively discussed. It was
understood to be the kind of middle-class orientation that held very little chance of
changing the fates of working-class African Americans, who suffered miserably during
the Great Depression. However, JCNR participants were divided along the same line that
divided those within the NAACP several years prior: between Black separatists who
fought for economic independence for African Americans and those who saw interracial
alliances with the labor movement as critical for racial equality. The participants’
statements also focused on explaining the roots of black economic inequality and
evaluating the feasibility of two primary solutions: establishing a Black Belt economy in
the South and organizing Black workers into trade unions.
Most participants in the JCNR attributed the root causes of Black Americans’
dismal economic position to capitalism and class relations. “There can be little doubt that
the inequalities experienced by the Negro masses under the New Deal stem from
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economic and not racial causes,” Davis argued.106 Bunche similarly claimed that the
“dilemma of the New Deal, then, merely reflects the basic dilemma of capitalism.”107
McKinney of the Workers Party argued that “the Negro worker must realize his class
position as a worker and not attempt to maintain a race position as a Negro, first, last, and
always. This means the repudiation not only of the white ruling class but the Negro ruling
class as well.”108 Dorsey connected “the economic plight of the American Negro” to the
whole of the working class, claiming “our economic problem differs in degree, not in
kind. Our special disabilities are organically related to our class exploitation.”109 Echoing
key themes from the Harris report, these statements argued that the problems facing
Black workers were rooted in the capitalist economic system and were not simply the
result of racial prejudice.
Although many agreed on this assessment of the economic causes of racial
inequality, the proposed solutions highlighted the differences between the those who
advocated for economic self-determinism and those who favored organization within the
trade union movement. The CPUSA representatives, like Du Bois, advocated for
economic self-determination and particularly pressed for a focused campaign in the
South. The CPUSA’s legal work for the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama in 1932 had
“provided a stellar opportunity for the party to announce its presence in the South and
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trumpet its militant and uncompromising opposition to racism.”110 This experience
contributed to the CPUSA’s decision to organize around the idea of a “separate black
nation in the Black Belt.”111 In his contribution to the JCNR, CPUSA representative
James W. Ford focused on the economic condition in the South. Ford claimed that it was
clear “to every Negro on the plantations of the South that Mr. Roosevelt has only been
helping the plantation master.”112
While Ford did not directly mention the Black Belt in his contribution, both the
Socialist Party and the Workers Party characterized the CPUSA position as such in their
contributions. Norman Thomas of the Socialist Party argued that it was an “exceedingly
dangerous and misleading attempt to apply in America the principles of cultural
autonomy which have worked well under the differing conditions of Russia.”113
McKinney similarly articulated that “the Workers Party rejects as spurious and defeatist
all schemes based on race patriotism and nationalism; whether it be ‘self-determination
for the black belt,’ back to Africa, salvation by Negro business enterprise, or any other
scheme or plan which in practice means the segregation of the Negro worker.”114 While
they continued to eschew a direct focus on dismantling segregation, the Socialist and
Workers Parties both saw the focus on Black separatism as an appeal to, rather than an
attack on, the fundamental structures and premises of a capitalist economy.
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In his contribution, Du Bois aligned his position with Booker T. Washington’s
assessment that African Americans needed to secure their economic rights before their
political ones. However, he faulted Washington for “unquestionably” basing “his idea of
the economic status which Negroes must gain…on the capitalistic organization of the
United States.”115 And while Du Bois was critical of Washington’s reliance on capitalism
as a basis for black economic advancement, he still favored segregation as a temporary
means of improving the economic standing of black Americans. He further argued that
the main aim should be “to organize the vast consumers' power of this group as to secure
wide economic independence through the exchange of services and the exchange and
manufacture of goods.”116 Other JCNR participants directly challenged Du Bois on Black
separatism and economic self-determination. Dorsey observed that the Black separatist
movement failed to explain how it would address the fact that the capitalist system,
largely controlled by whites, had control over the critical systems of credit and major
industries.117 Haynes, representing the Federal Council of Churches, argued that “an
independent racial economy cannot succeed apart from the national economy,” which
meant that the separatist proposal was largely infeasible.118
Those critical of the Black separatist position argued for focusing their efforts on
the trade union movement. This led many to adopt the frame of African Americans as
workers, first and foremost. But many proponents of the trade union strategy also
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equivocated more on the particular effects of race-based exclusions or the “special
grievances” of Black workers. For example, in his contribution titled “The Plight of the
Negro Industrial Worker,” T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban League powerfully
asserted that “the Negro remains the most forgotten man in a program planned to deal
new cards to the millions of workers neglected and exploited in the shuffle between
capital and labor.”119 Hill also pointed to the ways in which race prejudice had led to
Black workers’ exclusion from certain segments of the labor market and relegated them
to the “industries whose future is the most uncertain because of factors over which
workers themselves have little or no control.”120 However, Hill also argued that it was a
mistake to organize Black workers solely along race lines. “This can never be
successfully done,” Hill argued, “for interests of Negroes within the race are as divergent
as are the interests of all white workers and Americans in general.”121
Hill’s position was not shared by all who advocated the trade union strategy. A.
Philip Randolph, for example, had just led a union organizing campaign for the first allBlack union, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (for more discussion of the BSCP’s
organizing drive and the affiliation process, see Chapter Four). Randolph’s contribution
to the JCNR meeting, “The Trade Union Movement and the Negro,” directly challenged
Hill’s assessment. He called for an organization for Black workers akin to the Italian
Chamber of Labor and claimed that only Black workers could effectively organize other
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Black workers.122 But Randolph’s position was not quite so absolute as his statement
made it seem. While the BSCP was an all-Black union, they had also chosen to affiliate
with the AFL, which was still a very white organization.
Randolph’s claim that Black workers should lead organizing efforts partially
rooted in the experiences of discrimination and exclusion many Black workers faced in
trying to join unions in the early decades of the twentieth century. While New Deal
legislation empowering labor unions led to an influx of new members, many maintained
segregated locals or excluded African American workers altogether. As historian
Lizabeth Cohen has argued, the Great Migration and the arrival of Black workers into
major Northern cities like Chicago generated friction and posed barriers for rank-and-file
organizing.123 But it was not only the racial prejudice of Northern white workers which
presented obstacles. Black exclusion also highlighted a significant rift within the labor
movement. The problem of organizing Black workers in the AFL was not only the result
of racial discrimination. It was also a consequence of the Association’s focus on the
organization of skilled craft workers. In 1935, when the JCNR meeting took place, the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) had just broken away from the AFL and
proposed a model of industrial unionism. This model meant organizing unskilled and
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semi-skilled workers, where the majority of Black workers were concentrated. In line
with this, the CIO, both at the national level and on the shop floor, ushered in a more
racially inclusive version of civil rights unionism beginning in the 1930s.124
Considering this focus on workers, representatives from the major labor
associations were suspiciously absent from the JCNR meeting. But other participants at
the meeting pointed toward the progress that had resulted from interracial labor
organizing. Davis argued that despite the “vicious policies of the leaders of the A.F. of
L.,” solidarity between Black and white workers had been forming. “In every major strike
in this country,” Davis stated, “Negro union members have fought with their white fellow
workers in a struggle for economic survival.”125 Haynes of the Federal Council of
Churches pointed out that unions had been a vehicle for Black workers to increase their
skills and transform unions into less hierarchical and more democratic organizations.126
On behalf of the Socialist Party, Thomas similarly argued that there was considerable
hope for African Americans in “uniting with Socialist and enlightened labor unionists
who are fighting for equal treatment of white and colored workers in labor organization
and in the whole economic structure.” 127
This tension between those who saw trade unions as partners or opponents in the
project of working towards racial equality would continue to animate political differences
among this group and others similar to it. However, the positions continued to evolve as
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racial advocacy organizations and labor unions developed and fought to adapt and
strengthen industrial policy for workers in the coming decades.
Conclusion
After the 1935 meeting, the JCNR transformed once more into the National Negro
Congress, which became the leading organization of the Popular Front, seeking to build
interracial union solidarity, particularly with the CIO and the Communist Party.128 The
emerging tension over debates that took place, both within the NAACP’s convenings and
in the JCNR, provided a critical foundation for these same actors as they sought to carry
the lessons of the first wave of the New Deal into the major developments in industrial
relations.
A deeper analysis of the legislative and organizational debates over race and the
New Deal employment programs reveals the ways in which racial and social democratic
ideologies coalesce and diverge. The legislative and organizational debates, as well as the
subsequent institutional formation outlined in this chapter, provide clear evidence that
calls for racial and social democracy were not separated in the 1930s as they became in
later decades. Instead, these ideas were uniquely entwined through debates among these
organizations and their appeals to the federal government.
These publications and convenings, while different in scope and participants,
highlight the similarities and differences in the ideas and ideological orientation of these
groups. These points of commonality and departure guided significant efforts to bring
together organizations and individuals and generate a vision for racial economic
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advancement that targeted structural economic features in addition to, and in some cases
instead of, purely racial demands. While the actions and contributions of these early
racial advocacy organizations have been well-documented, what has been less carefully
considered is the competing political-economic visions that animated these early
coalitions, particularly consideration of them as presenting alternatives to Black
separatism or challenging legal segregation. Internal debates within and among these
organizations highlight the way in which the changing political-economic visions were
reflected in the scope and nature of their work. These policy debates and internal
discussions reveal the extent to which efforts to address racially-skewed economic
disadvantages were often framed in terms of two distinct ideological formations: racial
democracy and social democracy.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENTS IN BLACK EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC WORKS
ADMINISTRATION
In 1937, the National Urban League sent a memorandum to President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt reflecting the experience of African Americans under New Deal
programs:
Unquestionably, their status today is improved over their status of 1933, but there
are still disturbing signs which indicate that the progress of Negroes has not been
at an equal rate of whites, and that the disparity between white and Negro living
standards, which is already far too great, may become considerably increased if
present trends proceed unchecked.129
This statement highlights the tensions emerging among efforts to support the broad
economic changes ushered in by the New Deal and the fact that they were not being
distributed equally across the population. During the New Deal, particularly from 19331935 when Congress and the Roosevelt administration were working to pass the first and
second waves of legislation, racial advocacy organizations were fighting to address
economic inequality for African Americans. As the previous chapter detailed, some
organizations put significant energy into building interracial coalitions and endorsed the
view that the problems faced by Black workers stemmed from the inequitable distribution
of wealth under a capitalist economic system – highlighting a more social democratic
vision for economic equality. But as the above quote makes clear, other racial advocacy
organizations focused on the particular impact and influence of those policies on Black
129
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workers. The tensions between these social democratic and racial democratic approaches
were especially evident in New Deal industrial policy debates. Working to navigate these
new policies shaped the racial advocacy organizations’ ideas, ideologies, and interests in
ways that influenced their future efforts.130 This chapter analyzes the development of two
landmark agencies created by new industrial policy in the first wave of New Deal
legislation: the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Public Works
Administration (PWA). Both established by the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), these two agencies explicitly addressed issues of Black employment.
Before considering their significance for Black employment, it is useful to situate
the NIRA, NRA, and PWA within the broader context of New Deal reforms. The NIRA
was part of the first wave of the New Deal legislation, enacted in 1933 during
Roosevelt’s first hundred days in office. In addition to the NIRA, this first wave included
a banking assistance bill, cuts to federal payments to veterans and federal employees, a
repeal of Prohibition, and two separate measures providing economic relief for the
agricultural and industrial sectors. All these measures sought to lift the country out of the
crippling Great Depression. But ultimately, the NIRA was unsuccessful in building
support for full-scale industrial planning.131
These two agencies were also important because they reflect two very different
approaches to New Deal economic policy. While some have painted the New Deal as a
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coherent and premediated campaign, the reality is that it was forged out of many different
ideas about how best to rescue the economy.132 Roosevelt, confronted by a whole host of
political-economic ideas that spurred from the Progressive tradition, did not adopt a
single set of reform ideas. Instead, many contending ‘progressivisms’ were enacted in
New Deal policy.133 However, in the first wave of the New Deal in 1933, Roosevelt and
the New Dealers in Congress exhibited stronger adherence to some tendencies over
others.
For example, the NIRA, which was at the very heart of the first wave legislation,
was intended to forge a new version of industrial relations. However, it bore some
similarities to Hoover-era voluntarism and associationalism. Most centrally, the NIRA
created a new administrative agency to manage industrial relations: the National
Recovery Administration (NRA). The NIRA’s version of associationalism relied on a
series of enticements to bring both business and labor to the table in order to work toward
a mutual agreement over industrial policy. To entice business, the NIRA relaxed antitrust laws and allowed for more coordination among businesses. To entice labor, the
NIRA recognized unions’ collective bargaining rights and outlawed employer
interference through Section 7(a) of the law. With both business and labor at the table,
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the NRA created a set of industrial code boards that would negotiate price, wage, hour,
and other regulations for major U.S. industries.134 The intended result was an enhanced
version of associationalist industrial relations, where the federal government acted as a
mediator over relatively harmonious negotiations between labor and industry.135
The prominence of the NIRA and the emphasis on this version of associationalism
reflected Roosevelt’s preference in these early years for industrial planning and sparking
a consumer-driven economic recovery. But this was not the only approach to recovery
exemplified in NIRA programs. The law also allocated $3.3 billion to public works
programs. This massive spending program reflected the view that deficit spending would
be more effective at restarting the economy than the consumer-driven approach.136 The
NIRA authorized the Public Works Administration (PWA) “to stimulate the economy by
providing money for public construction and to employ the unemployed.”137 Despite
Roosevelt’s skepticism about the potential for public works construction projects to spur
economic recovery, between 1933 and 1939, over two-thirds of New Deal relief funds
went towards public works programs.138 The federal government’s massive investment
the in public works programs like the PWA and the closely related Works Progress
Administration (WPA) spurred a “public works revolution.” Most significantly, these
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programs “helped justify the new role of the state in American life, legitimizing—
intellectually and physically—what has come to be known as Keynesian management of
the economy.”139
Considered in the context of the broader political-economic stakes of New Deal
reform, the NRA and PWA reflected different visions and versions of economic recovery.
These agencies also reveal how the federal government, labor, and industry were thinking
about Black workers as they implemented New Deal policies. The differences in
political-economic visions enacted are critical for understanding the New Deal’s legacy
and how the policies and programs created ushered in a major wave of changes in the
political-economic landscape in the United States that improved the lives of many
millions of Americans. The expanse of new programs and agencies provided a higher
baseline of support for economic and social welfare. Many Americans went back to
work, became homeowners, and started to receive other public welfare assistance as a
result of New Deal programs. But many were excluded from the intended universal
programs along the lines of race, gender, and citizenship.140
Political scientist Suzanne Mettler has argued that the New Deal created two
“distinct forms of governance separated in terms of gender,” and ultimately two
definitions of citizenship, one for white men and the other for nonwhite men and women.
This aspect of New Deal development, Mettler claims, has been frequently overlooked
139
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because New Deal analyses tend to focus on the origin and creation of policy rather than
their consequences.141 This claim has generated a robust literature that has exposed
another set of limits to the New Deal political order in terms of the outcomes it produced,
particularly for women, African Americans, and immigrant populations. But this renewed
focus on the policy outcomes has not fully explored the effect of these New Deal policies
on the nodes of Black politics and the changes that New Deal policy inspired. Instead,
they tend to represent a limited set of interventions by racial advocacy organizations. For
example, many focus on efforts to attach anti-discrimination clauses to New Deal
legislation or push for inclusion of agricultural and domestic workers in social welfare
programs, categories of workers that were disproportionately Black.142
But these efforts do not describe the variety of ways that racial advocacy
organizations were seeking to influence New Deal policy and the broader economic
context they saw themselves operating in. For example, the exclusion of agricultural and
domestic workers was part of a much wider tactic employed by employers and industry
representatives seeking to limit the scope and reach of the New Deal transformation. The
first section of this chapter will explore evidence of these efforts to exclude and segment
workers in debates over the NIRA as well as the specific implementation during the NRA
code board hearings. Looking specifically to one example from the NRA debates reveals
that a loose coalition of the NIL and several American Federation of Labor (AFL) and
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Communist Party (CPUSA) labor affiliates opposed industrialists seeking to exclude
categories of workers. The second section of this chapter will focus on the first time
racial quotas were used to facilitate Black employment through the PWA. In both cases,
racial advocacy organizations worked to balance efforts to pursue racial democracy and
social democracy.
This chapter presents a broader exploration of the strategic and ideological
considerations of racial advocacy organizations in this period, highlighting the important
interventions by the Negro Industrial League (NIL) in the creation of NRA and PWA.
The NIL’s efforts were hugely influential in shaping racial advocacy organizing in years
to come. Experiences navigating both these agencies informed racial advocacy
organizations’ efforts to work through the federal government in pressing for racial
equality. Future policy interventions by racial advocacy organizations drew extensively
on the NIL’s advocacy on the NRA and the experience of using racial quotas to increase
Black employment. In addition to a shifting view of the viability of the federal
government, these agencies also highlight significant opportunities and significant
challenges for coalition-building with organized labor in this period. The NIL found a
strong partner and advocate in labor during the NRA cotton textile code hearings. But the
building trades unions proved more of an obstacle in implementing the PWA quota
system. In sum, this chapter highlights that there were also important early instances
when racial groups and labor worked forged common ground through legislative and
administrative battles.
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The National Industrial Recovery Act: Recovering an Economy in Decline
The first racial advocacy organization to intervene in New Deal debates was the
Negro Industrial League (NIL). John P. Davis and Robert Weaver founded the
organization for the express purpose of having an organization to represent Black
workers in debates over the implementation of the NIRA. As was discussed in the last
chapter, the creation of the NIL facilitated a more serious discussion of the possibility for
social-democratic reforms to improve economic conditions for African Americans. In
addition, Davis and Weaver’s testimony was partly responsible for the fact that separate
wage differentials for blacks and whites were not enacted through the NRA codes,
specifically the cotton textile code.143 But the main issue that the NIL faced in the NRA
debates was an attempt by industry representatives and employers to artificially divide
workers into different categories in order to create classes of workers they could exclude
from labor protections. The NIL’s intervention in these debates underscores that racial
advocacy organizations were far from absent in these early New Deal debates; in fact,
they were engaged in debates that highlight the fundamental points of tension over how
the nation should seek to recover the economy.
These points of tension were very salient and had tangible effects on racial
advocacy organizing at the time. Historian Touré Reed argues that New Deal labor laws
fueled some fear “that the federal government’s efforts to bolster organized labor might
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further undermine Afro-Americans’ economic standing.”144 Similarly, historian Philip
Foner argues that for Black workers, “it rapidly became clear that the code mechanism
under the NRA was valueless for black workers; it merely legalized for all American
industry the pattern of racial discrimination that had long been the practice of Southern
employers.”145 These fears and the efforts to press for racial and economic equality
through the NRA played out in debates over the cotton textile code industrial board.
In order to understand the evolution of the cotton textile code board and the
relevance of the NRA, it is first necessary to unpack one further dimension of economic
thinking in the first wave of New Deal industrial policy. As has been outlined above, the
NIRA involved navigating different visions of economic and industrial regulation and
different ideas about the use of industrial planning and federal spending to address the
economic collapse. The major legislative efforts in 1933 highlight another important node
for this debate—the differences in the structure and function of the agricultural and
industrial economies. While many of Roosevelt’s advisers thought that the overall
success of the New Deal program would hinge on saving farms, some also saw the
recovery of the industrial sector as critical for relieving the effects of the depression.146
Ultimately, the two sectors came to be managed by separate legislative frameworks: the
agricultural sector by the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the industrial sector by
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).
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These separate legislative acts also divided the administrative management of the
two sectors into separate administrative agencies: the Department of Agriculture oversaw
the agricultural sector, and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was tasked with
economic recovery and growth for the industrial sector. Arguments to differentiate these
sectors came from many directions. Still, agribusiness and agricultural manufacturers
made the strongest case that the agricultural sector be managed exclusively by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to avoid dual administration and taxation. One
consequence of this differentiation was that agricultural labor was siphoned off from
industrial labor and was not subject to the NIRA’s industrial protections.147
In articulating visions for economic recovery, industry and agriculture differed
sharply on where to prioritize efforts to restart the economy. Some saw agriculture and
industrial production as parallel and entwined enterprises. Others argued that the
agricultural and industrial economies had been impacted differently by the economic
crash and would require different interventions to recover. These differences led to many
divisions in AAA and NIRA debates as well as some significant points of confluence.
The agricultural sector (which included small farms, plantations, larger industrial farms,
farmers associations, agribusiness, and agricultural manufacturers) united around the idea
that differentiating the agricultural and industrial sectors meant that agricultural workers
should be excluded from NIRA labor protections. For both small farmers and
147
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agribusiness alike, labor standards for agricultural workers would increase their
production costs and farm commodity prices. The most forceful arguments for the
exclusion of agricultural workers in these debates came from farmers’ associations,
agribusiness, and agricultural manufacturers, those who had the most direct economic
investment in this position.148
The agricultural sector was not alone in arguing against labor standards that
would increase the costs of production. In debates over the NIRA, industrial elites and
employers also asserted that rescuing the industry meant stimulating production while
keeping production costs down, which was the basis on which they opposed wage and
hour protections. But the AFL, organized labor’s most influential voice in Congress,
challenged these arguments and advocated for labor standards that would protect
workers.149 Focusing on issues facing industrial workers and the industrial sector, New
Dealers and the AFL argued that increasing wages would increasing consumer buying
power, which was critical for economic recovery. 150
While the AFL effectively countered the efforts of employers and industrialists to
limit the scope of labor protections when it came to industrial workers, there was no
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comparable organization making the same case on behalf of agricultural workers. The
AFL was silent on the issues faced by agricultural laborers in debates in the NIRA and
AAA. Their silence in national policy debates reflected organized labor’s ambivalence
over organizing agricultural workers. Farm laborers, who were largely seasonal and
migratory, were difficult and expensive to organize. As a result, many AFL leaders
thought that the costs of organized them outweighed the benefits.151 As one AFL leader
famously said in 1935, “only fanatics are willing to live in shacks or tents and get their
heads broken in the interest of migratory labor.”152
Further, at this point, the AFL was primarily focused on organizing skilled
workers along craft lines. Some agricultural workers who worked in agricultural
processing jobs more closely resembled the traditional craft workers the AFL sought to
organize. However, the vast majority were unskilled field workers. Given the craftoriented focus of the AFL, the first and most concerted efforts to organize agricultural
workers in the late 19th and early twentieth century had been led by the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) and the Communist Party’s Trade Union Unity League
(TUUL).153
As would be true throughout the next few decades, efforts to organize unskilled
workers were divisive within the trade union movement. Left-leaning organizations like
the IWW and the TUUL, and in the late 1930s, the Congress of Industrial Organizations
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(CIO), emerged in large part to challenge the AFL based on its reluctance to organize
unskilled workers, including agricultural workers.154 Even without strong backing from
organized labor, the NIRA led to a revival in labor unionism among agricultural workers,
who worked to establish new unions and labor standards using new federal protections
even though the new laws did not formally protect them. In sum, the national AFL’s
ambivalence toward organizing agricultural workers combined with the burgeoning
conflict over organizing mass industrial workers helps explain AFL leaders’ silence and
acquiescence to the exclusion of agricultural workers from New Deal protections.
With no clear opposition, Congress agreed that the agricultural sector should be
subject to regulation under the AAA and not the NIRA, which effectively excluded one
of the most vulnerable categories of workers from U.S. labor protections. The NIRA did
not explicitly exclude agricultural workers from Section 7(a) protections, but the
legislation did ultimately endorse a view of the agricultural and industrial sectors as
distinct. Even Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY), the author of the bill and a great
champion of organized labor and workers’ rights, endorsed this view. In his introduction
of the NIRA, he made clear that agriculture was not included in the bill’s definition of
industry and that there would be no duplicative oversight with the AAA.155 As a result,
Congress ceded authority over the agricultural sector to the Department of Agriculture,
which left agricultural workers without labor protections or collective bargaining rights.
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Farmers’ organizations, agribusiness, and agricultural manufacturers used concerns over
possible “dual oversight” under the NIRA and the AAA to argue that sole authority over
the agricultural sector should reside within the Department of Agriculture.156 They also
argued that dual oversight could lead to double taxation, with taxes imposed by both the
NIRA and AAA on the agricultural sector.157
By appealing to concerns over dual administration and effective economic
recovery, farmers, farmers’ organizations, and agricultural manufacturers won a
definitive victory in settling the agricultural industry under the authority of the AAA and
not the NIRA. Most crucially, they had crafted a mechanism for excluding certain
workers from the labor regulations ushered in by New Deal reforms. Employers and
industrialists would continue to use that tactic beyond the agricultural sector and the
NRA. The idea that a minimum wage and other labor protections could actually harm
critical areas of the economy was a tool that opponents of the New Deal crafted in order
to defend the interests of capital in subsequent battles over industrial relations.
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Since the NIRA delegated the responsibility of setting wage and hour restrictions
to the National Recovery Administration (NRA), these attempts to exclude classes of
workers featured prominently in debates over the industrial code boards created by the
legislation. Although the amendment to Section 8 of the NIRA clarified that the
Department of Agriculture would have primary oversight over the agricultural sector, one
significant NRA code board dealt with agricultural production: the cotton textile code
board. This code board was also significant as it marked the entrance of concrete debates
over labor and economic regulation of Black workers.
The National Recovery Administration and the Cotton Textile Code Board
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) laid out a framework for industrial
revival: it enabled the federal government to set standards for production, relaxed
prohibitions on monopolies to allow for industry-wide cooperation, and called for
minimum wages and maximum hour provisions. However, some of these thresholds were
not set in the legislation itself. Instead, the law delegated the determination of price
controls, wage minimums, hour maximums, and other things to a set of specific industrial
code boards set up under the National Recovery Administration (NRA).158 These boards
created a new model of industrial relations, one that intended to balance the interests of
industry, labor, and the consuming public. Overall, the NRA reflected the
accommodationist orientation wherein the federal government played an oversight role.
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allowing labor and industry negotiate industrial relations amongst themselves.159 Industry
wielded significant power in the NRA by accepting and then renegotiating fundamental
premises of industrial planning that NRA was trying to accomplish. This will become
extremely clear from industrialists’ and manufacturers’ efforts to exclude classes of
disproportionately Black workers from labor protections under the cotton textile code.
The NRA’s first major initiative was to develop industrial and labor standards for
the cotton textile industry, which continued the struggles over agriculture, industry, and
worker exclusions. Since Section 8 of the NIRA was amended to clarify that the
Department of Agriculture would have primary oversight over the agricultural sector, the
NRA did not establish code boards to create labor standards for the agricultural sector.
The two exceptions were the sugar-beet and the cotton textile sectors.160 The massive
cotton textile industry was a priority industry for the Roosevelt administration because
cotton prices had dropped so precipitously during the Great Depression. Roosevelt even
asked the cotton textile board to convene before he had signed the legislation into law.161
The debate over the cotton textile code, once again, raised questions about the
delineation of the agricultural and industrial sectors. The NRA’s hearings to establish an
industrial code for the cotton textile industry reveal that, as they had during the NIRA
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debates, agribusiness and agricultural manufacturers sought to exclude categories of
workers from New Deal programs to avoid the labor regulations imposed by the
legislation. Representatives of employers and industry argued that several classes of
disproportionately African American workers should be excluded from wage and hour
protections. Their arguments endorsed labor protections only for those workers who, by
their relative proximity to the chain of production, were deemed essential to the flow of
commerce.
The NIL, along with trade unionists from the AFL and Communist Party opposed
this view and argued for universal inclusion of workers under the code. While not
ultimately successful in keeping these classes of workers in the code, the NRA
administrators in the Roosevelt administration called for the cotton textile code to submit
a plan to extend workplace protections to the excluded workers. While it was not an
immediate victory, it was still a significant indicator that the federal government was
open to a vision of economic recovery that extended protections to more vulnerable
workers. It also highlights how these debates over the inclusion of Black workers were
part of a broader struggle over agriculture and industry in the New Deal.
Considering the evolution of the code itself illuminates these dynamics. As laid
out by a draft presented in June 1933, the stated purpose of the cotton textile code was to
address unemployment, improve standards of labor, limit competition, and increase the
“consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power.”162
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The public hearing considering the first proposal for a cotton textile industry code
generated significant debate over the proposed minimum wage and maximum hour limits
as well as the definition of the category “employee.”163
The first version of the code, drafted by the three industrial representatives on the
panel, stipulated a maximum 40-hour workweek, a $10 minimum weekly wage in the
South, and an $11 minimum weekly wage in the North. George Sloan, an industry
representative of the Cotton Textile Institute, spearheaded the efforts to draft the code and
presented it to the assembled Board. However, it quickly became clear that the industry
representatives had drafted the code without input from organized labor. One of the
government administrators overseeing the code board hearing was flabbergasted when
organized labor, including the AFL and its affiliate, the United Textile Workers of
America (UTWA), expressed its opposition to the code in the public hearing. The UTWA
representative said that there had not been an opportunity to raise concerns about the
code, as the manufacturing representatives had written the draft.164 This was not
uncharacteristic for the NRA code boards. Government administrators had quickly
become overwhelmed by the sheer scope of the task and, in many cases, delegated code
creation to businesses and employers.165
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The UTWA and other labor groups advocated for a lower maximum hour
provision and a higher weekly minimum wage than the manufacturers. By doing so, they
sought to simultaneously limit worker hours and create more jobs without lowering
overall wages. Some labor groups were concerned that the maximum hour provision was
not a guarantee of those hours and that the weekly wages were likely to decrease for
those workers. So, they advocated for higher wages. Thomas McMahon, who testified on
behalf of the UTWA, argued that the weekly wage should be $14.166 The other key AFL
locals and labor groups to testify also argued for a higher minimum wage than had been
proposed. This group included the national AFL, its affiliate the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America (ACWA), the Massachusetts Textile Council, and the National
Textile Workers. The constellation of this group is particularly telling. While all these
locals were in the AFL at that time, McMahon of the UTWA and Sidney Hillman of the
ACWA were among the seven founding members and unions of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), which broke away from the AFL in 1935 to focus on
organizing mass industrial workers. Textile workers, both in the North and the South,
were important sectors for that strategy.167
McMahon of the UTWA explicitly pointed to the exclusion of certain classes
from the definition of “employees” in the draft code as problematic. In the section
stipulating the minimum weekly wage for unskilled workers, the proposed code
exempted “learners during a six weeks’ apprenticeship, cleaners and outside
166
National Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearing on Code of Fair Practices: Cotton Textile
Industry, Vol. No. 1, June 28, 1933, Ibid, I-1.
167
Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955, 24 and 75-6.

86

employees.”168 The NRA administrators asked Sloan of the Cotton Textile Institute and
other agricultural manufacturers about the exclusion of these three classes in their first
testimony on June 27, 1933. Sloan claimed that excluding apprentices from the
minimum-wage requirements, reflected that fact that these were training programs, not
formal employment. He maintained that if minimum wages were put in place for this
group, employers would likely discontinue the apprentice programs due to the increased
cost. William H. Allen, the government administrator and chairman of the session, voiced
a concern that excluding apprentices from the code’s definition of an employee could
make them “perpetual apprentices,” who move from company to company, unable to find
stable work. Sloan admitted that while this exact situation had not come up in preliminary
discussions, he believed the proposed code would prevent this.169
Sloan invited another cotton manufacturing representative from the code board
and president of the American Cotton Manufacturers Association, T.M. Marchant, to
explain and defend the exclusion of cleaners and outside employees. “‘Cleaners,’ as they
are classed in the southern mills, are sweepers and certain types of operatives that clean
up the machines, merely when it is standing idle…Outside labor, as designated here, are
altogether colored workers who come in contact with the farming employes [sic], or
farming help. Colored operators.”170 When questioned about changes to the wage scales
for outside employees and cleaners, Marchant responded that he thought “it would be the
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understanding that naturally the wage scale of the outside employees would come up on
some corresponding basis in this fight.” General Hugh Johnson of the NRA asked
whether these increases in wage for outside employees would be proportional to increases
in wages for classes of workers included in the code. Marchant said he could not be sure
the increase would be proportionate, but he was confident that they would increase.
Johnson pressed Marchant on why, with that assumption, the code should not designate a
wage scale for cleaners and outside employees, as well. After some ineffective evasion,
Marchant said that it had not been considered. Johnson let the issue rest and returned to
Sloan’s testimony.
The following day, McMahon of the UTWA returned to this issue and argued that
the proposed exclusions from the code implied “careful stipulation about the meaning of
the word ‘employes [sic].’ Under the definition contained in the code ‘employes’ [sic] are
those actually employed in the operation and tending of looms and spindles.” McMahon
drew attention to the fact that, as drafted, the code’s definition of employee drew
significantly on the relationship of specific jobs to a chain of production. For example,
cleaners who worked around machines when they were idle were not thought to be part
of the production process. But McMahon stated that while the UTWA did not see these
exclusions as intentionally excluding unskilled workers, the effect was that “the most in
need of relief are afforded no relief.”171 While they may be outside of a recognized chain
of production, McMahon suggested that the decision about whether to include workers in
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the code should reflect the precarity of those workers and their need for legal protections.
This argument reflected a very different version of labor protections than what was being
advanced by the AFL at the national level. The UTWA was arguing quite forcefully for
labor protections for unskilled Black workers and challenging the exclusion of workers
based on proximity to the industrial chain of production.
This difference between the national AFL and the UTWA speaks to the fomenting
divide within the AFL over organizing industrial workers, which ultimately sparked the
split and formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). But this incident
also highlights that Black workers and issues of racial exclusion were very much
entwined with arguments about the need for universal labor protections made by soon-tobe CIO affiliates like the UTWA. Further, this exchange challenges those who argue that
a sense of solidarity among the white working-class, unified by a psychological
experience of whiteness, has perpetuated racial exclusion and discrimination against
Black workers.172 The clear division among white trade unionists as to how to pursue
universal labor protections that would include workers challenges the idea that “the
relationship between race and labor can be reduced to a narrative of exclusion and
subordination.” Instead, it requires consideration of a more complex array of factors,
most important among them being how this fight figured in the broader struggle between
capital and labor.173
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Concerning this broader struggle between capital and labor, this exchange also
reveals several important dynamics at play in this debate and other debates over the early
codes more broadly. In defining the excluded groups, cotton manufacturers like Marchant
emphasized that the outside workers and cleaners were not part of the chain of production
since they cleaned the machines when they were idling or simply provided support to
workers engaged in the chain of production. Marchant’s murky and evasive answers
make it challenging to assess the motivations behind the exclusions, which were of
interest to employers and manufacturers in seeking to create exemptions and ways around
new labor requirements. As McMahon pointed out in his testimony, this version of
industrial relations placed unskilled workers, who were already at the bottom of the wage
scale in the cotton textile industry, without the benefit of the new labor protections. But
this was only one possible version of industrial relations. As an alternative, McMahon
pushed for universal and inclusive labor regulations that also included Black workers.
Just as they argued that agricultural workers should be excluded from the NIRA based on
a delineation of the agricultural and industrial economies, employers and manufacturers
further sought to distinguish categories of workers “worthy” of labor protections in order
to create classes of workers that would be unregulated by New Deal labor protections.
While McMahon and Marchant did not explicitly call these exclusions an outright
or intentional exclusion of Black workers, two prominent labor and racial advocacy
organizers framed their remarks in explicitly racial terms. They were John P. Davis of the
Negro Industrial League (NIL) and June Croll of the National Textile Workers, a labor
group organizing southern cotton workers under the Communist Party (CPUSA). In his
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testimony, Davis provided census data to establish that of the nearly 14,000 Black
workers attached to cotton mills, roughly three-quarters were unskilled laborers, and only
one-quarter were semi-skilled operators. Further, Davis stated that seven out of ten of
these workers worked in five southern states (North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
Alabama, and Georgia). The fact that these were largely unskilled workers in the South
meant that, on the whole, Black workers were getting paid much less. Davis did not offer
comparable figures for white workers, however, as there was no official public
documentation of the comparison of wages between laborers and semi-skilled operators.
He did include the reference to unofficial records as part of his testimony:
Reports of private investigators from several sources agree, however, on these
basic conclusions: that persons classified as laborers working in cotton mills
receive a lower wage than that paid those classified as operatives; that an even
lower wage scale prevails for Negro laborers in the cotton textile industry than for
whites classified as laborers; that the hours of work for this class are more than 40
hours a week; that the work is unhealthy and generally unsanitary conditions
prevail.174
On these grounds, Davis claimed that the exclusion of outside employees and cleaners
would disproportionately impact Black workers:
This exception necessarily results in the exclusion of Negro wage earners from
the benefits to labor provided by the Act and stated to be within the purpose of the
Act by the President of the United States and the Administrator of the Act
appointed by him. The sharpness of this discrimination would be accentuated by
the fact that over four-fifths of colored ‘laborers’ attached to the cotton textile
industry are concentrated in the South – where wages are lowest and hours of
services are longest.175
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Davis argued that the very spirit of the exclusion went against the basic principle of
minimum-wage legislation to “raise excessively low wages.”176 Like McMahon of the
UTWA, Davis stressed that employers would be tempted to “evade the law by
reclassifying employees.” With an available group of laborers not protected by minimum
wage and maximum hour protections, employers were likely to “either falsify the
classification or shift men grouped in the excluded occupations to part-time work in
fields that are not included in the regulations.”177 This aligned with Marchant’s stated
intention that the wages of these classes of workers would be determined by the
employers, with perhaps some relationship to subsequent rises in the minimum wage for
code employees, but certainly no guarantee.
The NRA government administrators, Johnson and Richberg, asked Davis a single
question, whether the Negro Industrial League was satisfied with the minimum wage rate
proposed by the code. Davis once again pointed to the lack of a comprehensive cost of
living study for Black workers in the South, which they had asked the Department of
Labor to conduct. Without such information, Davis said he could not make a clear
assessment but agreed with the testimony of other labor groups who raised concerns.
The limited engagement with Davis stood in sharp contrast to Johnson and
Richberg’s open hostility to June Croll of the National Textile Workers. In her testimony,
Croll attacked the proposed code because, in her view, it did not accomplish the NIRA’s
goals to create jobs and increase wages for workers. Croll argued that neither the 40-hour
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maximum nor the weekly minimum wage took into account the real situation for textile
workers. She also clearly articulated the racial implications of the proposed worker
exclusions:
In the South, for instance, taking up this question of cleaners and outside people
who do odds and ends around the mill, who are they in the south, particularly?
Negroes. I know there are probably a lot of people here who think we don’t have
to worry about them. They are not people.
Croll’s testimony weaved together racial exclusion and worker exploitation concerns in
ways that connected the points made by other trade unionists and racial equality
advocates.
First, on the point of the maximum hour provisions, Croll argued that while some
workers were working 40, 50, and 60-hour workweeks, many workers had not been able
to get more than a few hours in a week. Further, she claimed that simply limiting the
hours for existing workers would not necessarily translate to job creation. Many
companies were seeking to stretch the existing employees by asking them to manage
more looms.178
In addition to highlighting the unfair practices of employers, Croll was also highly
critical of organized labor, particularly of the AFL and the UTWA’s failure to fight for
contracts that reflected the workers’ preferences and needs. She criticized organized labor
for using the exclusion of Black workers as a bargaining chip for higher wages for their
178
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white members.179 She also sought to distinguish between the interests of workers and the
machinations of labor elites, who were not only acting to benefit their workers.180 Indeed,
the national AFL representatives, William Green and John Frey, stayed quiet in response
to attempts to exclude outside workers and cleaners. But McMahon of the local AFL
affiliate, the UTWA, issued a clear call for the inclusion of the outside workers and
cleaners. This difference supports Croll’s claim that there were important distinctions
between the national union’s leaders and the rank-and-file workers, again speaking to the
growing rift that would result in the formation of the CIO.181
President Roosevelt signed the final version of the code on July 9, 1933. It
required $12 and $13 minimum weekly wages, a $1 increase over the original proposal,
but it maintained the 40-hour workweek. It also excluded outside workers and cleaners,
but with an important caveat:
While the exception of cleaners and outside workers is approved for the present, it
is on the condition that the Planning and Supervisory Committee provided by
Section 6 prepare and submit to the Administration, by January 1, 1934 a
schedule of minimum wages and of maximum hours for these classes.182
While not an outright success, this was a significant indication that the administrators
were dissatisfied with Sloan and Marchant’s defense of the exclusions and perhaps
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compelled by the testimony of those who advocated keeping outside workers and
cleaners in the definition of employee.
This code board hearing highlights an important moment for racial and labor
equality advocates. At its core, the issue of the outside workers and cleaners was a fight
over the consequences of placing some categories of laborers outside the framework of
legal labor protections. McMahon and the UTWA recognized that the risk of settling for
anything other than universal inclusion would be allowing employers to continue to
exploit the most disadvantaged workers. Davis and Croll also pointed to the harmful
consequences of these exclusions, highlighting the racially disparate impact that the
exclusion would have on Black workers. It is not clear whether the NRA administrators
were more compelled by the racial disparity or universal protection arguments. However,
the determination that the cotton textile code must set labor standards for cleaners and
outside workers in the following six months indicates that these arguments against
exclusions successfully shifted the government’s position on problems with excluding
classes of workers. Ultimately, this reconsideration never took place, as the tide turned
against the NRA, most critically resulting in the Supreme Court’s declaration that key
provisions, including the labor protections in Section 7(a), were unconstitutional.183
The Public Works Administration: An Experiment in Black Labor
The PWA, also created as part of the NIRA, generated another important
precedent for Black workers. The PWA was granted $3.3 billion to build and rehabilitate
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public infrastructure and create new jobs.184 Included within the PWA’s broad program
were a small number of construction projects that mandated racial quotas. The quota
system created by the PWA intended to address instances of racial discrimination by
requiring that employers and unions meet a designated threshold for Black construction
workers.185 The head of the PWA, Harold Ickes, who was Secretary of the Interior from
1933-1946, had been president of the Chicago NAACP prior to his appointment (from
1922-1924). Ickes established an “interdepartmental group concerned with the special
problems of the Negro” and appointed two advisers on Negro Affairs: Clark Foreman, a
southern white liberal, and Robert C. Weaver, a Harvard-trained black economist.186
Weaver left Davis and the Negro Industrial League to work as an Advisor on
Negro Affairs in the Department of the Interior. Some scholars have argued that the quota
system was a significant development for Black workers. Others have cautioned that the
small number of projects coupled with the fact that it was not applied to future programs
were limitations of the intervention.187 But whatever the broad impact and legacy of these
programs, this early instance of government intervention on behalf of black workers
informed and shaped the efforts of racial advocacy organizations for years to come.
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The PWA was not the first time the federal government confronted discrimination
issues in contracts for federal projects. Racial advocacy organizations had unsuccessfully
to tried to get more Black workers hired for public works projects during the Hoover
administration. In the early 1930s, the NAACP criticized the federal government for
failing to hire Black workers for two major public works projects. The first was the
Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, which received $185 million in federal funds and
created 3,800 jobs. The companies advertised that they were especially interested in
hiring military service members and veterans, but no Black workers were selected,
despite the large numbers of Black veterans who applied. The second project was a flood
control project in the Mississippi River Valley, which employed Black workers but paid
them much lower wages and forced them to work longer hours than whites. Hoover met
with the NAACP and National Bar Association to discuss discrimination in these projects
and established a commission to investigate the Mississippi project. However, he did not
dedicate funds to the commission, and the NAACP instead sought its own financing to
investigate.188
When Ickes became the Secretary of the Interior, he was aware of these
discrimination charges regarding public works programs, particularly on the Hoover Dam
project. His first action was to issue an order in 1933 prohibiting discrimination based on
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race or religion in PWA projects.189 The PWA was given broad latitude to implement the
anti-discrimination provision using the administrative tools they saw fit. One response
was to allocate a minimum percentage of payroll to go to Black workers on a subset of
PWA construction projects. The hope was that by setting a minimum threshold, the
agency could deem anything below that figure as “prima facie evidence of
discrimination.” Based on the 1930 occupational census, the PWA required that the
minimum percentage of Black workers on a given contract be equal to half the total
percentage of skilled black workers in the city or region. 190 Initially, PWA administrators
were unsure what their potential for enforcement would be. The anti-discrimination
clauses shifted the burden of proof onto contractors to provide clear evidence that they
were not discriminating against Black workers in the event that they did not meet the
quota. The required figures varied based on the workforce demographics in the cities
where projects were being implemented. Their early success in negotiating contracts in
Atlanta, GA, and Montgomery, AL emboldened the PWA administrators to set quotas
closer to the total percentage of skilled black workers in the area and include similar
benchmarks for unskilled workers.191
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Implementing this new quota system involved complex negotiations among Black
workers, organized labor, construction companies, and the government. Weaver argued
that one limitation of the quota system was that the federal government was usually not
an active part of the negotiation. Frequently, it was merely the provider of loans or grants
that were then managed by municipal, state, or local governments.192 Unions had a variety
of options to employ the required number of black workers: they could hire Black
workers already in the union; they could allow Black workers to temporarily join the
union, or they could issue work permits to black workers to meet their quota.193 Most
unions opted for the third option, which meant that they met the quotas without hiring
permanent Black workers into the union. This reflected labor’s resistance to federal
intervention into internal union affairs and ultimately meant that the PWA quota system
was not a particularly effective tool for facilitating Black workers’ integration into
organized labor.
Similarly, contractors were of little help in pushing unions to comply, for
“enthusiastic support of the agreement could alienate unions that a contractor would have
to work with in the future.”194 In some instances, unionized Black construction workers
also voiced opposition to the plan, claiming that “in the few unions where blacks were
dominant, opposition grew out of a fear that the PWA's demands might set a precedent
for restricting the number of black workers in the craft on other jobs.” According to
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Lawrence Oxley, who was then an administrator in the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration and member of Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet, these quotas would limit black
employment since the announcement stipulated “not more than 3 per cent of the skilled
jobs on the Harlem River construction project” would go to Black workers. Such a
proclamation was sure to “jar discordantly upon the ears of a large share of our
population."195
In considering the entire legacy of the PWA, historian Marc Kruman argues that it
had “ambiguous results.” It was in operation from 1935-1937 and only affected about
3,000 workers. Of the 37 projects that were the PWA administered, it had some success
in increasing the share of Black workers on federal public works payrolls. Perhaps
surprisingly, Southern contractors met the requirement more frequently than those in the
North.196 However, the program did not increase the number of skilled and unskilled
black workers in any of the municipalities in which it operated. Rather, it employed
available black workers for short-term projects. The quota system was also not broadly
adopted by other New Deal programs and agencies, with the exception of the PWA
Housing Authority, which adopted a quota system in 1937 that continued to benefit
skilled black construction workers. 197 While most New Deal agencies discriminated
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against black workers, Kruman argues that “the PWA experience suggests that in one
area the Roosevelt Administration did attempt to ease discrimination against Blacks, and
was partially successful.”198
Other scholars have contributed to this debate, broadly contributing to a
discussion of the limits and opportunities the New Deal economic program presented for
African Americans. In A New Deal for Blacks, first published in 1978, historian Harvard
Sitkoff argues that the PWA resulted in “unprecedented wages” for many Black workers
and “led to the admission of hundreds of blacks into previously lily-white Southern
construction trade unions.” However, in a later edition of the same book Sitkoff
recognized that his original claims, particularly the assessment that the PWA led to the
development of robust quota systems in other agencies (namely the U.S. Housing
Authority, Federal Works Agency, and the 1941 Fair Employment Practices Committee)
were overstated. He also indicates that his claims were based on the changes in policies
as opposed to practices.199 Indeed, other historians, like Nancy Weiss, argue that the
successes of the PWA were more modest than Sitkoff indicated. However, Weiss points
out that other agencies (like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration) were “organized in such a way that invited discrimination,”
making the PWA stand out by comparison.200
The impulse to attend not only to the changes in policies but to the practices that
resulted from the PWA should also invite a closer examination of how the PWA
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influenced racial equality efforts in subsequent years. The PWA sparked a debate about
the prudence of quota and proportionality provisions among racial equality organizations.
The NUL, which was mainly seeking to press the federal government to address
discrimination and disparities in relief and recovery programs, was supportive of the
quota system.201 They were more vocal in arguing for preferential treatment clauses, as
well. On the other hand, the NAACP was more cautious in its support for quotas and
proportional systems for addressing discrimination. Walter White did call for a “just
proportion” of public works funds to be committed to Black labor under President
Hoover. But like Oxley, the NAACP’s reticence about the use of quota systems was
rooted in its assessment that quotas might restrict opportunities for Black employment
instead of generating them.202 These differences in position on the quota system point to
the underlying tensions between social democratic and racial democratic methods for
increasing Black employment. While it stimulated public works and federal employment,
the PWA reflected a “scarcity economy” mindset, not a broad embrace of social
democratic calls for full employment.203
The NAACP and NUL would continue to debate the potential for economic
transformation through proportionalism in the years leading up to World War II. While
the NAACP and NUL preferred different tactics, they both embraced a version of
proportionalism that informed their future legislative efforts on behalf of Black workers.
Most importantly, both organizations increasingly called on the federal government to
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intervene in union operations to promote inclusion of Black workers. 204 The launch of
these new agencies provided grounds for racial equality organizations to experiment with
approaches to racial equality and economic opportunity. But the PWA inspired
experimentation with approaches that reflected the racial democratic goals of shifting
employment arrangements within the existing system, not challenging the underlying
scarcity model.
Robert Weaver, who had been working within the PWA for a year and a half,
provided his own evaluation of the efficacy of the PWA for Black workers from his
unique position within the agency. In a 1936 article published in the National Urban
League’s journal, Opportunity, Weaver was “convinced that [the PWA quota system] is a
workable solution to a difficult problem.” He argued it was more than just a “gesture in
the direction of effectively preventing discrimination against colored workers.” Nor, he
argued, was it one that sought to address discrimination after it had occurred, which he
said was usually the case. Instead, it transferred the burden of proving the existence of
discrimination onto the contractor or union to “establish the absence of discrimination.”205
By tying federal funds to specific employment arrangements, the government played a
more active role in mediating industrial relations.
But there were limits to what the PWA could do to address discrimination, and
Weaver’s account also clarifies that the agency’s approach highlighted these issues for
industrial policy. Some were familiar barriers. For example, Black plumbers and
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electricians were, in some cases, unable to obtain required licenses, which were required
under local and municipal laws.206 In addition, as was discussed above, Weaver notes that
federal oversight of PWA projects was limited, with more direct authority resting with
state, county, and municipal governments. This meant that the federal government had
limited involvement in constructing the contract itself, which further limited its scope of
influence. As Kruman also highlights, once contracts were in place, if the quotas were not
met, the government could cut off funds or pursue legal action. However, this outcome
was unlikely, given that to “use such sanctions in order to obtain the employment of a
few black workers would have been like using a sledgehammer to pound in a
thumbtack.”207 Thus, in the event that contractors and unions did not meet their quotas,
there were limited options for recourse.
Further, while the PWA helped to establish criteria that could help identify
discrimination, there “was no criterion which could be used to indicate when
discrimination had been abolished.”208 Thus, there remained challenges to translating the
quota system, or a proportional method for integrating Black workers, to broader federal
employment programs. Weaver argued there were two important lessons from the case of
the PWA as it relates to anti-discrimination policy. First, a clause was useful but not a
guarantee that discrimination could be regulated. And second, a clear and measurable
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criterion would be necessary to ensure that such a principle could be put into practice.
The above passage also points to the limits of a clear criterion. If companies and unions
were able to supply enough Black workers, that would be sufficient evidence that they
had not discriminated.
Finally, Weaver concluded that the PWA did not substantially increase the
number of Blacks in the workforce. Instead, it served mainly to shuffle workers who were
already part of the recognized labor force:
The minimum percentage clauses were designed to meet a peculiar situation.
Their objective was to retain past occupational advances for Negroes in the
middle 1930's—a period of slack labor demand. They were frankly a device to
regain lost ground; they were not designed to open new types of employment.209
This assessment speaks directly to the difference between the racial democratic approach,
shuffling Black workers in the existing workforce, and the social democratic approach,
which would have created new employment. It is clear that the PWA’s quota system had
served as a venue in which the merits of racial and social democratic approaches were
being evaluated and, to differing extents, adopted by racial advocacy organizations.
Although there were significant limitations in implementation, the PWA was
significant because it was the first time the federal government acted so deliberately to
direct industrial relations for the benefit of Black workers. Further, discussing the
limitations and pitfalls of anti-discrimination measures, particularly their lack of ability to
fully break down barriers into labor unions, provides important insights. The question of
how to deconstruct those barriers would be the subject of racial advocacy organizations’
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testimony during legislation proposed in the second wave of the New Deal (discussed
further in Chapters Four and Five). The ideas and reflections here, voiced by Weaver and
by the NAACP and NUL regarding quotas and proportionalism, would continue to shift
and evolve. And more importantly, the next iteration of this debate would reflect a very
different position within Congress and the government on how far to extend into
managing industrial relations.
Conclusion
During the first wave of the New Deal, the federal government’s increasingly
active role in guiding industrial policy presented new opportunities and barriers for racial
equality organizations. Through the NRA and PWA, racial advocacy organizations and
labor attempted to influence industrial policy. The NRA’s cotton textile code board
revealed that advocating for a universalism paradigm for industrial relations encompassed
both social-democratic demands for broad labor protections and racial democratic
concerns specific to Black workers. But the modest victory of AFL and Communist Party
labor organizers and the NIL secured in a provisional promise to keep cleaners and
outside employees in the cotton textile code did not prevent the emergence of a dual
wage system. This alliance of labor and racial advocacy organizations and their
alignment around issues of universal application of wage and hour standards to all
workers, including Black workers, is an important episode in emerging efforts to address
racial and economic equality.
But this nascent coalition was not the only legacy of the cotton textile code board
and the NRA more broadly. The NRA’s minimum wage provisions and geographic
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differentials led employers to replace many existing Black workers with white workers
paid at the NRA’s higher rates. In essence, minimum wage levels “enabled prejudiced
employers to ‘indulge their taste for discrimination’ without having to pay for it.” 210 The
industrial codes also paved the way for occupational and geographical differentials that
served a very similar purpose, providing devices for the exclusion of masses of Black
workers.211 These developments created incentives for employers and industrialists to
continue arguing for labor exclusions, as the following chapters will make clear.
The other opportunity for negotiating opportunities for Black workers in industrial
policy during the first wave of the New Deal was the PWA. This experience did not lead
to further collaboration with organized labor. Rather, the PWA revealed that in some
cases, the federal government was a less effective mediator. However, the PWA did
introduce a more explicit federal mechanism for increasing Black employment through
racial quotas. Racial advocacy organizations were divided on the utility of this tactic and
would continue to debate such race-specific goals in future policy battles.
These debates also underscore that the NRA and the version of associationalism
Roosevelt put forward collapsed in on themselves, both as the result of mounting
opposition from the business sector and the invalidation of key provisions of the NIRA
by the Supreme Court in 1934. In endorsing the Wagner Act, which was an attempt to
reconstruct key labor provisions of the NIRA and NRA, Roosevelt acquiesced to the idea
that his version of associationalism was intractable and the New Deal coalition’s vision
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for industrial policy shifted in the following years (for more on the Wagner Act, see
Chapter Four).212
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CHAPTER 4: NEW LABOR FRONTIERS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
DURING THE SECOND WAVE OF THE NEW DEAL
A. Philip Randolph represented a unique perspective among the Joint Committee
on National Recovery (JCNR) participants. He was the sole representative from a labor
organization at the JCNR and in 1935 was in the final years of an organizing campaign
for the first all-Black union, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP). Indeed, the
question of whether organized labor as it existed in 1935 could be a partner for racial
equality advocates seeking to promote Black employment loomed large at the JCNR
meeting. Randolph’s contribution to the meeting, “The Trade Union Movement and the
Negro,” spoke directly to this question. Randolph’s articulation of the issue was this:
“whether the A.F. of L., through its conventions and the Executive Council, has the moral
will and power to compel national and international unions affiliated with it to admit all
workers as members, regardless of race or color, is a question yet to be answered.”213
Moving into the second wave of the New Deal, this question became more salient as
Randolph, the BSCP, and other racial advocacy organizations pursued partnerships and
encountered roadblocks in working with organized labor.
The previous chapter laid out debates that were emerging when John Davis and
Robert Weaver formed the Negro Industrial League (NIL) in response to the first wave of
New Deal industrial policy in 1933. This chapter considers how those debates evolved
alongside the shift from the NIL to the Joint Committee on National Recovery during the
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next iteration of industrial policy in the second wave of the New Deal starting in 1934
and 1935. In some cases, these debates were taking place concurrently with the
administrative debates in the NRA and PWA. But one difference marked by this second
wave of policy-making was that the issues that racial advocacy organizations had raised
in the first wave took on more prominent roles in legislative debate. Drawing particularly
on experiences during the cotton textile code board hearing of the National Recovery
Administration (NRA), racial advocacy organizations raised issues facing Black workers
in debates over the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the 1935
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the 1935 Social Security Act (SSA), and the 1935
Workers’ Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance Bill (the Lundeen bill). As they
had in response to the NRA and the Public Works Administration, racial advocacy
organizations continued to call for race-based measures to be incorporated into law.
Extending the consideration of key themes from the JCNR meeting discussed in
Chapter Two, racial advocacy organizations also increasingly focused on broader issues
of economic restructuring and increasingly called for a larger role for the federal
government in industrial policy. These efforts to target economic change brought them
into closer contact and collaboration with both labor unions as well as the Communist
Party (CPUSA). The development of these alliances and their moments of success and
failures sheds light on the conditions and context in which racial advocacy organizations
and labor unions could build strong alliances.
This chapter analyzes the legislative debates over the major legislative efforts that
shaped industrial policy in this period, particularly focusing on the points of commonality
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and difference between racial advocacy organizations and labor unions. Beginning with
A. Philip Randolph’s successful efforts to organize the BSCP from 1925-1937, the
chapter highlights the successful attempt to organize Black workers under new federal
labor protections in the Railway Labor Act. Randolph and the BSCP fought alongside
other white railway unions and succeeded in broadening the definition of “employee”
under the RLA to include the porters, maids, and conductors. These were the classes of
workers the BSCP represented and without the broadened definition, their unionization
efforts would have fallen outside the scope of the law. While the BSCP’s interests
aligned with white labor unions during the RLA hearings, the BSCP’s decision to affiliate
with the AFL exposed both the challenges and opportunities for Black workers and the
major labor association.
Key legislation in 1935 also put forward a new set of industrial policies, in
response to the Supreme Court’s 1935 ruling in Schecter v. Poultry Co. which voided
central provisions of the NIRA. The primary challenges with the NIRA’s central agency,
the NRA, extended beyond the Court’s ruling, however. For separate reasons, labor and
industry had both come to oppose the NRA’s code boards, the primary industrial relations
framework. For labor’s part, the collective bargaining rights in the NIRA’s Section 7(a)
were too limited and did not go far enough in helping independent labor associations.214
In response to the NRA, many companies had gotten around the employee representation
provisions in Section 7(a) by creating employee representation plans, or company unions.
These were organized groups of employees, but they were largely financed by employers.
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Further, as was outlined in the last chapter, the widespread practice of exclusion and the
fragmented code boards made the NRA unwieldy and ineffective, particularly for
establishing labor standards. This meant that wage and hour protections were being
applied in a piecemeal fashion, with no national standard or baseline.
Collective bargaining rights and the need for clearer wage and hour protections
had become central issues for organized labor in industrial policy debates. Even before
the Court invalidated the NIRA, progressive members of Congress had already begun
crafting a new industrial relations act, the Wagner-Connery bill, which representatives of
organized labor and many others saw as not only a chance to reconstruct Section 7(a) but
also as an opportunity to push for stronger prohibitions against company unions and to
establish a stronger national labor board. Labor’s increasing political influence, coupled
with Roosevelt’s assessment that the associationalist framework of the NRA was not
effective industrial policy, led the administration and New Dealers in Congress to back
the Wagner Act, which sought to more directly empower organized labor rather than
foster an associationalist and harmonious vision for industrial relations.215
Racial advocacy organizations, particularly the NAACP and NUL, drew on their
experiences with the NRA and PWA and used their NLRA testimony to call for
government intervention in industrial relations to break down racial barriers that were
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preventing Black workers from joining unions. But the NAACP and NUL’s arguments
that racial barriers were preventing unionization of Black workers were met with
resistance from members of Congress and representatives of the AFL. Their pushback
reveals a commitment to a version of industrial relations where the government’s role
was to restrain employers, not intervene in labor’s operations. These testimonies reflect a
commitment to trade unionism as a viable path to black economic equality, but the
arguments were less connected to a critique of the capitalist economic order than they had
been in the JCNR discussions. However, the Communist Party advanced a critique of the
capitalist economic order and the AFL’s organizing strategy as it affected workers,
including black workers.
Finally, this period also saw the advent of a new element of industrial policy:
unemployment insurance. As it was attached to employment status, unemployment
insurance occupied a middle position connecting industrial policy and the welfare state.216
Concurrent with the debate over the Wagner Act, members of Congress and the
Roosevelt administration were also crafting several proposals to establish social
insurance programs for the needy elderly and unemployed, as well as for children,
mothers, and the disabled. Debates over what would ultimately become the Social
Security Act (SSA) resulted in the largest expansion of the American welfare state to
date. But many thought the SSA did not go far enough in helping struggling Americans
and pushed for an alternative proposal, the Workers’ Unemployment Bill, Old Age, and
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Social Insurance Bill, or the Lundeen bill, which would offer greater relief to
unemployed workers. Supporters proposed to pay for it, not through a payroll tax on
workers, but rather a tax on corporations and large estates. Notably, the bill also
contained an anti-discrimination provision promising relief regardless of “sex, race, or
religious creed.” The Lundeen bill represented a more social-democratic version of
unemployment insurance. The champions of the bill in Congress included racial equality
organizations, the Communist Party, and rank-and-file trade unionists.
Each of these proposals sought significant changes in American political and
economic institutions and presented new opportunities for elected officials and a broad
range of citizens and organizations to advocate for alternative visions for how
government should intervene in the economy and on behalf of whom. In many ways,
these debates were extended ideas and ideological positions that first emerged in debates
over the NIRA. However, there were also significant differences. For one, racial
inequality and discrimination featured more prominently in Congressional debates and
hearings over the second wave of New Deal proposals. Carrying forward arguments
made in the 1935 meeting of the Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR), an
interracial coalition of racial equality organizations fought to connect issues faced by
Black workers to debates over industrial relations and social insurance during the
hearings on key second wave New Deal proposals.
And while one uniting goal of the JCNR participants was to build politicaleconomic institutions that aided the least-advantaged workers, in this period fissures over
how to do that that began to reinforce ideological formations that segmented racial and
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economic issues as distinct, rather than connected, contributors to Black economic
inequality. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the first wave of the New Deal had
given rise to broad-based, interracial coalitions that understood racial inequality to be one
feature of a capitalist economic order. But these efforts were also in tension and at times
seen as opposed to efforts to provide more explicit provisions for Black workers, taking a
more race-centric focus that often accommodated the existing economic system. The
legislative debates in the second wave of the New Deal included new articulations of this
fissure. Most prominently, debates over the RLA, NLRA, SSA, and the Lundeen bill
brought the question of whether organized labor could be an ally in these struggles or an
opponent to the fore. These efforts began to foment a belief among some organizations a
more narrowly-tailored adherence to racial democracy, defined primarily by a focus on
racial discrimination, was a more fruitful path than mounting a social-democratic
challenge to the Keynesian capitalist political-economic order.
The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters: Legislative and Organizational Battles
for Recognition
In the early twentieth century, railway labor came to be governed by a different
set of industrial policies, and battles between railway labor associations and railway
carrier companies set precedents that, while separate, did influence the broader
development of industrial policy. In particular, railway unions succeeded in amending the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) in 1934 to include a broad definition of employees and
establishing a Mediation Board with the power to rule in favor of independent unions
over company unions created by the carriers. These victories, won by the BSCP as well
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as white railway unions, set an important precedent that inspired other labor
organizations to press for the same kinds of protections and safeguards in the Wagner Act
and industrial policy more broadly. 217
The development of industrial policy regarding railway labor in this period was
especially significant for racial equality advocates considering the question raised by the
JCNR participants about working with organized labor. A. Philip Randolph, whose
contribution to the JCNR had been precisely focused on the question of organizing for
racial justice through labor unions, was in the midst of a unionization campaign of Black
employees of the Pullman Company that stretched from 1925-1937. The Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) set several important precedents. First, it was the first allBlack union to form and officially affiliate with a major labor association, the AFL.
Second, it became the first union to make use of the Mediation Board created by the
RLA. The BSCP occupied the important position as both a labor union of Black workers
and an important racial advocacy organization. Randolph and the BSCP would play a
critical role, particularly as the organizer of the 1941 March on Washington which
resulted in the creation of the first-ever federal agency to address discrimination and fair
employment (see Chapter Six for a discussion of these efforts). Randolph and the BSCP’s
path to union recognition underscores both the legal and organizing challenges that
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workers, and particularly Black workers, faced during this time. Further, it calls attention
to the important ways that Randolph and the BSCP were weighing elements of racial and
social democracy in constructing a new union.
The Path to Victory: Interracial Solidarity and Amending the Railway Labor Act
The legal challenges the BSCP faced in their recognition campaign were the same
as those faced by white railway labor unions at the time. First and most importantly,
workers had to be recognized and protected under the law. In the early twentieth century,
laws governing the railway sector specified the particular classes of laborers that were
protected. In 1915, a national Commission on Industrial Relations convened to consider
the “economic status of Pullman conductors and porters” and highlighted the need for
federal legislation that would cover the Pullman Company employees.218
The second major legal challenge was that independent unions, like the BSCP,
had to garner more support than the company unions that many carriers and other
employers created in order to satisfy the requirement that employees be allowed to
organize and bargain. The Transportation Act of 1920 provided a first opportunity for the
BSCP to assert itself as the agent representing Pullman employees and challenge the
existing company union, Pullman’s Employee Representation Plan. However, Randolph
and the porters did not take this first opportunity to bring their case before the Railway
Labor Board established by the act, for it had limited authority and effectiveness for
aiding labor struggles. The “Big Four” Brotherhoods put pressure on Congress to
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establish a better and more effective labor board for railway employees.219 While the Big
Four Brotherhoods all barred Black railroad workers from becoming members, legally
the groups all found themselves facing the same obstacles: adjudication boards could not
force employers to bargain with independent unions who had seemingly less support than
company unions.
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 established a new set of labor and bargaining
conditions and created a new Mediation Board to resolve disputes between carriers and
labor groups. The act also officially recognized and protected Pullman employees.220
Critically, the act defined the scope of workers included in the carrier industry and
created regional and national adjudication mechanisms for disputes that could not be
settled between employers and organizations representing their employees, be they
company or independent unions. Carrier companies and workers disagreed as to how
these boards should be structured and managed, with employees favoring a centralized
national structure and employers favoring regional adjustment boards. Their preferences
reflected the power differential between employees and employers. Employees sought an
arbiter with authority to impose sanctions on unwilling companies, while employers
favored less authoritative boards.
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Both the NIRA and the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (1933) changed
the bureaucratic channels railway labor groups had been using to try to usurp company
unions in the railway industry and re-opened the question of which employees would
qualify for protection under the law. Randolph, in coordination with other white railway
labor organizations, pushed for amendments to the Railway Labor Act in 1934 that would
include all categories of railway laborers and establish an adjudication board with more
authority to enforce decisions between employers and employees.
The need for a more powerful arbiter became clear as the porters sought
recognition through the new Mediation Board. The RLA created both regional adjustment
boards and a national Mediation Board to resolve disputes between carriers and their
employees. According to the law, the adjustment boards were to be “created by
agreement between any earner or group of carriers, or the carriers as a whole, and its or
their employees.” These boards were also to have equal representation from both
employers and workers.221 The national Mediation Board, with members appointed by the
president, was the entity designated to resolve disputes that were not settled in the
regional boards of adjustment.
In 1926, the BSCP brought a case before the Mediation Board to challenge the
company union, but the Pullman Company maintained that the Brotherhood did not have
the majority support that their company union had. On August 9, 1927, the mediators
announced that no agreement had been reached and recommended the groups enter
formal arbitration through a regional adjustment board. Unfortunately, under the
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Railway Labor Act, arbitration was a voluntary step that both parties had to agree to, and
the Pullman Company declined. Without a decision from a regional adjustment board, the
BSCP could not appeal the decision to the national Mediation Board. 222 However, the
mediators in the BSCP case did indicate, in their opinion, the BSCP represented the
majority of Pullman porters, which was a major landmark in their campaign and a
positive indication of what new federal industrial policy could offer to workers seeking to
organize.223
With no path forward through the Mediation Board, Randolph and the BSCP
brought a suit in federal court against the Pullman Company and simultaneously fought
to amend the RLA in 1934. 224 Randolph also continued to build support for a strike vote,
which he hoped would force the national Mediation Board and President Roosevelt to
take notice and establish an emergency board.225 Randolph was not alone in advocating
for revisions to the adjustment boards. Still unsatisfied with the mechanism for
adjudication, a coalition of railway labor groups was also seeking to challenge employersanctioned company unions among carrier companies. George Harrison, representing the
Railway Labor Executives Association, raised complaints similar to the BSCP when he
testified before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in April 1934. He argued
that in the 8 years that railway labor unions had been under the jurisdiction of the RLA,
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they had come to identify “certain unfair practices.”226 One key problem was the
continued existence of company unions, which he argued should have been prohibited by
both the RLA and NIRA. However, the greatest and most controversial issue Harrison
identified in his testimony concerned the adjustment boards, those that oversaw labor
disputes, a claim the Senate Committee chair agreed with.227
Harrison and the railway labor organizations argued forcefully for a stronger
national mechanism to oversee labor disputes. He succinctly paraphrased the same
problem facing the BSCP, which was that the RLA provided “for the establishment of a
system of regional or national boards of adjustment, but the joker in the situation is that
you cannot establish them unless you can get both parties to agree.”228 While the carrier
companies continued to favor regional boards, Harrison and the labor organizations he
represented favored a national board with the authority to enforce the rulings of the local
boards. Harrison’s proposed amendments were to create such a board; however, it would
not have jurisdiction in cases where a voluntary regional board had been created by
carriers and their employees.229 Without a capable enforcement mechanism, it would be
impossible for labor groups to challenge their company unions. Harrison proposed
additional amendments that defined company unions and instituted more mechanisms to
protect workers from being pressured to join these groups.
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While Harrison’s organization did not formally represent Randolph and the
BSCP, the two were clearly coordinating their efforts and arguments in 1934. Harrison
tried to cede his remaining time to Randolph in subsequent testimony and argued that the
amendments he put forward would also solve the BSCP’s predicament.230 While he was
not able to testify in the same hearing as Harrison, Randolph had testified before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in April 1934 and submitted a written
statement to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In his April
1934 testimony, Randolph called for the same amendments Harrison had proposed and
reiterated Harrison’s claim that “the matter of the company union is really the crux of the
whole question.”231 Harrison and Randolph would later that year find themselves on
opposite sides during the AFL national convention, with regard to a set of resolutions to
address racial discrimination within the association.232 This struggle within the AFL will
be explored in the next section, however here it is important to point out that Randolph’s
calculations about the necessity of legal alliances and those within the AFL were
different. His pragmatism was one of his organizing strengths.
When the RLA amendments were first proposed, the sleeping car porters, maids,
and dining car employees were not included in the definition of carrier workers. Some of
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the BSCP’s leaders felt that those exclusions were largely an act of racial
discrimination.233 Randolph also testified that the amendments should include those
categories of workers. Without this amendment, he argued, the “some nine or more
thousand” sleeping car porters, in addition to thousands more dining-car workers, would
no longer be protected in their organizing efforts. Further, Randolph argued that “unless
this is done, it is apparent that endless complications will arise in attempts to adjust
disputes that will arise between these classes of employees and the railway companies for
which they work.234
The final 1934 Crosser-Dill Railway Labor Act reflected many of the changes the
BSCP and Harrison’s association advocated for. The revised act did away with the
regional adjustment boards in favor of a national mediation board that could initiate cases
brought by either party.235 The new Mediation Board was organized into four divisions
and the third division included porters, maids, and dining-car employees. Further, the
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amended RLA also resolved the question of the legality of company unions for railway
companies.236
While these were important victories for the porters, during this time the BSCP
had also become subject to two additional pieces of legislation that imposed new barriers
for their campaign. In 1933, Congress passed both the NIRA and the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act (ERTA). In the testimony on the RLA discussed above, Randolph
also outlined how they became trapped between the jurisdictions of multiple new
agencies:
When the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 was enacted with its
far-reaching provisions to safeguard the right of self-organization for railroad
workers, the porters and maids thought that they would then be able to establish
their right to select and designate representatives of their own choosing, but when
their case was raised to the coordinator, they were informed that the Pullman Co.
did not come under NRA because it is a carrier and it does not come under ERTA
because it is not a carrier by railroad, and that the only remedy was to amend the
act so as to include sleeping-car companies.237
The BSCP found itself in this strange legal loophole because of the particularities of the
Pullman Company and the porters as a class of workers. The Pullman Company
manufactured sleeping cars and also contracted to operate them on larger train systems.
Thus, it did not fit exactly into the common carrier definition. Indeed, Pullman Co. tried
to exploit this loophole and avoid regulation under new railway labor legislation by
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arguing that its employees functioned more like innkeepers than train employees.238 The
combined passage of the ERTA and the NIRA in the same year created an additional set
of questions about jurisdiction over carrier employees. The BSCP followed the
coordinator’s recommendation to seek to amend the RLA to include porters, maids,
dining car employees, and Pullman conductors. Ultimately, it was through the
amendments to the RLA in 1934 that the BSCP was able to petition the Mediation Board
for an election mandate, which they successfully did in 1935.239 As a result of their
efforts, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters was the first union to conduct a national
election under the newly created Mediation Board.240 After a 12-year battle, the Pullman
Company and the BSCP signed their first contract in 1937.241
This was a significant victory: A. Philip Randolph had succeeded in forming the
first union composed entirely of Black workers. And as Harrison and Randolph’s
testimony clearly shows, the BSCP’s legal challenges were largely shared by white
railway laborers. Both were fighting against company unions and the overwhelming
power of employers. This alignment and collaboration with white railway labor certainly
do not discount the challenges the BSCP faced in affiliating with the AFL as an all-Black
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union. But it does speak to the potential for such collaborations to press toward shared
legal goals.
The Fight for Affiliation with the American Federation of Labor
At the same time that Randolph and the BSCP were fighting for changes to
industrial policy that would grant the union formal recognition, they were in the midst of
another fight for recognition within the AFL. As it had during the JCNR meeting, the
question of affiliating with the AFL or any union that allowed for segregation and racial
discrimination had been a matter of great debate within the BSCP. For example, Black
porters, maids, and conductors had not been allowed to join the major railway labor
unions as they began to form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
“Big Four” Brotherhoods passed constitutional amendments and bylaws provisions to
exclude black workers.242 Prior to joining the porters’ fight, Randolph himself had been
very critical of the AFL’s organizing practices, both on account of racial bars and also
based on the AFL’s preference for craft unions: “[Randolph] realized the masses of
Negro workers would never get into craft unions because they were living in an industrial
economy that was increasingly minimizing the necessity of skill by adopting
technological processes, designed as laborsaving and mass production devices.”243
Yet Randolph’s position shifted once he took on the task of organizing Pullman
Co employees. He argued, “there is no hope for any group of workers without some
power and history has shown that the labor movement is the source of power for
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workers.” And he also saw an avenue into the AFL: by appealing to their sense of selfinterest in avoiding powerful blocks of black strikebreakers.244
In the 1920s, the BSCP leadership affiliated with the AFL, which some regarded
as a controversial decision. The BSCP needed the institutional insight and resources to be
able to pursue its recognition campaign against the Pullman Company, but many were
also wary of negative consequences. As International Vice-President Webster recounted
in a 1940 speech looking back on the decision, the perception of this decision by many
was that the BSCP had decided to subject itself to another prejudiced organization. But
Webster argued for the alliance on strategic and ideological grounds:
But in my experience in the American labor movement, particularly in the
American Federation of Labor, I want to say to you that the question of amicable
race relations is being more logically worked out in the trade union movement
than it is in any other movement in America…After all, the majority of white
people are workers and the majority of Negroes are workers.245
The decision to affiliate with a highly segregated institution like the AFL was necessary
for building their union. But the above quote also highlights that there were factions
within the leadership that saw building a strong labor movement as an important means
for pursuing racial equality. Webster suggests that investing in broad working-class
solidarity was a way to build power.
Scholars have also speculated as to what drove William Green, then president of
the AFL, to bring the BSCP and Black workers into what was still a highly segregated
and racially exclusionary organization. Pfeffer and Brazeal both argue that Green was
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clearly motivated by the potentially beneficial strategy of bringing would-be
strikebreakers into the fold. Both scholars also argue that Green felt pressure to offer
black workers an alternative to communism.246 Randolph, a staunch Socialist, had worked
to squelch Communist efforts to infiltrate the BSCP, perhaps affirming Green’s hope that
“the organization that could serve as an instrument for rallying Negro workers under the
hegemony of the Federation.”247
And while Brazeal recognizes the threat as Green perceived, he seems to rule out
the possibility that any black workers could establish any real ideological attachment to
communism or other radical ideologies:
It was hoped that this action [Green working with the BSCP] would decrease the
tendency of Negro workers to listen to the radical doctrines of those who
considered them a potential reservoir that would give numerical, if not ideological
impetus to aid the cause of communism.248
Brazeal seems to sidestep the real issue, which was that in this period the AFL was
focused on organizing workers in skilled trades and was hesitant to organize masses of
industrial workers. Further, Brazeal’s statement suggests both that the Communist Party’s
organizing strategy was distinct from an underlying ideological commitment to mass
worker mobilization and that black workers were some coherent ideological mass that
would not be ideologically committed to communism. This comment represents a kind of
racially essentialist reasoning by reducing considerations of communism among black
workers to one of strategic calculation, not ideological commitment.
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The BSCP’s path into the AFL sheds further light on these dynamics. When the
BSCP first applied to the AFL for an international charter in 1928, the Hotel Alliance, the
hotel and restaurant international, claimed that it should represent the porters since the
sleeping cars were more like “hotels on wheels” than railroad companies. However, the
BSCP pushed back against becoming part of the Hotel Alliance because it would limit the
BSCP’s autonomy. By way of compromise, the AFL gave each of the fourteen branches
of the BSCP independent charters with the AFL. This gave the BSCP autonomy over
their locals’ operations, but it also reduced their ability to influence the AFL in
conventions. While the international unions were granted convention votes based on the
size of their membership, federal unions were each granted a single vote. Had they been
an international union, however, the Porters would have had 40 votes based on their size,
as opposed to the 14 votes for each federal union.249
In 1934, the same year that the BSCP was fighting for recognition under the RLA,
they had to fight once more for their autonomy within the AFL. The Order of Sleeping
Car Conductors, one of the “Big Four” Brotherhoods, applied to the AFL Executive
Council for jurisdiction over the sleeping car porters, conductors, and maids. Initially, the
Executive Council granted the Order’s request and placed the BSCP under the control of
another international union. However, when Randolph threatened to withdraw the BSCP
from the AFL entirely, the Executive Council rescinded its decision. On August 17, 1935,
the AFL finally granted the BSCP its own international charter: “This charter grant was
but one of the factors which phenomenally changed the position of the porters’ union,
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from an exceedingly weak organization in 1933 to that of a virile one whose morale was
at a high peak in 1935.”250 This was a significant victory for the BSCP in gaining
autonomy within the AFL structure.
Given Randolph’s commitment to industrial unionism, some have also remarked
that it was unusual that Randolph did not follow his friend and mentor John L. Lewis of
the United Mine Workers when he and other unions broke away from the AFL to form
the CIO and pursue industrial unionism in 1937. There is no indication that Lewis ever
invited Randolph to join him, nor any indication that Randolph considered the move
himself. Scholars like Paula Pfeffer speculate that Randolph could have been considered
that the move would have meant the BSCP became part of one of the large,
discriminatory railway unions that they had fought so hard to stay out of in the AFL.
Whatever the reason, the benefits of bringing black laborers into the AFL for Green were
challenged by Randolph’s willingness to bring issues of racial discrimination within the
AFL into the public eye. The BSCP gave racial advocacy organizations a foothold in
organized labor.251
There are several key takeaways from the recognition battle of the BSCP,
especially when told from the perspective of legislative and bureaucratic change. First,
the interplay among newly created agencies was both a challenge and an opportunity for
workers trying to challenge company unions and establish their own autonomous
organizations. As Paula Pfeffer and others have argued:
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Rather than denying responsibility for unemployed relief and remaining blind to
deprivation of civil rights, the many commissions and agencies of the New Deal
provided more rational, dependable, and, consequently, more amenable to
deciding minority-group issues on their merits than did local authorities and
private employers characterized by emotional racism and paternalism.252
The BSCP benefitted from a membership boom as the NIRA sent a signal to labor groups
and civil rights groups that integration into unions and the labor movement was an
important opportunity for economic advancement.253 Further, as industrial rights
continued to morph following the Supreme Court’s overturning of the NIRA, many
looked to the railway labor groups as an example of how to successfully reshape
industrial relations and protect the interests of workers.
This history shows that the BSCP’s legal and organizing battles displayed one
particular pathway towards interracial unionism. The legal battles Randolph and the
BSCP fought were not focused on racial discrimination or other issues pertaining
specifically to Black workers but rather relied on collaboration with white railway labor
groups to mount a successful challenge against the Pullman Company. The porters were
advocating for expanding labor rights against industrialists who were attempting to use
company unions to satisfy the new legislative protections for labor. Looking to their
internal struggle for recognition with the AFL, the BSCP successfully pressed for
recognition and autonomy within the association’s structure in order to avoid being
subsumed into a larger, segregated local. The tactics and approaches Randolph shaped in
this period would inform his later approach to the fight for fair employment during World
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War II (see Chapter V). However, this was not the only strategy of racial advocacy
organizations engaged in industrial policy debates in the second wave of the New Deal.
The following sections turn to debates over the NLRA, SSA, and Lundeen bill, which
taken together display both efforts to push for labor protections and social insurance for
more workers, including Black workers, as well as clearer articulations of a more racially
democratic focus on racial discrimination within unions.
The National Labor Relations Act: Industrial Relations for Black Workers
A. Philip Randolph and the BSCP charted a middle path by both collaborating
with white labor groups to amend the Railway Labor Act (RLA) as well as pressing from
within the AFL for greater racial inclusion. One result of this approach was that the
challenges of racial integration in labor unions were not a part of the legislative debates
over the RLA. However, testimony over the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the
Wagner Act) brought clashes between racial advocacy organizations and organized labor,
particularly the AFL, to the fore of congressional debates. Unlike debates over the 1933
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the congressional committees that considered
the NLRA heard from a variety of organizations that included calls for greater inclusion
of Black workers in industrial policy. These interventions cohered around two basic
positions that roughly correspond to the racial and social democratic approaches to
industrial policy.
The racial democratic position, put forward most clearly by the NAACP and the
NUL, called attention to the racially discriminatory practices of organized labor and the
exclusion of classes of disproportionately Black workers from the act’s definition of
132

employees. These groups called for the NLRA to be amended to include an antidiscrimination clause that would apply to labor unions seeking protection under the law
and a definition of employee that included strikebreakers and agricultural and domestic
workers. While somewhat different in their prescriptions, in their testimony, the NAACP,
NUL, and FCC all called on more explicit government intervention in industrial relations
to correct discriminatory practices of unions.
The social democratic position, which was most clearly articulated by the
Communist Party (CPUSA) and a related group the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL),
connected issues of racial inequality to the broader capitulation to industry and
employers’ interests in the NLRA. Representatives highlighted that rather than acting as a
potential corrective force in regulating unions discriminatory practices, the experience of
the first wave of the New Deal revealed that both the AFL and the federal government
were constructing a version of industrial relations that conceded too much ground to
employers at the expense of workers.
It is important to note at this juncture that the AFL largely avoided the issue of
racial discrimination and Black workers in their testimony. And as the most prominent
labor association at the time, the AFL was an important force shaping the law. However,
this claim also should not be overstated. While it is true that the leadership of the national
AFL did not speak to issues faced by Black workers in their NLRA testimony, this should
not be mistaken for a blanket position of the Association. The AFL, as a labor
association, represented a heterogeneous collection of trade unions, which were all
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enmeshed in questions over Black workers.254 As the last chapter discussed, where the
AFL national leadership was more reticent to address issues faced by Black workers in
the NRA cotton textile code board hearing, local AFL affiliates took a more direct
approach. Further, the next section of this chapter includes a discussion of the rank-andfile AFL locals that went against the AFL leaderships position and advocated for the
Lundeen bill.
Before explaining how the racial and social democratic approaches factored into
debates over the NLRA, it is important to give a brief overview of the key issues
animating debate over the Wagner Act, particularly from the perspective of AFL.
Ultimately, the debate centered on many of the same issues and questions that animated
discussion of the RLA: an explicit prohibition of company unions as recognized labor
representatives and a stronger labor or mediation board to give the policy real authority.
255

Indeed, the RLA had come to be seen as a beacon of the impact effective industrial

policy could have, particularly for preventing strikes and promoting industrial peace:
For a definite program of long-time planning, we must have Federal legislation.
Such legislation is by no means unknown. We have already before us the railway
labor legislation which has shown the way.256
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Green argued that the reason the RLA had been so successful in preventing railroad
strikes was that both sides felt secure in the arrangement: “there exists a genuine
satisfaction in the hearts and minds of the railroad workers through the operation of the
Railway Labor Act.”257 It was this kind of petition for industrial harmony that sparked the
critique from the left, by groups like the CPUSA.
And although it did not go far enough in support of workers to satisfy the
CPUSA, the NLRA represented a period of reshuffling and resettling industrial policy.
While the NLRA attempted to reconstruct key components of the NIRA, particularly
Section 7(a) which had expanded bargaining rights for workers, the law was a bolder
declaration of support from the federal government for organized labor and workers than
the previous iteration. The NIRA was intended to facilitate a version of industrial
harmony, where decisions about industrial policy were made jointly by industry and
labor. The NLRA siphoned off labor protections and sought more explicit provisions to
strengthen organized labor.258 Tellingly, labor had been unsatisfied with the NRA
framework, arguing that it gave too much power to industry. 259 The NLRA established a
permanent labor relations board that would supervise union elections and compel
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unwilling employers to the bargaining table. It also established a list of unfair, or
coercive, labor practices committed by employers.260
As for the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, company unions were formidable
organizing challenges for many workers trying to organize under the AFL or as another
independent labor group. While the Supreme Court had found the company union was
unconstitutional in 1930, in the case of Texas & New Orleans Railway v. Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks, they were still a major organizing obstacle for labor unions.261 In his
1934 testimony before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, AFL president
William Green pointed to the growth in company unions since the passage of the NIRA
and the weak enforcement power given to the labor board by Section 7(a).262 Further,
Green connected strikes and labor unrest, not to organized labor, but the massive influx
of company unions. He argued that 75% of strike activity resulted from resistance to the
proliferation of company unions.263
Finally, the interpretation of a majority rule stipulation was a major issue related
to challenging company unions. In February of 1934, the executive branch issued a
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directive in the NRA bulletin (Release 3078) with an indication about how the code
boards and NIRA should treat the issue of majority rule:
The Executive order establishes the principle of majority representation and gives
to the National Labor Board authority to hold elections, to acquire knowledge as
to the majority desire of units of employees on the question of their
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining…”264
Three days later, NRA administrators Johnson and Richberg issued a controversial
interpretation of FDR’s memo. In a special release on February 4, 1934, the memo stated
that “the selection of majority representatives does not restrict or qualify in any way the
rights of minority groups of employees or of industrial employees to deal with their
employer.”265 The AFL challenged Richberg and Johnson’s interpretation, calling it
completely antithetical to the Executive Order’s intent. Green and Lewis argued that this
interpretation would result in a proportionate representation plan: “In other words, they
say the majority can deal for the majority, the minority group for the minority, and
another group for another group, the individual for the individual.”266 Green stated that
“Minority rule can only have one aim, and that is to confuse and divide the workers—to
play one organization against the other.”267
AFL representatives did not explicitly link any of these issues to the struggles of
Black workers, nor did their position reflect the NRA cotton textile code board debates or
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the experience of incorporating Black workers into PWA contracts. However, the
organizations and groups that did speak to the issue of racial discrimination and the
exclusion of Black workers from government programs and organized labor connected
those issues directly to these issues outlined by the AFL. Some scholars have argued that
pressure from the AFL and the white Democratic South left Wagner with his hands tied
when it came to helping black workers.268 The next section will turn to the racial and
social democratic articulations of these proposals.
The Racial Democratic Position: Discrimination and Exclusion for Black Labor
While Randolph had worked alongside white railway labor groups in the RLA
debates, racial advocacy groups argued that the NLRA should be used to address labor
unions’ racial practices and overall adopted a much more antagonistic approach to
organized labor. In particular, two prominent racial advocacy organizations, the NAACP
and the National Urban League (NUL), called for specific changes to the law to address
racial barriers to employment and particularly to labor unions. Both organizations called
for a clause that would prohibit racial discrimination and add it to the list of unfair labor
practices stipulated in the law. In addition, they called for revisions to the definition of
“employee” to include strikebreakers, unorganized workers, and agricultural and
domestic workers. The NAACP made one final, and more extreme demand, that
discriminatory unions should not be protected by the law’s collective bargaining rights.
The NUL and the NAACP’s interventions in the NLRA debates reveal that whatever the
268
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debate over racial and social democracy within the organizations, the organizations at this
moment saw organized labor as an obstacle, rather than a partner, in fighting for
employment opportunities for African Americans.
The NUL adopted a slightly less pessimistic stance than the NAACP about the
possibility of working with labor unions. In a brief submitted to the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor in April 1934, T. Arnold Hill, the president of the NUL, stated the
organization’s “unqualified approval of any measure that seeks to equalize bargaining
power of employers and employees,” a powerful endorsement of the aim and spirit of the
bill. But Hill’s brief also pointed to major weaknesses of the legislation and the
“inequalities of bargaining power handicapping more than 5,000,000 Negro workers
compel us to register protest against the adoption of the Wagner bill in its present
form.”269 Hill identified two sources of this discrepancy in bargaining power. One was
between employers and employees, which he found the bill to be vastly useful in
equalizing. The second was between Black workers and majority-white unions. This
second imbalance, according to Hill, went unaddressed in the proposed bill.270
The NUL proposed four major amendments that would address this second
imbalance. First, it offered a revised definition of employee that would include
strikebreakers. Second, it proposed to add an anti-discrimination clause to the law’s
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definition of “labor union.”271 Third, it advocated that the bill should include racial
exclusion as an unfair labor practice. Considered together, these proposals were
reasonable extensions of existing proposals within the bill, but not radical departures
from it. Hill concluded his brief by arguing that inclusion in existing unions as segregated
locals was an attempt to placate Black workers, but the arrangement would ultimately be
to the detriment of the entire working class. The growth of competitive unions based on
race, he argued, only served to weaken the bargaining power of all workers.272 Thus, the
NUL staked out a position that linked the success of the entire labor movement to Black
workers.
The NAACP’s assessment of the weaknesses of the law was similar to the NUL’s,
but its proposals would have seriously curtailed the bill’s ability to increase workers’
bargaining power through organized labor. William Taylor, head of the NAACP’s
Legislative Committee, opened his brief to the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor in April 1934 with a fiery admonishment: “[W]e are convinced that this bill
conceals more danger to the future welfare of the colored citizens of this country than any
bill seriously considered by Congress in the last 75 years.” The organization’s first
proposal was to add discrimination on account of race, color, creed to the list of Section
V’s unfair labor practices, as the NUL had called for. The second proposed amendment
would have exempted employers from bargaining with unions with racially
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discriminatory membership practices.273 The final proposal was to exclude unions that
discriminated against black workers from all labor protections put forward in the Wagner
bill. 274 Particularly these final two recommendations went a step further than the NUL’s
proposal and were drastic measures that would have seriously narrowed the scope of
applicability of the law.
Members of Congress were not amenable to or convinced by the NAACP and
NUL’s claims of discrimination by labor unions. In February 1935, Charles Houston of
the NAACP testified before the House Committee on Education and Labor regarding
another bill that was eventually rolled into the NLRA. Houston’s testimony and
engagement with the committee members revealed that committee members largely
believed that unions were accepting black members and that low numbers of African
Americans must be because African Americans were not taking the opportunity to join
the AFL. The following exchange between Houston and Congressman Richard Welch
(R-CA) elucidates this point:
Mr. Welch: How many unions exclude Negroes?
Mr. Houston: I cannot give you the definite figures on that. I can furnish them.
Mr. Welch: My understanding is that there are very few labor unions that exclude
Negroes.
Mr. Houston: The trend is toward giving Negroes recognition, that is true.
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Mr. Welch: What percentage of the Negro workers north of the Mason-Dixon line
are enrolled in labor unions…Why is it that your people north of the Mason-Dixon
line have not availed themselves of the opportunity to enroll in organized labor?275
Houston responded by providing instances in which blacks had been accepted into
unions, but experienced worsened employment conditions as members. However, similar
to Davis before the cotton textile code board, Houston was not able to provide any of the
aggregate figures the committee requested at multiple junctures, which no doubt did not
help to dispel the beliefs of committee members that no formal obstacles existed for black
workers seeking to unionize.
In addition to highlighting the discriminatory practices of unions and arguing that
they be addressed in the law, the NAACP and NUL also fought to broaden the law’s
definition of “employee” as an alternative means of increasing legal protections for Black
workers. Houston argued that the bill should create workers councils that would represent
workers from unorganized labor groups, for example, those in the unorganized sectors:
“So far as we are concerned, this is particularly important because over 3,500,00 of the
5,500,000 Negro workers are in occupations which are notoriously unorganized; that is,
in agriculture and domestic service.”276 Houston attempted to connect the struggle of
unorganized workers to the exclusion of cleaners and outside employees under the cotton
textile code:
For example, in the cotton textile industry, the code which was first promulgated
provided, as I understand, that outside crews and cleaners should be exempted
275
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from the hours and also the minimum wage benefits of the code. Ten thousand out
of the 13,000 Negroes in the industry came under the classification of outside
crews and cleaners.277
Without a formal structure representing the interests of workers who were not members
of unions, Houston felt that the legislation would be failing to protect and assist a large
group of laborers.
T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban League articulated a similar concern in his
testimony on the Wagner bill and suggested the bill be amended to include black workers
being used as strikebreakers as part of the class of employees defined in the bill.278
Houston claimed that only considering organized workers, and not unorganized workers
or strikebreakers, was a major weakness of the existing legal frameworks.279 Following
Houston’s prepared statement, Chairman Connery (D-MA), co-sponsor of the bill,
pushed back on Houston’s proposal for a set of workmen’s councils that would include
unorganized workers. This, Connery argued, would open the door to representatives from
company unions serving on these councils, which was expressly what the bill sought to
prevent.
Picking up on the issues of organized labor and black workers, Wisconsin
Congressman George Schneider, a member of the Progressive Party, and Chairman
Connery (D-MA) both argued that the better path toward inclusion of Black workers was
277
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not to seek representation for unorganized workers, but to continue to organize through
the AFL.280 Connery even argued that the AFL would have been a reliable path to avoid
the exclusion of the cleaners and outside workers:
Chairman: Do you think the 5 American Federation of Labor men would allow
the outside workers and cleaners to be exempted from that code?
Houston: No
Chairman: Of course, they would not. They would not let them be exempted. And
you would get the same results, far better results than you are seeking through
your counsel…Your only salvation, I think, is for your five union-labor men to be
on there and for their own protection, not yours, but for their own protection they
are going to see that these outside crews and cleaners are not exempted, that the
manufacturer will have to pay them decent wages to keep up the wage scale.281
Here, Connery was referring to the five labor representatives that would sit on a newly
formed labor board, if the bill should pass. Houston accepted Connery’s point, but the
historical record indicates that the assumption that the AFL would stand against the
exclusion of specific classes of workers was ill-founded. While the UTWA, an AFL
affiliate, did argue for universal inclusion, AFL’s president William Green did not protest
the exclusion of cleaners and outside workers in his testimony before the cotton textile
code board under the NIRA or the exclusion of agricultural workers under the NLRA.282
Houston and Taylor had both tried to draw attention to unorganized workers and
to use governmental interventions to protect them and aid their organizing efforts, as they
had in the PWA. However, the response of committee members reveals that they were
not interested in intervening in operations within labor unions. Rather, committee
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members advised Houston that organizing workers into labor unions was the best path
toward securing rights and improving the conditions for workers. But the committee
members’ belief that the AFL and organized labor was open to black workers and that
they could be relied upon to advocate against exclusions of outside workers and cleaners
reveals their bias, or at best misinformation. Like Davis before the cotton textile board,
the NAACP and NUL did not have the data to dispel these beliefs.
The Social Democratic Position: Racial Inequality and Capitalist Contradictions
The NAACP and NUL were not the only groups to highlight the specific plight of
Black workers during the NLRA hearings. The Communist Party (CPUSA) as well as a
communist-oriented affiliate, the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), both raised the
challenges facing Black workers in their testimony. However, unlike the NAACP and
NUL, the CPUSA and TUUL did not call for amendments to address racial
discrimination. Instead, they called for greater social-democratic provisions to protect
workers. Importantly, the CPUSA and TUUL representatives also raised points of
critique with the AFL and major organized labor. However, it was largely to criticize the
AFL’s embrace of the goal of “industrial peace” and harmony, which they saw coming at
the expense of workers. Considered together, the CPUSA and TUUL articulated a social
democratic approach to industrial policy that incorporated Black workers’ issues and
connected them to a critique of capitalism.
Recalling the CPUSA position during the JCNR meeting helps to foreground its
NLRA testimony. In the JCNR, James Ford of the Communist Party (CPUSA) presented
a vision for black workers and CPUSA that emphasized class dynamics within the
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African American population and conveyed some opportunities as well as limits to
collaboration with the AFL. Ford argued that while all workers, white and black, were
“wage slaves under capitalism,” black workers were doubly exploited. Part of the
explanation Ford provided was that the AFL, rather than being a defender of workers, had
facilitated animosity between black and white workers in order to maintain a cheap labor
force of black workers:
The fact of the matter is that the capitalists have used the Negro masses as a
reservoir of cheap labor. They have done everything in their power with the
assistance of the leaders of the American Federation of Labor to prevent unity
between white and black labor.283
However, despite the claims by the Socialist Party and Workers’ Party contributors to the
JCNR that the CPUSA favored economic self-determination in the form of the Black
Belt, Ford argued for building a coalition under the National Negro Congress of racial
advocacy organizations and sympathetic white workers. Further, he laid out what CPUSA
saw to be the most viable path toward breaking down racial inequality:
It has been one of the most inspiring facts of recent history in the United States
that white workers and intellectuals have begun to overcome white prejudice and
lead the struggle for Negro rights. This is because of the economic crisis. As they
have lost their jobs, as their conditions have grown steadily worse, they have seen
the necessity of uniting with their fellow black workers against the employers.284
While the economic crisis presented challenges, in fact, the JCNR meeting had been
convened to address the additional burden being born by Black workers, here was an
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example of the opportunity for building towards coalitions as the best measure for
reducing white prejudice.
Moving to CPUSA’s interventions in the NLRA debates, William Dunne testified
before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in April 1934. While the following
year he would appear again before Congress on behalf of the Communist Party (CPUSA),
at this time Dunne appeared as a representative of Trade Union Unity League (TUUL).285
Officially founded in 1929, TUUL sought to create unions independent of the AFL’s craft
unionist focus from within the organization. Although it was relatively short-lived,
dissolving in 1934, TUUL led a series of strikes in the pre-war period that publicly
contested the AFL’s craft union structure. Further, scholars have argued that the TUUL’s
work paved the way for organizing women, African Americans, and mass-production
workers in the CIO.286 As Ford spoke to in his contribution to the JCNR, CPUSA was
working to unionize sharecroppers in Alabama and Arkansas.287
In his 1934 testimony, Dunne argued that the proposed Wagner Act, as well as the
Social Security Act, were programs for capitalist recovery, not measures to improve the
lives of workers, particularly Black workers. Dunne claimed that the NLRA is just an
extension of the NIRA, which gave rise to “the greatest development of company
285
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unionism ever seen in this country.”288 Further, he argued that rather than empowering
workers and labor organizations, the bill inhibited worker power by “putting still more
obstacles in the way of effective use of the strike weapon,” which was labor’s main
source of power.289
Dunne also critiqued the bill’s objective to promote “industrial peace,” which he
argued meant peace for employers at the expense of workers. He claimed that designating
unfair labor practices wouldn’t have the effect of changing the underlying relationship
between employer and employee, rather it would just give new machinery for
maintaining the same relationship.290 On this point, Dunne lumped the interests of the
AFL in with the interests of employers and the government, offering a critique of the
associationalist model that had been guiding industrial policy for decades. Senator
Wagner and other members of the committee pushed back on this point:
Senator Wagner: You say the bill lines up with big business. If that is so, they do
not seem to appreciate it.
Mr. Dunne: I remarked on that early in my remarks, but I am sure they will
appreciate it later, Senator Wagner, just like they did in reference to clause 7
(a).291
In this exchange Dunne was recalling the original opposition of many employers and
industrialists to the NIRA during the time of debate, as discussed in the previous chapter.
This opposition had given way to accommodation, however, as the subsequent rise in
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company unions created a way for industry and employers to avoid the new labor
regulations.292
Dunne also made specific reference to the plight of Black workers in his
testimony. In summarizing the series of political-economic developments supporting that
shaped the Wagner-Connery bill, he said:
There is to be seen the advent of large numbers of negro workers in the South into
struggle for better wages and working conditions and union recognition as in the
Alabama coal mines, together with white workers. There are such developments
of negro workers in the Civilian Conservation Camp near Tuscaloosa, Ala.,
against intolerable conditions, discrimination, and segregation.293
Unlike his fellow JCNR participants, however, Dunne and the TUUL did not draw the
need for an anti-discrimination clause. Rather, Dunne concluded his statement by calling
for a 35% increase in wages, a reduction of hours, for Congress to pass the Lundeen Bill
(which will be discussed in the next section), a guaranteed living wage, and the abolition
of injunctions against workers. To pay for the programs, Dunne argued that military
funds be redirected and a tax imposed on incomes over $5000 per year.294 These more
expansive social programs, financed by taxes on the wealthy rather than payroll taxes,
were put forward as better alternatives for pursuing the interests of Black and white
workers.
Given his position within the TUUL, the main object of Dunne’s testimony was to
highlight the continuities between the NIRA and the proposed Wagner Act and the
commonalities between the interests of the AFL and industry. The fact that the TUUL
292
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and CPUSA pointed to the inadequacies of the ruling arrangement for Black workers
highlights that while they recognized a unique plight of the Black worker, they
understood all workers to be disadvantaged by the capitalist system and the craftdominated labor movement.
In March 1935, Dunne presented a brief to the House Committee on Education
and Labor. This time he listed his affiliation as CPUSA and the Daily Worker, CPUSA’s
primary publication. Dunne restated the CPUSA’s opposition to the bill in its current
form, claiming that the AFL and other labor groups’ support for the Wagner Act
represented a betrayal of the working-class. Once again, Dunne also singled out the
particular plight of black workers, citing data from John P. Davis and the JCNR which
demonstrated that the proportion of black Americans on relief had grown from 1929 to
1933 and that the number of jobless African American workers had increased, not
decreased, as a result of the administration of the NRA. By way of example, Dunne
referred to the black workers at a silk textile plant in North Carolina, who were exempted
from the NRA silk textile code’s wage requirements and were receiving $2 less per week
than was required in the code.295
Dunne reiterated the same recommendations from his prior testimony: the passage
of the Lundeen bill, the prohibition of company unions, and legalization of the right to
strike. However, the brief also called for the NLRA to be implemented without
discrimination based on “occupation, sex, race, nationality, religious and political
295
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opinion.” It also included a provision “specifically declaring illegal any discrimination by
employers against Negro workers in the matter of employment, wages, and working
conditions.”296 The CPUSA’s testimony stipulated that economic recovery had come at
the expense of workers, Black and white. By drawing attention to the fomenting of AFL
and industrial interests, the CPUSA argued that the government should protect the most
marginalized black workers by implementing a broader set of labor protections than what
the AFL was fighting for at the time. They also pointed to the importance of social
democratic programs, like social insurance and welfare programs, which will be
addressed in the next section.
Conclusion
The NLRA debates highlighted racial and social democratic approaches to
industrial policy that offered two different paths to addressing barriers for Black workers.
They also highlighted two different critiques of organized labor, as a force for racial
exclusion and as a capitulation to capitalism. Neither of these views included a
particularly optimistic view of partnership with organized labor. However, there was also
a middle position carved out by the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), who had been a
prominent participant in the JCNR, that pointed to a more fruitful and hopeful direction
in this regard.
James Myers, the Industry Secretary of the FCC, submitted a brief to the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor in March 1935. Myers’s statement supported the
NLRA, citing an FCC organizational statement calling for improved industrial relations:
296
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“The increasing tension between labor and management in some of the great industries of
the Nation creates a serious menace to civic order and social progress.” But the statement
also made clear that strong labor organizations are the most important part of industrial
relations to be reached through legislation: “this is not class legislation, but a guarantee of
rights without which labor cannot hope to maintain its standards against strongly
organized aggregations of capital.”297 The rights of workers to organize was one tenet of
the FCC’s official document “Social Ideals of the Churches.”
But in addition to highlighting the need for broad labor rights, Myers’s brief also
recommended that the bill be amended to include an anti-discrimination clause, in an
effort to ensure the broadest union membership:
The executive committee of the Federal Council has also declared it to be a moral
obligation of organized labor to admit to its membership ‘competent workers
without distinction of nationality or race.’ I would recommend that the bill be
amended so as to safeguard this principle.”298
Similar to Haynes’s contribution to the JCNR, Myers argued that it was imperative that
unions work to address discrimination in order to build mass support and foster broadbased organizing. Myers and the FCC recognized that “abuses of power have occurred
on the part of labor as on the part of other groups may be freely admitted, but these
cannot be pleaded as a denial of justice.” Expanding social rights, here through rights to
collective bargaining, were the best insurance for “responsible social action.”299 The
FCC’s advocacy for an anti-discrimination clause strikes a more tempered tone than the
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NAACP and NUL’s critique of organized labor’s racial practices, on the one hand, and a
stronger endorsement of existing labor organizations than the CPUSA, on the other.
But more importantly, the FCC’s middle position foreshadowed the emergence of
a labor organization like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The space that
opened up was for a labor association that, unlike the AFL, saw industrial unionism and
the mass organization of unskilled workers, which included many Black workers, as
fundamental to the growth of the labor movement. The AFL had an easier time
sidestepping the integration of Black workers, given the craft model which constructed
barriers to entry for all workers, provided justifications for exclusion of particular groups.
But this was not the model or approach the CIO took and their rise helped to forge a
different sort of interracial partnership, which will be explored in future chapters. The
potential for this kind of coalition to foster significant collaboration between racial
advocacy organizations and organized labor can be seen in the loose coalition that was
forged to fight for the Lundeen bill.
Social Security Act and Lundeen Bill: Challenging Economic Visions for Recovery
The NLRA was not the only piece of legislation in the second wave of the New
Deal that was critiqued for not going far enough to protect workers. While the Social
Security Act (SSA) has been called the “most important single act in the creation of the
American welfare state,” there were those who argued for an alternative measure that
endorsed many of the principles of a more robust social democratic state.300 This
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alternative was the Workers’ Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance Bill, more
commonly known as the Lundeen bill. The ultimate victory of the SSA over the Lundeen
bill also served to link the welfare state inextricably with employment status and
industrial policy, since the law financed unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, and
maternal and child welfare programs largely through payroll taxes and taxes on
employers. Political scientist Robert Lieberman has argued that by tying social welfare to
occupation and work status, the SSA had the effect of sorting Americans by both class
and race. While not explicitly racially exclusionary, he argues that differences between
the programs in terms of state versus federal oversight and funding mechanisms created
different institutional environments.301 Historian and political scientist Ira Katznelson has
similarly purported that “each of the old age, social assistance, and unemployment
provisions advanced by the Social Security Act was shaped to racist contours.”302
Racial advocacy organizations testified and objected to the “racist contours” they
perceived being written into the SSA. But an emerging coalition of third-party advocates,
rank-and-file labor unions, and racial advocacy organizations also incorporated demands
for better inclusion of Black workers into their call for a social-democratic alternative to
the SSA: the Lundeen bill. Advocates of the Lundeen bill argued that it was a much more
expansive social welfare program. Critically, the Lundeen Bill embraced a spirit of
universalism in its coverage. It created a weekly unemployment benefit for “all workers
301
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and farmers,” unlike the SSA which excluded domestic and agricultural workers from the
Old Age Insurance program.303 Related to this point, the Lundeen bill proposed to provide
unemployment to those who were out of work at the time, whereas the SSA did not.304
There was also no limit on unemployment insurance based upon the duration of
unemployment. The Lundeen bill also included a comprehensive anti-discrimination
clause, expressly identifying racial equality as an important component of the bill’s
universalism. 305
Perhaps most importantly, there were significant differences in the proposed
financing mechanisms for the respective bills. Each title of the SSA was financed
somewhat differently, notably, the Old Age Insurance was the only program that was
entirely federally administered, and the funds were derived partly from a payroll tax on
employers and workers.306 The remaining programs were funded jointly by the states and
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federal government and administered by the states. By contrast, the Lundeen bill
indicated that a large provision of funds was to come from the treasury and when that was
exhausted, a tax was to be “levied on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporation
incomes of $5,000 a year and over.”307 In other words, the Lundeen bill proposed that
unemployment benefits be financed through taxes on corporations and wealthy
individuals, rather than workers and employers.308 Political scientist Richard Valelly
argues that, unlike the SSA, the Lundeen Bill was constructed to be fiscally quite openended.309
The origins of the Lundeen bill help to shed light on the alternative politicaleconomic framework proposed in the bill. In January 1935, Representative Ernest
Lundeen, member of the Minnesota delegation and the radical third-party Farmer-Labor
Party, introduced the “Workers’ Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance Act” in
the House. The Farmer-Labor party was one of several radical third parties to form in the
particular political contexts outside the Deep South in the early twentieth century. In the
late 1800s, a coalition of agribusiness and workers came together to stamp out radicalism
among farmers.310 It was this opposition, Valelly argues, that contributed to the formation
of the radical farmer-worker parties in Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and several
other states. These parties united ideological strands from populism, Debsian socialism,
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and middle-class Progressivism in order to challenge the existing political order.311 They
also gained political influence at the state level at a time when “dual-sovereignty” of the
states and federal government provided states with an opportunity to construct their own
political-economic regimes and influence national policy.312 Members of the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party as well as the Wisconsin Progressive Party were also able to capture
some national-level policy-making power by way of seats in Congress.
The bill gained broad support from a coalition of racial equality advocates, the
Communist Party, and rank-and-file trade unionists, all of whom called for an alternative
to the Social Security Act. However, congressional debates over these two measures also
garnered significant disagreements among labor and racial advocacy organizations. The
following sections will detail the positions of the organizations engaged in this debate,
particularly highlighting how a loose coalition formed to support the Lundeen bill and a
more social democratic vision for social welfare provision.
The American Federation of Labor: Rifts Between Leadership and Rank-and-File
Organizations
The debate between the Lundeen bill and the SSA also exposed a rift between the
AFL’s leadership and its rank-and-file membership, which was rooted in very different
political-economic commitments. The AFL’s national leadership was largely in support
of the SSA. William Green, who testified on behalf of the AFL, broadly endorsed the
idea that relief efforts had to be temporary, that SSA should not be further relief, and also
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supported a waiting period of two weeks before unemployment insurance kicked in and a
cap of 19 weeks per year on unemployment benefits.313 While he did oppose the
compulsory employee contribution and the focus on state rather than federal standards
and implementation, Green’s argument was for the more limited program for social
insurance and unemployment put forward in the SSA.
But the AFL rank-and-file organizations that testified before Congress did not
share their leaders’ vision. Representing 3,000 local affiliates of the AFL, O.J. Hall of the
AFL Local Action Committee for Workers, Louis Weinstock of the AFL Committee on
Unemployment Insurance, and Elmer Johnson of the Chicago Branch of the AFL Trade
Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance all testified in support of the Lundeen
Bill on behalf of rank-and-file workers. 314 Weinstock pointed out that Green’s testimony,
and the stance of the AFL executive committee, was antithetical to the interests of their
rank-and-file members, as the association had recently reversed its position and come to
support unemployment insurance in any form.315
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Further, Weinstock and Hall maintained that if Congress could “give millions of
dollars to moribund banks and collapsing industries,” surely it should be “equally within
their power to provide funds for the millions of unemployed without compelling the
workers to bear the costs of unemployment insurance.” They argued that rather than place
the burden on the “workers who have built up the power and wealth of this country,”
funding should come from those with incomes over $5,000.316 They promised continued
collective action and opposition to the SSA on behalf of workers: “We are going, as a
working group, to resist the passage of the administration bill (S. 1130) in every possible
way, since the outstanding feature is its inadequacy for the needs of labor.”317
Elmer Johnson’s testimony in favor of the Lundeen Bill, which was given before
the House Labor Committee, illuminated more of the machinations within the AFL.
Johnson appeared on behalf of workers from 27 AFL unions (of various trades), although
he did not testify in an official AFL capacity.318 This point was of great interest to
Lundeen, who questioned him about his relationship with and attitude toward the AFL.
Johnson clarified that while his organization was made up of entirely AFL workers, the
leadership of the Chicago AFL opposed to their group.319 Johnson reported that despite
support from his organization and members from other unions, AFL leadership had
blocked their efforts to discuss the Lundeen Bill in their convention and other
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consideration of unemployment and social insurance proposals. As a result, he argued,
members of the Chicago Federation of Labor had chosen to endorse the Wagner-Lewis
bill without full consideration of any alternatives.320
Hall, Weinstock, and Johnson’s testimony constituted the critique that the
leadership of the AFL was not responsive to or reflective of the demands of its workers.
These rank-and-file representatives were not the first to offer this critique of AFL
leadership. Representatives of the Communist Party had been raising similar concerns in
public proceedings as well (recalling June Croll’s testimony before the Cotton Textile
Board in Chapter Three and William Dunne’s testimony on the NLRA). Further, the
support coming from the rank-and-file of the AFL speaks to the ability of a reformoriented political economic agenda to speak to broad segments of workers. Further, their
endorsement of the Lundeen Bill came along with an endorsement, or at least acceptance,
of the anti-discrimination proposal entailed within.
The National Urban League: Calling for the Lundeen Alternative
Many of the calls of rank-and-file union members were echoed in the NUL and
Atlanta Urban League’s support for the Lundeen bill. The NUL was the primary racial
advocacy organization to call for the Lundeen bill over the SSA. T. Arnold Hill returned
on behalf of the NUL and testified before the House Committee on Labor in 1935 and
was joined by Reginald Johnson from the Atlanta Urban League to testify in favor of the
320
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Lundeen bill. At the end of Johnson’s testimony, when he was asked whether he thought
the Lundeen Bill would help Black as well as white workers Johnson responded: “It will
benefit the Negro, more so than any other bill before Congress at this present time.”321
This profound endorsement of the Lundeen bill signals the resonance of social
democratic proposals with the NUL at the time.
Hill and Johnson laid out three main reasons for the NUL’s support of the
Lundeen bill. First, the universal provision of unemployment benefits would mean that
agricultural and domestic workers would be included: “These two groups are the most
insecure of all American workers. For them there are no codes of fair competition, no
labor unions, and no unemployment benefits contemplated, except those this bill sets
forth.”322 He also challenged a popular economic presumption that if manufacturing
levels could be returned to 1928 levels, the farm industry would naturally follow suit. Hill
pointed out that the problem with this claim is that relief efforts and payments were being
concentrated in urban centers, not rural agricultural communities. This complemented a
point made by Johnson, that “the only artificial life that is given to the agricultural
regions is through the constant pumping of Federal funds into them, which does not reach
basically the Negro share cropper and tenant farmer, but which goes into the pockets of
the big landowners and the banks.”323
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The second reason they cited for support of the Lundeen Bill was its endorsement
of collective bargaining rights:
I favor this bill for another very significant reason—because it upholds the right
of workers to organize unions for their own welfare and protects them when they
refuse to work below the average local or trade-union wages, or under unsafe or
unsanitary conditions, or when the hours are longer than the prevalent union
standards of a particular trade locality.324
What is important to note here is how the SSA and NLRA bleed together in consideration
of the Lundeen Bill. The fact that the proposed social welfare programs were tied to
occupation and work status, as well as the fact that many of the advocates of the Lundeen
bill saw a great need for more relief for unemployed and underpaid workers, meant that
the proposals for changes in industrial relations and creation of social security were
bound together. Finally, Hill points to his support of federal, rather than state,
interventions.325 Along with many other racial equality advocates, Hill was skeptical of
leaving appropriation and oversight in the hands of the state governments, who had been
widely variable in their support for Black workers.
Johnson’s testimony closely paralleled that given by Hill, but several points are
worth noting. First, Johnson pointed to the NRA as an obstacle for black workers. Many
benefitted from the NRA, but many also lost their employment as the NRA codes largely
eliminated marginal jobs where blacks were employed.326 Further, he pointed to the large
number of workers who would be fall outside the protections of the law due to the
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exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers under the SSA: “We find that the
Wagner-Lewis bill, among other exclusions, eliminates from its provisional features the
4,962,451 domestics which comprise 11 percent of all occupations and 4,392,764 farm
laborers which comprise 9 percent of all occupations.”327 He also called attention to the
fact that the employee contributory provision for Black workers would be harmful,
especially in the South, where wages were low and employee contributions would drive
their living wage even further.
Johnson also made frequent reference to a report that had recently been conducted
on changes in earnings, as a mechanism for comparing the Wagner-Lewis and Lundeen
bills for those gainfully employed. One very peculiar section compared rates of
employments for different classes of workers, highlighting the decline in black workers
in skilled jobs who had been in jobs for less than 1 and 10 years. Johnson did not fully
articulate his conclusion, but one possible interpretation is that he was attempting to show
the rise in short-term positions and the lack of long-term, stable prospects for black
skilled workers. Considered together, the NUL representatives made a strong case for the
Lundeen bill and underscored the economic realities of Black workers at the time. Their
testimony struck a different tone than the racial democratic focus they had adopted in the
NLRA hearings.
The NAACP: Expanding Social Insurance
Unlike the NUL, the NAACP maintained a very similar racial democratic line in
its testimony on the SSA, calling once again for anti-discrimination measures to be
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included in the legislation. While the NAACP did not explicitly endorse the Lundeen bill,
some of the organization’s key objections to the SSA did reflect the same problems that
led the NUL, among others, to endorse the Lundeen bill. The NAACP’s Charles Houston
testified before both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee
on Finance in early 1935 regarding the SSA. Most centrally, he called for an antidiscrimination clause to be placed on the bill. But in addition, Houston highlighted the
disproportionate impact of the agricultural and domestic exclusions on black workers,
called for Titles I and II to be merged into a universal program, and pointed to the fact
that it did nothing for those currently unemployed.328 Some scholars have argued that
Houston was the only witness in the SSA Congressional hearings to push for universal
coverage and that in doing so, he aimed to defeat the bill entirely.329 However, the
constellation of amendments Houston puts forward mirrored the Lundeen Bill’s plan for
universal inclusion, even while he did not expressly name the Lundeen Bill.
In his testimony, Houston’s fundamental argument was that Title I, insurance for
the needy elderly, and Title II, the contributory retirement funds, be rolled into one.330 His
concern with the differentiated programs was that while Title I relied on federal
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intervention and funds, Title II required action by the states to enact legislation. The
problem with this plan, according to Houston, was that “as practical statesmen you know
the difficulties there be in getting any age-assistance plan through the legislature of
Southern State if Negroes are to benefit from it in any large measure.”331 Houston argued
that it would be much easier to force states to adhere to federal jurisdiction, which could
come with an anti-discrimination provision.
Houston also acknowledged the administrative burden of Title II: “No argument
is necessary to demonstrate that the overhead of administering and really enforcing a payroll tax on casual, domestic and agricultural workers would practically consume the tax
itself.”332 But Houston offered the example of the NRA as a case in which federal
intervention, in the opinion of Houston and the NAACP, had worked:
But I say this, that it is perfectly practical to establish a minimum, and that there
are no more difficulties in establishing a minimum wage under the N.R.A. The
N.R.A. worked out differentials for different sections of the country, and I think,
again, even if you did have a system of Federal differentials, that that might be
satisfactory.333
His favorable assessment of the NRA code boards here strikes a different tone than his
testimony on the NLRA, where he argued that the NRA had led to the development of
wage differentials by race. Taken together, the underlying premise of Houston’s
argument here seems to be that, while imperfect, government regulation and intervention
was a desirable means of protecting and furthering the rights of black workers.
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Houston explicitly used the language of anti-discrimination in his testimony when
arguing for provisions prohibiting discrimination on account of race to be added to any
federal law or agency. This emphasis mirrored earlier statements that he, Taylor, and the
NUL made with regard to the NLRA.334 He also called for a more explicit designation
with regards to distributing funds: “I think that there should be a provision written into
the bill in such States at least that where the money is allocated to the States and by law
in public institutions you have a separation of races, there must be an equitable
distribution between the white and colored citizens.”335 Here, Houston was referring to
the Morrill Act of 1862 (amended in 1890) which allocated federal funds to states to
create state land-grant colleges and required states seeking those funds to make
institutions for African Americans, as well. While many of Houston’s proposals were
contained in the Lundeen Bill, he did not explicitly refer to the alternative bill in his
testimony.
The Communist Party: Calling for a Lundeen Alternative
As they had in testimony on the NLRA, representatives of the CPUSA and
affiliated organizations registered their support of the Lundeen Bill as a proposal that
would more significantly benefit workers, including Black workers. Their arguments for
passing the Lundeen bill over its alternative very much mirrored those of the rank-andfile trade unionists and the NUL, namely that it provided more immediate relief for the
unemployed who were still reeling from the economic depression and it would fund
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unemployment through a tax on those with high incomes and not struggling workers.
However, one of the workers’ organizations affiliated with the CPUSA, the League of
Struggle for Negro Rights, drew specific attention to the impact the bill would have on
Black workers.336
In his testimony before the House Committee on Labor in February 1935,
Manning Rudolph Johnson of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights pointed to
persistent underemployment and underpayment of black workers under NRA codes,
lower payments in hourly relief wages, as well as the limits of the SSA: it only proposed
to care for 3.5 million of 12 million unemployed and the “balance will have to depend
upon the local charitable institutions for relief.” 337 Like the NAACP, NUL, and other
Communist Party representatives in testifying on the NLRA and SSA, Johnson also
focused attention on the problem of black inclusion in the AFL. And once again, the
comments made by committee members indicated their belief that the structure of the
AFL was one that formally was open to and included black workers.
Johnson argued that while the national AFL conventions have passed resolutions
barring racial exclusion, individual locals and internationals continued to practice
exclusion of and discrimination against black workers. Representative Schneider (P-WI),
who had pressed Houston on this very point during NLRA debates, responded that the
“American Federation of Labor cannot interfere with the autonomy of these
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organizations, and therefore they cannot force them but you know it to be a fact that there
are untold numbers thousands of colored workers, who are members of the American
Federation of Labor.”338 This response implied that Congress had limited ability and was
unwilling to interfere with the autonomy of the AFL, in the same way the AFL claimed it
was unable to interfere with the autonomy of individual locals,.
Johnson also echoed an important claim that James Ford put forward in his
contribution to the JCNR on behalf of the Communist Party. Ford argued that capitalists,
with help from the AFL, were striving to prevent unity among black and white
workers.339 Johnson provided his own articulation of this idea:
Of course, they used that to justify their course and to make the question a racial
question. It is not a question of color. That is only artificial. It runs deeply in the
economic and social system. The powers that be are utilizing the question of race
to cover up a deliberate policy to play black against white and white against
black. We have seen it in practice in practically every industrial conflict, where
they have used the Negro labor to break the strikes of white labor. They have used
white labor to break the struggles of Negro labor, and of course this antagonism
created between the white and the Negro workers prevents unity and accrues to
the profit of the employers. It is the old principle that has been in existence ever
since the Roman Empire divided and ruled.340
The sentiment here was clear: employers and some union elites were using race to divide
the working class and thus the response by black and white workers was to contest the
union of labor elites, industry, and a complicit Congress and administration.
Conclusion
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In his JCNR contribution, Albion Hartwell, who also testified for the Lundeen
Bill on behalf of the Interprofessional Association for Social Insurance, predicted that
only one coalition could be relied upon to advance racial equality in Congress. He argued
that “representatives who are elected directly from the ranks of workers and farmers will
carry on the fight in Congress on behalf of the Negro and white workers of this
country.”341 Indeed, not only did Hartwell’s assessment manifest in the actions of groups
like the CPUSA and rank-and-file trade unionists working to similar ends as racial
advocacy groups in support of the Lundeen Bill. Their vision for a political-economic
system that increased the safety net for workers in ways that were often inclusive of
Black workers was a clear and significant trend. These efforts constitute clear evidence
that these organizations and actors adhered more closely to a social democratic vision for
increasing broad access to public goods.
At the same time, these testimonies also reveal that racial advocacy organizations,
particularly the NAACP, drew more heavily on racial democratic principles to argue for
racial equality. They argued for government to intervene in industrial relations on behalf
of Black workers, as it had in the PWA and Morrill Act. However, in this case, the target
was not federal distribution of funds, but instead discriminatory trade unions. Even so, at
this juncture the possibility for collaboration with labor unions looked more promising
than it had during the first wave of the New Deal and the advent of the CIO would only
increase this potential.
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Conclusion
This chapter argues that in the Second Wave of the New Deal, major politicaleconomic debates over labor protections, trade unionism, agricultural and industrial
labor, and social welfare programs served as a space in which organizations were
fomenting strategies and ideologies for pursuing racial and social democracy. These
debates highlight that a broad set of actors had combined concerns about racial equality
and economic restructuring, which reflected a variety of strategic and ideological
positions and a set of very real political constraints.
This historical analysis of these important legislative acts poses a challenge to
claims that major racial equality organizations had formed a loose coalition to lobby
solely for anti-discrimination clauses to be placed in major New Deal legislation.342
Rather, this account highlights two major ways in which a broader, interracial group of
racial advocacy organizations were combining calls for racial equality and economic
restructuring. First, organizations like the NAACP and the Federal Council of Churches
called for anti-discrimination provisions as important backstops to ensuring distribution
of federal employment protections and welfare provisions to Black Americans. Recalling
the cotton textile board of the NRA, where the federal government had signaled an
interest or willingness in explicitly structuring federal programs to address racial
discrimination, these organizations argued for similar protections to be enacted in the
NLRA and SSA. The second position, put forward by the Communist Party, NUL, and
342
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rank-and-file AFL members, sought to highlight how the increasingly similar interests of
leaders in organized labor and major industries were leading to legislation that did not
serve the interests of workers, including Black workers.
Ultimately, neither of these political strategies persuaded Congress to change
course and the reactions of Congressional members reveal an important allegiance to the
AFL. Members of Congress pushed back against claims of discrimination within
organized labor, which reflected faith in the AFL and an unwillingness to intervene in
union operations on behalf of Black workers. The defeat of the Lundeen bill and passage
of the Social Security Act further indicated that Congress was committed to a narrower
unemployment program version of industrial relations where the AFL had the
authoritative voice for trade unions.
Importantly, A. Philip Randolph and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
(BSCP) did not rely on either of these political strategies in securing the clearest victory
for racial advocacy organizations in this period. The BSCP did not foreground their fight
as one over racial discrimination, on the part of the government or the AFL. Instead, they
leveraged their strategic affiliation with the AFL and allied with white railway labor
groups to push for the inclusion of specific classes of workers in the Railway Labor Act
and for a stronger adjudication board to challenge company unions. Where rank-and-file
members and racial advocacy organizations contested the AFL leadership’s position on
the NLRA, SSA, and Lundeen bill, there was less division over the RLA. The BSCP and
the white railway labor groups focused on discrediting the company union, efforts which
were noted by the AFL in later testimony on the NLRA. Further, the BSCP did not
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include their battle for recognition with the AFL in their testimony, which would have
reflected the concerns that racial advocacy organizations expressed about barriers to
organized labor for black workers. Instead, Randolph engaged in a parallel battle within
the AFL to ensure that the BSCP maintained their autonomy and was not subsumed into a
larger local affiliate as a segregated local.
By the end of the 1930s, a line between social democracy and racial democracy
was being contested on strategic and ideological grounds, especially by the organizations
advocating for racial equality in the New Deal economic and social welfare programs.
Moving into the next decade, as the U.S. began to prepare for and contribute to the WWII
effort, discrimination in the military and employment opportunities in defense industries
become the primary grounds for political contestation. These organizations and coalitions
became the backbone for a more official front pushing for the broader inclusion of
African Americans in this economic expansion. Under the leadership of A. Philip
Randolph, these organizations comprise the central membership of the 1941 March on
Washington. Additionally, the clear rift in the AFL became more pronounced when a
faction of the AFL base, led by John Lewis of the United Mine Workers, broke away and
formed the Congress of Industrial Relations (CIO).
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CHAPTER 5: THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT AND THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
This chapter covers two major developments in organizing for racial and
economic justice in the late 1930s and World War II period: the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and the formation of the March on Washington Movement (MOWM). In many
ways, the developments described in this chapter concern relatively distinct debates. On
the one hand, the FLSA involved efforts to institute federal wage and hour protections,
creating friction within organized labor. And on the other, the MOWM led to major
changes in the strategic and ideological priorities among racial advocacy organizations.
But there were also significant ways these debates brought labor unions and racial
advocacy organizations into closer collaboration and conflict, reflecting the dynamics of
previous debates over industrial policy and foreshadowing what was to come.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is often passed over in explorations of
industrial relations twentieth-century industrial relations. Many accounts jump from the
NLRA to the full employment efforts of 1945-1946 or directly to the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947.343 Part of the reason for this is that while the law established important
protections—it set a minimum wage threshold, ushered in the 40-hour workweek, and
outlawed child labor—it was also somewhat limited in scale. The FLSA wage and hour
protections only covered about 39% and 14% of working men and women, respectively.
Further, southern congressional members were able to restrict the minimum wage
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provision so that it had no impact on crucial industries in the South: textile, tobacco, and
lumber, among others.344 Connecting these exemptions back to similar debates under the
NRA and NLRA, it becomes clear that the FLSA provides another important case study
in explaining the development of exemptions and exclusions in industrial relations and
how they were used to limit the scope of New Deal labor protections. As they had before,
these exclusions and exemptions once again elicited strong responses from organized
labor and racial advocacy organizations and brought them into a closer coalition.
But the FLSA also was signed into law during a crucial period in the development
of labor’s influence, which political scientist David Plotke has shown was not an
immediate or natural constituency group but rather developed in response to New Deal
policy and political changes.345 Economic historian Alan Brinkley argues that during this
time, labor’s increasing influence and clout, particularly within the Democratic Party,
was accompanied by their embrace of federal intervention in industrial relations.346 Even
though it is true that two major labor leaders and forces within the CIO had placed wage
standardization and the FLSA at the top of their political agenda, this account departs
from that interpretation. Instead, it points toward contrary evidence from the debates over
the FLSA.347 Rather than supporting the creation of federal bureaucratic mechanisms to
oversee wage and hour provisions, organized labor was resistant to these key provisions
within the FLSA. Brinkley correctly asserts that labor had embraced the NLRB and other
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provisions of the NLRA. However, by 1938 the AFL and CIO had both become more
hesitant to accept federal intervention in what they thought should be autonomous union
affairs. This revision helps to explain why a more robust push for broader economic and
social-democratic reforms did not come to fruition in this period.
This chapter also analyzes important changes in racial advocacy organizations'
strategic and ideological focus and coalitions during World War II. Much as they had
during the New Deal, racial advocacy organizations saw the war as a major opportunity
to secure economic gains for Black workers. Given the massive explosion of wartime
production and the creation of good-paying jobs, organizations debated the best strategies
for ensuring that African Americans had fair and equal access to those jobs. Some
leaders, especially those within the NAACP and NUL, thought that a more
accommodationist approach, channeling Black support for the war efforts would help
shift white attitudes about the “caste system” after the war. This vision was for a Double
Victory or Double V campaign: seeking victory over fascism abroad and victory over
racial discrimination at home. But a new crop of younger and more radical militants
argued that more direct action in opposition to the war was needed.348 The more
accommodationist position ultimately consolidated into a new organization, the March on
Washington Movement (MOWM).
In 1941, the new MOWM coalition planned a massive march of 100,000 on
Washington D.C., demanding inclusion in the wartime industries and military efforts.
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President Roosevelt capitulated and issued an executive order calling for an end to
discrimination in the wartime industries, vesting the power to oversee that mandate in the
Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). The formation of the FEPC was a great
victory for the nascent MOWM coalition. It helped to usher in a new approach to mass
politics in the wake of increasing skepticism of the model of elite bureaucratic
adjustment.
Importantly, the MOWM also departed from the interracial organizing efforts
during the New Deal, particularly from the National Negro Congress (NNC). While the
Negro Industrial League (NIL) and the NNC had been powerful advocates for interracial
coalition-building in the previous years, their alliances with the left-wing of the labor
movement and the Communist Party “tragically hampered associations with other New
Deal and urban African American constituencies.”349 In their stead, the MOWM began to
develop a race-centric strategic and ideological vision for organizing. To dispel
accusations that their organization was a Communist or a front for left-radicals, the
MOWM created a Blacks-only membership policy. Related to this shift, the organization
also increasingly highlighted race-specific issues, like desegregation of public
accommodations, that were relatively distant from underlying political-economic
conditions.
The Fair Labor Standards Act
The debates over the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the final piece of
New Deal industrial legislation, reveals that organized labor had become resistant to
349
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endorsing a strong bureaucratic state with the ability to intervene in collective bargaining.
In 1937, Congress began considering new labor legislation to address the need for
minimum wage and maximum hour regulations across industries. The 1933 NIRA
attempted to institute wage and hour standards through the fragmented industrial code
boards but these were ultimately ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. However,
the resulting Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), signed into law on June 25, 1938, created
a national standard across industries and geographic regions. The FLSA created a Wage
and Hour Division in the Department of Labor and set up an oversight committee
composed of members of the “disinterested public” and equal parts labor and industry.350
In an effort to avoid further Supreme Court action, proponents of the bill crafted new
arguments and justified these labor protections as valid extensions of the commerce
clause.
Labor unions and racial advocacy organizations were key players in these debates
and largely supported establishing national standards for hours and wages. However,
organized labors’ position had shifted in from the earlier New Deal period. First, in
contrast to the fierce fight for the NLRB several years before, organized labor’s support
for powerful administrative adjudication functions had waned. While supportive of
federal efforts to establish minimum wage and maximum hour provisions in the FLSA,
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and newly minted Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) were both resistant to expanding the administrative apparatus in the
FLSA. Officials of both the AFL and CIO argued against implementing an NLRB-style
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board to investigate wage and hour violations as they constituted undue interference in
labor’s internal functions.351
This signaled a shift in labor’s approach to organizing through the federal
bureaucracy. During the New Deal, organized labor fought for a stronger labor
adjudication board to aid in their fight against company unionism. These efforts resulted
in the National Labor Relations Board. However, starting in the late 1930s, organized
labor became wary of expansive and powerful federal agencies that could intervene in
collective bargaining processes and other union policies and practices. Unions fought to
maintain complete autonomy over their internal processes. This included their ability to
address issues related to the employment, promotion, and general inclusion of Black
workers. Despite the efforts of racial advocacy organizations, Congress deferred to
union’s preferences for non-interference in collective bargaining processes. Labor unions
sought and were largely successful in ensuring that executive agencies would do the
same.
However, labor and racial equality advocates were united in a fierce battle over
whether the FLSA propagated wage differentials that excluded many African American
workers from new federal labor protections. They argued that businesses had exploited
regional and industrial variation under previous New Deal labor legislation to exclude the
most precarious classes of workers, who were disproportionately Black. Racial equality
advocates, in this case, most prominently the National Negro Congress (NNC), argued
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that national wage and hour standards were necessary to eliminate the practice of paying
different wages for similar work in other parts of the country. As they had during NRA
code board debates, racial advocacy organizations objected to the parsing of labor
categories and the creation of exemptions or differentials. Geographic differential wages,
they argued, roughly translated to racial differentials. Employers and industrialists
countered that differentials simply reflected industrial and regional differences and that
trying to address them would institute unfair burdens on industry.
While the issues raised by racial advocacy organizations and organized labor were
distinct, they connected back to an evolution in thinking about the broader role the
federal government, and particularly the bureaucracy, should play in industrial relations.
On this question, these two important sets of actors began to diverge, and significant rifts
formed. These issues were embedded in shifting ideas about the administrative state,
industrial relations, and political-economic conditions as the country entered a major
economic downturn in 1937, followed by a rapid escalation of production in the lead up
to World War II.
Implementing Wage and Hour Protections: Passing the Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) drew more explicit connections between
labor standards and commerce, in an effort to avoid further intervention by the Supreme
Court. The Court rejected core provisions of the NIRA on the grounds that they
constituted an overextension of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.
Supporters and opponents both framed their arguments in terms of the recent Supreme
Court rulings related to commerce power. The FLSA connected labor conditions to the
179

commerce power by arguing that variable labor standards created unfair competition and
caused labor disputes that disrupted the flow of commerce.352 On the day the bill was
introduced by Senator Black (D-AL) and Congressman Connery (D-MA), a letter from
President Roosevelt was read before Congress, in which Roosevelt affirmed the power of
Congress to regulate commerce to ensure labor meets a set of “civilized social
standards.”353 He also explicitly addressed recent actions of the Supreme Court in limiting
the interstate commerce power of Congress. Drawing on Justice Holmes’s dissenting
opinion in the case Hammer v. Dagenhart, where the court ruled that Congressional child
labor laws constituted undue interference in interstate commerce, Roosevelt reaffirmed
Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. He claimed that while Hammer v.
Dagenhart reflected the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, the dissenting opinion
reflected the popular will of the American people.354 While Roosevelt indicated an
understanding of the variability of standards in different industries and localities, he
maintained that a baseline set of guidelines was necessary.
Hearings on the FLSA offered a moment of reflection on the progress and
challenges of implementing the NIRA and NLRA. Leon Henderson, who had been the
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director of Research and Planning for the NRA, testified that the proposed bill was a
more modest endeavor. The NRA agency had been designed to avoid the “conflict of
objectives” that ultimately caused “administrative indigestion” for the NRA.355 Through
the FLSA, Congress and the executive successfully implemented national labor standards
for wages, hours, and child labor. However, they also re-constituted worker exclusions
that had been a source of conflict, particularly with labor and racial equality advocates.
On the question of a need for national standards, the battle lines mirrored previous
fights over the NIRA and NLRA. Organized labor, alongside many racial and social
justice organizations, favored the creation of national standards, as they would create
important protections for workers and a national standard for labor regulations. 356
Representatives of large companies, like the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) opposed setting industry standards and expanding government intervention in
collective bargaining processes, arguing that the FLSA, like the NRA, was an
unconstitutional use of the commerce power.357 Some smaller manufacturers, like a
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representative from the Alabama cotton textile company Avondale Mills, were convinced
of the need for federal standards, but argued that they should be very low.358 While these
broad strokes of the debate bore many similarities to previous debates, the experience of
federal management of industrial relations under the NIRA and NLRA changed some
opinions. On the whole, the FLSA generated far less opposition among the business
community than the NLRA had.359
One of the most significant accomplishments of the NLRA was the creation of the
National Labor Relations Board, which created an administrative channel for labor
unions to seek redress that had been slow to come through the courts. The AFL and other
major trade unions had been the strongest proponents for creating this labor board and
giving it significant autonomy both from industrial and political influences (see Chapter
Four). Section V of the original version of the FLSA bill called for a similar board to
oversee wage and hour disputes: the Labor Standards Board. In this first version of the
bill, introduced in May 1937, the proposed Labor Standards Board was granted
considerable power to conduct investigations and set wages and hours in particular cases.
Most significantly, it authorized independent investigations to be initiated by the board,
not initiated by a complaint from an interested party. This was a significant difference
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from the NLRB, which functioned more like a court and required an individual complaint
to open a case.
Unsurprisingly, many representatives of business and industry opposed this
provision of the bill. For example, a NAM official expressed concern that the proposed
board “would be given unfettered discretion to roam at will among every trade and
occupation in the country and establish whatever conditions of employment” and favored
limiting the board’s power to that of an advisory council, without real administrative
teeth.360 The Chamber of Commerce also raised concerns about the severity of penalties
the board was authorized to impose.361 These national associations and companies like the
National Coal Association called the proposed board an undue infringement in collective
bargaining, which they argued should be protected from government interference or
coercion.362 That businesses were speaking favorably of the collective bargaining
processes that many had been working to undermine in their negotiations was not
shocking. Rather, it speaks to the desires of industrial representatives to limit federal
intervention setting a national threshold for wages and hours.
But business and industry were not alone in their opposition to Section V and the
proposed Labor Standards Board. Organized labor similarly saw the provision as an
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infringement on the process and power of collective bargaining. The American
Federation of Labor (AFL) had been instrumental in the passage of the NLRA, which
established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the sole mediator of labor
conflicts. Despite 30% growth in membership during the peak New Deals years of 19331935, the AFL had become disenchanted with the NLRB and state intervention in
collective bargaining for a variety of reasons. First, on an ideological level, the AFL
understood this kind of regulation to be a slippery slope for becoming controlled or
oppressed by the state and thus came to be wary of agencies like the NLRB.363 On a
second and more strategic level, the AFL also believed that the NLRB favored their rival
national labor association: the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO
broke away from the AFL in 1935 to pursue mass industrial unionization, instead of the
AFL’s focus on craft unionism. And although they differed quite significantly on tactics
and approaches to organizing American workers, on this question of federal intervention,
the CIO also expressed concerns over the new state bureaucratic structures, although for
slightly different reasons. CIO leaders and rank-and-file members were concerned that
the goals of industrial peace and stability were leading entities like the NLRB to tamp
down on labor’s goals and power. Rather than seeing the state as a tool for advancing
worker power, the CIO understood it to be at best a barrier and at worst openly hostile to
the goals of organized labor.364

363
Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in
America, 1880-1960, 101-102.
364
Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 17; Alan Brinkley,
The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1995), 202.

184

The testimony of leaders of the AFL and CIO on the proposed FLSA reflected
these positions. In his June 1937 testimony before joint committees of Congress, AFL
President William Green argued that minimal government standards should be a
safeguard against egregious labor practices, but that government intervention should
retract as collective bargaining expanded. Employers could choose to engage in collective
bargaining with unions to avoid government regulation and intervention. In short, Green
argued that government should set a low threshold for labor standards but refrain from
more intrusive investigation or standard setting for industrial relations in order to
preserve union autonomy.
During questioning by the committee, Representative Reuben Wood (D-MO)
asked Green whether the government should intervene if collective bargaining resulted in
an agreement that fell below the wage stipulated in the law. Representative Wood was
trying to ascertain precisely how far the AFL’s principle of union autonomy should
extend, and Green made his position clear:
It is better for us to preserve the principle of collective bargaining and industrial
democracy than it is to clothe some board with authority to determine whether a
collective-bargaining agreement, honestly entered into between employers and
employees, is valid and should stand. That is a very serious matter.365
Later in the questioning, Green stated that the role of the labor board should not be
setting minimum wages but instead recognizing those agreed upon by employers and
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unions.366 Here, Green attempted to carefully restrict the state to recognizing existing
agreements, but not interfering in them. In the AFL’s view, this kind of intervention
would have opened the door to state control of collective bargaining processes. Green’s
argument that the government’s role was recognizing agreements was an important
statement on the limited role the state should be allowed to play in collective bargaining.
Leaders of the other leading national labor organization, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), also called for limits on the board’s authority to intervene
in collective bargaining agreements.367 The AFL and CIO disagreed on many organizing
principles, and notably had very different approaches to organizing Black workers. But
John Lewis (President of the CIO and United Mine Workers of America) shared Green’s
view that Section V threatened to undermine and undercut collective bargaining
arrangements. Lewis argued that the original bill set up two standards for minimum wage
payments. First, it stipulated a 40-cent minimum hourly wage in Section II of the bill,
which, in Lewis’s opinion, was a “straight-out declaration that no employer in industries
engaged in interstate commerce shall pay any employees less than 40 cents an hour.” But
Section V also created a different range of 40-60 cents an hour, which Lewis argued
would create additional bureaucratic hurdles by not establishing a clear standard and
leaving it to the board’s discretion.

366

Ibid, 239.
Sidney Hillman of the CIO developed a very close relationship with Roosevelt and, as a result, viewed
state-centered solutions for building union power much more favorably. On the other hand, John Lewis of
the CIO maintained a more critical stance toward Roosevelt, particularly on issues where he felt
Roosevelt’s compromises were too favorable toward corporations. Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor’s War At
Home: The CIO In World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 34-6.
367

186

While the intention might be laudable, Lewis argued that Section V would create
difficulties in implementing wage and hour standards. Thus, he recommended deleting
Section V in favor of the clearer standard offered in Section II. Senator Robert LaFollette
of the Progressive Party in Wisconsin defended Section V. He argued that the purpose of
the section was to create a mechanism for review of contracts that came in at standards
lower than the minimum thresholds. But Lewis feared that such a declaration would
become recognition of a fair minimum wage in the legal and public view. Lewis thought
this should be a power retained by Congress, not by a board. 368
The other CIO leader to testify, Sidney Hillman (Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, ACWA), expressed support for the construction of Section V and the broader
powers it contained. He agreed that it was important to set baseline thresholds for
minimum wages and maximum hours. But he also testified that nothing in the
construction of Section V made him concerned that the implementation would lead to
administrative overreach. During questioning, Senator LaFollette remarked on the direct
conflict between Lewis and Hillman’s positions. Hillman responded that their positions
reflected very different organizing experiences, and he repeated his belief that Section V
would not allow for undue or unwarranted government intervention in collective
bargaining processes.369

368

Statement of John Lewis, President of Congress of Industrial Organizations and United Mine Workers
of America, HRG-1937-EDS-0015, 274 and 279-282.
369
Statement of Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Hearings
before a Joint Meeting of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on
Labor, 75th Congress, “Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937. Part 2,” ProQuest Legislative Insight, HRG1937-EDS-0015, June 7-9, 11, 14-15, 1937, page 949.

187

The disagreement between Hillman and Lewis was not limited to this debate over
the FLSA. Hillman, who came to be known as the “labor statesman,” maintained a much
more optimistic view of the potential for using the state to advance the interests of
organized labor. Roosevelt had appointed Hillman to be the labor representative on the
National Recovery Administration (NRA) in 1933 and since that time had been
advocating for a “new unionism” that sought a more “cooperative relationship between
workers and employers, born of a shared commitment to efficiency and increased
production.” Hillman maintained close ties to the Roosevelt administration, while Lewis
was a harsh critic of Roosevelt, going so far as to endorse Roosevelt’s Republican
opponent in the 1940 election.370 Critical divisions over the extent and nature of state
power in collective bargaining shaped consequential debates not only in Congress but
also within the AFL and CIO themselves.
Despite Hillman’s influence over the FLSA and connections to the Roosevelt
administration, Section V of the original bill had been scaled back considerably when
presented again in Congress in July 1937. The section had been reduced to a clear
statement that the Board’s oversight power would only be to maintain minimum wage
and maximum hour standards, set at 40 cents and 40 hours, respectively. The final law,
which was signed in June 1938, further reduced the federal government’s regulatory
370
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power over industrial relations. The Act created a new Wage and Hour Division in the
Department of Labor and designated an administrator to oversee operations of the
division. A new section outlined a gradual transition for increases in the minimum wage
rates and decreases in the hour provisions for all industries.
Interestingly, the final bill designated an administrator position rather than the
Labor Standards Board outlined in earlier versions of the bill. The final law created an
Industry Committee, which called for equal representation from the triumvirate of
consumers, labor, and industry, hearkening back to the membership configuration of the
NRA code boards. The administrator was empowered to convene these industry
committees from time to time to consider and propose specific regulations for industries.
The administrator was also invited to submit yearly reports to Congress on the activities
and actions. But ultimately, the advisory nature of this committee reflected a much more
limited administrative function. Congress did not give the committee the power to
conduct independent investigations, and it was not clear in the final law how they would
conduct any sort of review. Thus, labor’s focus in the debates over the FLSA indicates its
waning support for federal intervention in collective bargaining. However, a final set of
issues brought racial advocacy organizations and labor together and returned to a set of
issues animating industrial policy debates since the NRA.
Regional and Racial Wage and Hour Differentials
The FLSA aimed to improve the NRA industrial relations framework by reducing
the exclusions and exemptions for certain classes of workers, which was of great interest
to racial advocacy organizations and labor unions. Reporting as a former administrator
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with intimate knowledge of the NRA, Leon Henderson stated that the wage and hour
provisions set under the NRA industrial code boards had been “sapped of considerable
strength by exceptions, exemptions and tolerances for peak periods.” Of the 578 codes,
Henderson reported that only four did not contain exceptions for specific occupations.
Further, his estimates indicated that between “14 to 20 percent of all employees of
codified industries were exempted from code provisions.”371 These exemptions,
according to Henderson, created loopholes for employers to continue to operate outside
labor protections.372 Though Henderson did not indicate that these exemptions had
explicit racial consequences, racial advocacy organizations continued to connect
exemptions to the plight of Black workers.
Despite this warning, the FLSA excluded a set of worker categories similar to
those excluded under the NLRA of 1935.373 The question of imposing national standards
for wages and hours also brought to the fore an issue related to the exemptions that had
sparked important debate over the NIRA and NLRA: wage differentials. Roosevelt’s
introduction of the bill included an invitation to think about national labor standards as an
opportunity to improve production and the value of goods by imposing rudimentary and
baseline standards.374 But a reality of the American political economy during this time
was that in addition to industry, skill-level, and union strength, wages also varied based
371
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on geographic region. Industrial growth and development were concentrated in the North,
and by 1939, five northern cities combined contributed more to the national economy
than five Deep South states combined. While agriculture and farming remained the key
industry of the South, manufacturing and production were expanding in many southern
states in the lead-up to World War II.
In addition, the South maintained a labor surplus during the war, while two-thirds
of metropolitan labor shortages were in the North.375 This amounted to a complex and
bifurcated distribution of labor, capital, and industrial development between the North
and South. Congressional debates reflected this unevenness and regional differentiation
in debates over how to balance the interests and concerns of northern industry and
southern agriculture. Much as in debates over the NIRA and NLRA (see Chapters Three
and Four for further discussion), farmers and industry representatives were in broad
disagreement about how to stimulate the economy, each favoring proposals that they
believed would improve their sector’s standing in the national economy. Related to
wages and hour provisions, Southern farmers and agricultural industrialists argued that
imposing minimum wages and maximum hour provisions would further disadvantage
them nationally.
These broad patterns and trends had specific effects on Black workers in the
North and South, and shifting employment patterns also helped construct new racial and
labor regimes. The shortage of unskilled workers during World War I and the restrictive
375
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Jim Crow regime led many Black workers to leave the South. But even in the North,
Black workers were largely confined to unskilled industrial jobs and domestic service
jobs. In the South, a racial stratification developed for industrial jobs: “clean, light, wellpaid jobs for whites and heavy, dirty, lower paid jobs for Negroes.”376
This was the economic backdrop, then, for debates over wage differentials and the
FLSA. John P. Davis of the National Negro Congress (NNC) testified once more before
Congress to rectify the creation and existence of four types of differentials under the
NRA: occupational, geographic, economic grandfather programs, and worker class
exemptions. Davis built upon FDR’s framework and argued that Black workers had been
particularly “singled out” and were “legitimate victims” of wage differentials. Davis had
warned lawmakers during the 1933 NRA hearings that this would create significant
problems. During his 1933 testimony, Davis argued that excluding categories of workers
from the cotton textile code’s standards for wages and hours gave employers an easy way
to misclassify workers and avoid labor standards. Referring to four varieties of
exemptions created by the NIRA and NRA, Davis argued that the proposed Fair Labor
Standards bill created more harmful differentials, including a cost of living adjustment
that would allow Black workers in depressed areas to receive a lower wage. Davis argued
that setting wages in relation to the cost of living would introduce racially inflected and
harmful ideas that Black workers were less efficient and required less money to live.377
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Davis was not the only individual to testify to the problems created by wage
differentials. For example, H.J. Ford of the National Constitutional Defense League put
forward a similar argument to Davis and was similarly motivated by concern over the
exclusion of Black workers. He argued that the cost of living adjustments, geographic
and sectional differentials would allow for the categorization of different workers into
lower rates.378 Representatives of organized labor also highlighted wage differentials as
key problems with the bill. Hillman and Lewis (CIO) both opposed the wage
differentials, particularly the “rigid geographic scales.” Lewis directly challenged a core
presumption buttressing the geographic wage differential: that the cost of living was
considerably lower in the South.
On the contrary, Lewis argued that the relationship was inverted. The
considerably lower cost of living in the South resulted from low wages and was certainly
not a justification for them.379 Regional differentials were particularly important issues for
the CIO, which sought to organize southern industrial workers in the cotton textile, steel,
mining, auto, and rubber industries as part of Operation Dixie. Southern elites and
officials were firmly anti-labor. The AFL’s organization of craft workers in the South had
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to adhere to a rigid racial hierarchy that excluded Black workers. The CIO concentrated
its efforts on southern industrial workers, particularly those in the cotton textile industry,
which constituted the largest group of industrial workers. The CIO leadership thought
that a successful campaign in cotton textile would spur other industrial campaigns in the
South.380
Employers and industry representatives defended regional differentials by
claiming that it would be impossible to fit a national standard to different regions and
industries. This same argument had been used to oppose the creation of the NRA and
justify exemptions to the NIRA and NRA code boards for particular businesses and
industries. The contours of the argument, particularly related to the regional differences
between the North and South, was exemplified in the testimony of Donald Comer,
president of both the Avondale Mills cotton textile company and the American Cotton
Manufacturers Association. Avondale Mills was a conglomerate of cotton textile mills in
Alabama. As discussed above, cotton textile was a major player in the southern industry
and a target of organizing efforts by the CIO. In his testimony, Comer acknowledged that
he “had long been convinced that there had to be Federal rules” setting baseline standards
for wages and hours. However, he argued that this standard should be kept low to ensure
that the cost of industrial products was kept “in step with farm-buying power.” For
southern agricultural industrialists, regional and industrial differences blurred. Raising
wages and limiting hours, even if agriculture was excluded, would still increase prices of
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the industrial products that farmers had to buy. Thus, the need for a balance between
industrial and agricultural purchasing power was paramount.381
Exchanges between Comer, Davis, and the Senate and House joint committee
members illustrate that differentials were at the heart of this tension between agriculture
and industry and interests in the North and the South. Following his testimony,
Representative Matthew Dunn (D-PA) asked Davis to clarify how differential wage rates
could exist in the same shop or factory. He especially wanted to an example of how an
unskilled Black and white worker in a steel plant could be paid different wages. Davis
attempted to articulate that the differentials were not imposed within a single shop, but
rather the NRA codes set up differentials among regions that had the effect of
disproportionately affecting Black workers. Dunn responded by rejecting Davis’s
characterization of the NRA and New Deal as a raw deal for all African Americans. He
cited many African American workers who were aided significantly by the New Deal.382
As it had been during the NRA, PWA, and NLRA, proving racially disproportionate
impact was extremely difficult.
While Representative Dunn skirted the real question of geographic differentials,
an exchange between Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) and Donald Comer (Avondale
Mills) provided a clearer justification and defense of wage differentials. Broadly, Comer
claimed that the central problem with a fixed wage was that the cost of production,
including cost and labor efficiency, was not the same, even in the same kind of shop or
381
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factory. Senator Pepper asked Comer to expand and elaborate, explicitly asking whether
Black and white laborers in the same jobs truly had similar skill levels. Comer evaded the
answer at first, listed out factors that affect differences in industries like individual
efficiency, training, and literacy. When pressed, however, Comer illustrated how the cost
of production could be very different:
I may be making in one mill a piece of cloth that sells for 10 cents a yard. if I
spoil it, there is not much loss; but suppose I am making a silk that is worth 50
cents a yard, and I spoil that with a greasy hand or tobacco juice? All of those
things have to do with it.
Here, Comer invoked precisely the impressions about Black workers Davis cited: that
they were inefficient and less-skilled than white workers. He also articulated the
mechanism by which production costs could be affected by the labor force. According to
Comer, Black workers made more mistakes, generated more waste, and were thus less
efficient than their white counterparts. Senator Pepper was sufficiently convinced by
Comer’s argument, concluding that this amounted to a demonstration of the
differentiation between “raw material costs” in the North and the South that could justify
a differential wage rate.383
Despite calls by Davis and others to amend the FLSA and eliminate the
differential practices explicitly, the final bill contained no such statement. It did establish
gradual measures for setting a 40-cent hourly minimum wage and a 40-hour maximum
workweek over a subsequent six years. But the final Act also extended the exclusion of
ten classes of workers, including agricultural employees, from the wage and hour
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protections without addressing the concern over differentials raised. Testimony
highlighting the issues raised by exemptions and differentials did not compel Members of
Congress to act. Instead, they were swayed by the arguments raised by industrialists like
Donald Comer in favor of industrial and regional differentiation as, at least in part, a
reflection of the challenges faced by Black workers in the South.
Conclusion
Debate on the FLSA began in July 1937, but the final bill was not signed into law
until almost one year later, in June 1938. During that time, the U.S. experienced another
economic recession, which reanimated debates over recovering and growing the
economy. In October 1937, both the stock market and financial market plummeted,
sending the U.S. into another serious economic downturn. The crash took the country by
surprise and bore many similarities to the crash of 1929.384 The primary testimony
considered in this section draws on hearings that took place before the economic crash, as
they contained the most robust discussion by the actors of interest for this analysis.
However, even in these statements, which came before the crash, the core tenets of this
debate were visible. Efforts to connect the need for labor standards to interstate
commerce and a thriving economy invoked broader discussions of the differences
between agricultural and industrial production as well as regional and sector-specific
variation among industries. Racial advocacy organizations, and their allies in other social
justice organizations and labor unions (particularly the CIO), highlighted how regional
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and industry-specific differentials created a dense and complicated web of employment
relations that ultimately disadvantaged Black workers.
At the same time that the issue of differentials exposed a line of commonality,
particularly between racial advocacy organizations and labor. The debates over the FLSA
also revealed significant shifts in organized labor’s attitude about increased federal
bureaucratic power. While national unions had fought for a strong labor board under the
1935 NLRA, labor explicitly opposed a board with similar powers in FLSA debates. This
was not a complete departure from unions’ position, for labor had long sought to defend
its autonomy from federal intervention into collective bargaining and union operations.
However, the FLSA was an indicator of the increased skepticism labor held toward
bureaucratic oversight. This position became even more pronounced as both racial
advocacy organizations and trade unions navigated the channels of a new federal agency
several years later, the Fair Employment Practices Committee. Ultimately, these
developments signal what Lichtenstein has argued was a defeat of the corporatist model
for industrial relations, which would have entailed a more active role for the state.385 The
debate between Lewis and Hillman over a more state-centered approach revealed
important tensions. In the long term, weaker enforcement mechanisms in the federal
bureaucracy would reduce labor’s power in the coming years. This weakened
bureaucratic framework ultimately left room for collective bargaining to be steered back
toward the courts – the least friendly terrain.

385

Lichtenstein, “From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social
Democracy in the Postwar Era.”

198

Organizing for Jobs and the 1941 March on Washington Movement
While the NNC had still been an active advocate for Black workers during the
FLSA hearings, World War II sparked the emergence of a new organization, the March
on Washington Movement (MOWM), that lead to major strategic and ideological
changes among racial advocacy organizations. In the 1940 presidential election, President
Roosevelt and his Republican opponent Wendell Wilkie attempted to court Black voters
more aggressively than in past elections. Roosevelt did so by making several key
appointments just before the election. Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet had been heralded as an
effective strategy for resolving complaints from African American citizens during the
New Deal period and, in 1940, it once again helped him secure victory over Wilkie. But
despite his electoral victory, in the early 1940s, racial advocacy organizations and their
constituencies were increasingly skeptical that the complaint-adjustment process through
Black appointees was an effective path. National organizations as well, as large swaths of
African Americans, were beginning to favor more militant strategies and were seeking
alternative paths to demand action on the part of the federal government.386
This was the political backdrop, then, for the original but lesser-known 1941
March on Washington and the emergence of a new organizational coalition: the March on
Washington Movement (MOWM). Led by A. Philip Randolph, alongside many other
racial advocacy organizations (including the NAACP and NUL), the MOWM called on
President Roosevelt to take a stronger stand against discrimination in the defense
industries. If Roosevelt did not take action, Randolph and his allies planned to march
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100,000 African Americans on the nation’s capital on July 1, 1941. The greatest legacy
of the MOWM was that through their public pressure, FDR signed an executive order
establishing a new federal agency to eradicate discrimination in defense industries: the
Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC).
The MOWM was primarily a national organization, but scholars have also
highlighted how local branches of the MOWM (particularly in New York City and St.
Louis) led successful local grassroots campaigns on issues that were loosely related to the
national organization’s focus.387 The coalition-building and activism of the MOWM
departed in important ways from the racial advocacy efforts of the previous years in ways
that reflected changes in the strategic and ideological focus of racial advocacy
organizations.
This section will focus on three major convenings that were crucial to the
formation of the MOWM’s ideology and strategy and point toward two significant ways
in which racial advocacy organizing had evolved. First, the March on Washington
Movement adopted two important restrictions in its membership and vision for coalition
partners. It did not allow white members and instead generated a racial uplift narrative
that emphasized that self-organization was necessary for securing racial equality. Related
to this effort, the MOWM also made significant attempts to distinguish itself and push
out communist and other radicals from its ranks. This was a significant departure from
the NNC and Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR), where communists and
other left-wing movements had been important allies. It also reflected an endorsement of
387
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a specific kind of mass politics, one that saw differentiating among groups and
populations as a key imperative that was of equal, or in some cases greater, importance
than building a broad coalition.
While the MOWM sought to distinguish itself from radical, left-wing causes, the
fissures between the AFL and CIO also created divisions among racial advocacy
organizations, both along strategic and ideological lines. Initially, Randolph and the
MOWM aligned with the CIO’s anti-war stance and endorsed their vision for socialdemocratic progress through opposition to the war. The NAACP and NUL adopted a
more accommodationist stance, siding more with the AFL in support of the war.
Ultimately, the MOWM came to occupy a more moderate, accommodationist position
and that sought to use the war efforts to leverage jobs programs and economic
advancement for Black Americans. As key leaders in the MOWM, notably Randolph,
began to temper their calls for broad economic reform and instead turned to
desegregation and public accommodation cases. These shifts reflected a very different
vision for mass politics and racial and economic justice than had been pursued in the
previous years.
1940 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Biennial Meeting
In 1940, America had not formally entered the war, but it loomed imminently.
Partly due to this mounting tension, the nation was also teetering on the edge of
significant racial unrest.388 Often the emissary to Black Americans on behalf of the
administration, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt attended the BSCP’s biennial meeting to
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enlist support from the nation’s leading racial advocacy organizations in the war efforts.
The BSCP’s 1940 biennial meeting and celebration of the 15th anniversary of the
organization was largely a celebration of the porters’ victory against the Pullman
Company. However, it also served as a space for discussion about the goals of racial
advocacy organizing in the wake of the New Deal and on the eve of world war. While
much of the discussion at the meeting pertained specifically to issues of the porters,
Randolph and the BSCP’s broader role in forming the MOWM and the impending
pressures of the war effort sparked significant discussion among many of the speakers.
This discussion centered on two major debates; both were seeking to determine the best
way to use the war effort to advance racial equality. One debate was whether and how
racial equality organizations should support and participate in the war. The second major
question was how to overcome barriers in organized labor to take part in the boon of
wartime industrial growth, which in some ways was a continuation of debates that had
taken place in response to the first and second wave of the New Deal.
A central and controversial outcome of the 1940 meeting was a resolution
formally opposing the war. The resolution referenced the likely outcome of America’s
entrance in the war: “the introduction of some form of dictatorship in this country and the
possible emergence of fascism, which would result in the militarism of the nation and the
repression of minority groups and labor.”389 An array of organizations and actors urged
the BSCP to reconsider its position opposing the war effort. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt
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spoke briefly to the assembled crowd about the 1940 Burke-Wadsworth Act, which
instituted a peacetime draft and allowed conscription of men between 21 and 35 years of
age. She recognized that there were differences of opinion on the act. However, she
emphasized that proactive engagement and preparation were necessary for domestic
safety and that “every one of us has an obligation to try in every way we can to maintain
and improve our democratic form of government here.”390
The First Lady was not the only one to press the BSCP to reconsider its position
on the war. Spencer Miller, Director of the Workers’ Education Bureau of AFL, called on
the BSCP leadership to support measures to prepare to defend the country.391 Miller asked
the BSCP to reconsider its position given changing conditions and the threat to
democracy and organized labor. Suppression of labor unions in the wake of military
suppression and totalitarianism in Europe indicated that the labor movement had a vital
stake in helping to win the war for democracy. Miller did not reprimand the BSCP for its
anti-war position; on the contrary, he commented that it reflected one of the victories of
democracies that a minority view could be made public. However, he did argue that the
best way to combat totalitarian takeover was not through opposition to the war but by
becoming important stakeholders in the war efforts:
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If, as we enter upon military conscription in America—and we are entering this
very day—the greatest care is not taken to provide for the preservation of labor
standards and for giving labor an important part in the mechanization of national
defense, your fears about this business of conscription may be realized. That, it
seems to me, is why it is of the greatest importance that labor in this country
should insist that it must and shall have a part and place commensurate with the
sacrifice which the government is going to call upon us to make in this crisis.392
Miller’s comments reflect one side of an important debate that was also taking place
within organized labor. The war had shifted the organizing landscape quite significantly.
Unions were facing the threat of emboldened conservative opponents seeking to take
control of the defense mobilization apparatus to roll back the last decade of advances in
economic planning, which became even more pronounced in the war years.393 The
question of how to respond was a source of conflict and division within organized labor.
Some, like Miller, argued for a more conservative, assimilationist plan that used war
production to advance an agenda of “quasidemocratic state planning” resembling the
New Deal. On the other side were CIO unionists like John Lewis, who argued that a
wartime economic model would “inevitably strengthen the domestic enemies of the labor
movement and reduce the CIO’s power to advance a progressive social agenda at
home.”394 Randolph was bringing the BSCP into this fight beside Lewis and other leftleaning factions in the CIO.
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Led by the NAACP, some organizations also opposed discrimination in
conscription. Racial advocacy organizations successfully pressured Congress into adding
an anti-discrimination clause to the Burke-Wadsworth Act, but as Water White (NAACP)
noted, the clause was likely to be “nullified by another clause stating that persons will be
admitted to the armed forces of the United States only ‘if they are acceptable to the land
and naval forces.’”395 This clause gave the armed service’s discretion over their
admittance policies, which amounted to very little change in discriminatory practices.
These statements reflect two main approaches to racial advocacy organizing in wartime:
one that focused on broader political conditions and the other on narrower racial
considerations. In the first camp were Randolph, the BSCP and the CIO, who opposed
the war effort for fear that it would advance an agenda that was unfavorable to labor and
their pursuit of a broader social-democratic agenda. But the NAACP indicated an
accommodationist attitude regarding the war, so long as national legislation adopted antidiscrimination measures that were relatively disconnected from broader politicaleconomic arguments.
The Double Victory campaign reflected this more conservative or
accomodationist approach. The idea of the Double V campaign was that victory over
fascism abroad could be used to fight for racial equality back home. Historian Lee Finkle
documents that a “cautious group of editors and writers” in the Black press were “seeking
to avoid a direct assault on segregation and hoping to make inroads using traditional
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methods of protest such as lobbying committees, letter writing campaigns, and appeals to
the courts and the executive branch.”396 Both Granger of the NUL and Roy Wilkins of the
NAACP argued for channeling energy into the Double Victory campaign. Black support
for the war efforts would help shift white attitudes about the “caste system” after the
war.397 The NAACP and NUL were not the only ones who thought the war would bring
about an end to racial discrimination. The director of the Bureau of Employment believed
that the rapidly expanding war industries and the vast manpower needs in both
government and private industry would mean that employers would no longer be able to
afford to “indulge their prejudices against minority groups.” Persistent discrimination and
the particular geographic and industrial concentration of defense jobs rendered this
prediction false.398 However, the idea that the war could turn the tides for racial equality
was a powerful and enticing one for those favoring accommodationist strategies for
securing equality.
The MOWM attempted to occupy a middle position between mass militant war
opposition and this more conservative, accommodationist camp. Randolph and the BSCP
eventually softened their position against the war and used the war as a platform and
springboard for demanding racial equality. But this was also a concession to a more
conservative approach to wartime organizing, one that cast off mass protest and militant
actions in favor of quieter, more accommodationist reforms, like adding antidiscrimination measures to legislation. In January 1942, at one of the earliest meetings of
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the MOWM, the committee engaged in a lengthy debate over the importance of not
signaling “100% agreement” with the war effort, given the exclusion of African
Americans from the armed forces and war industries. The group decided not to “go on
record with opportunists and other leaders of Negro uplift organizations,” but instead to
take a more “radical” course demanding a Black member of FDR’s War Labor Board as
“prima facie evidence” that the President was centrally concerned with Black workers’
role in “industrial and economic life.”399 Thus, the movement evolved its position on the
war effort, coming to see the war effort as another terrain on which to fight strategic
battles for economic, or at least symbolic economic, racial equality.
The second important dynamic and source of contention at the 1940 BSCP
biennial meeting was organized labor’s ability to integrate Black workers. William
Green, president of the AFL, used his speech to declare the centrality of organized labor
for promoting the interests of the Black worker:
I declare, in your presence here today, that there is no movement in America, not
even the church itself, that is based upon the broadest constituents of brotherhood
and fraternity, that is doing more to break down racial prejudice and racial hate,
than the American Federation of Labor.400
Walter White (NAACP) said he had listened “with amusement” to Green’s statement that
the AFL was “leading the way against racial hatreds and prejudices.” White called the
group’s attention to 500 Black shipyard workers in Tampa, Florida were without work
because of racially discriminatory hiring practices of the AFL Boilermakers union
399
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(IBB).401 Racial advocacy organizations had good reason to be skeptical of such
declarations by AFL leadership, which had been a frequent refrain during debates over
the NLRA and SSA. As White’s comments highlighted, there was a considerable
discrepancy between the declarations of the AFL’s national leadership and the practices
of individual unions.
But unlike the debates in the New Deal period, when the AFL had been the
primary target of racial advocacy organizations, the emergence of the CIO offered
another path for organizing Black workers. The CIO broke away from the AFL in 1935 to
pursue a very different vision of industrial unionism, one that recognized the importance
of Black workers. Indeed, many CIO locals incorporated anti-discrimination clauses into
their constitutions, an issue that was a sticking point within the AFL. The CIO’s
organizing model was a primary reason for this difference in position. While the AFL
focused on organizing workers across workplaces into craft unions and focused more
(although not exclusively) on skilled workers, the CIO formed to organize unskilled
workers and build power by organizing all employees in a factory or workplace. Where
they had managed to secure manufacturing or factory jobs, Black workers were
predominantly hired as unskilled workers. Thus, the CIO was a more promising venture
for racial advocacy organizations and those seeking to organize Black workers. However,
this is not to gloss over the challenges of organizing Black workers into CIO unions. But
the groups of workers the CIO was seeking to organized forced them to confront issues of
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discrimination and integration head-on, unlike the AFL. The craft-based strategy allowed
the older union to sidestep those issues more easily.
Related to the opposing organizing philosophies of the AFL and CIO, racial
advocacy organizations’ ideological differences also led to different responses. Groups
like the NAACP were ambivalent and reticent to throw their weight behind the new CIO
and its organizing promise since some branches had developed closer ties with employers
than unions. The NUL urged Black workers to join the CIO, but largely avoided taking a
clear position on the AFL and CIO rivalry. The NNC and other left-leaning groups were
clear and ardent supporters of the CIO. However, for the more conservative groups like
the NAACP and NUL, the CIO and NNC proximity and engagement with Communists
was a divisive issue.402
The broad story of strategy and orientation of the AFL and CIO is important for
how the MOWM developed, but the contours of particular efforts to integrate Black
workers also varied dramatically based on the industry and region in which organizing
was happening. In the defense industry, political scientist Daniel Kryder argues that due
to the concentration of wartime production in northern industrial centers, the need for
skilled workers, and formal or informal methods of discrimination and exclusion meant
that Black workers were largely excluded from defense jobs.403 These specific conditions
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became particularly important when the FEPC began to act as an intermediary, using the
federal government’s power to influence racial integration into the wartime industries.
The 1940 biennial meeting of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters staked out
two important dynamics that would continue to influence racial advocacy organizing
efforts in the coming years. First was the negotiation between mass organizing with
broader and more radical demands and more targeted, accommodationist, and ultimately
conservative efforts to garner wins from the state on behalf of Black workers. The second
important development signaled in this meeting is the continued battle between organized
labor and racial advocacy organizations. The AFL gestured broadly to the importance of
organized labor for Black workers and the national commitment to integration and
desegregation of labor unions. At the same time, groups like the NAACP and NUL
pointed to organizing challenges in specific locals that contradicted those national
positions. These debates highlighted major questions for the MOWM’s organizing efforts
to influence and strengthen the FEPC.
Formation of the MOWM and the June 1942 Madison Square Garden Meeting
Having settled on the more accommodationist framework of the Double Victory
campaign, the MOWM and affiliated racial advocacy organizations began pushing
against discrimination within the defense industries as a specific opportunity to advance
Black employment and economic progress created by the war. As discussed in the
previous section, they had secured a narrow victory in amending the Burke-Wadsworth
Act with an anti-discrimination clause. However, they sought to shore up more
administrative support for that promise. In early 1941, the NAACP was pressuring
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members of Congress to set up a special committee to investigate discrimination in
defense industries. Introduced in the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in
February 1941, Senate Resolution No. 75 called for an investigation into discrimination
in hiring and training program admissions on behalf of Black workers.
The mandate and scope of work were very similar to Executive Order 8802,
which created the FEPC. However, in April 1941, the resolution was tabled indefinitely
after the National Non-Partisan Council included discrimination among the issues facing
the wartime industries in a meeting with the Special Committee Investigating National
Defense.404 The committee was tasked with investigating a range of issues related to
national defense, but the NAACP did not want racial discrimination to be included in the
committee’s broad scope of work, for fear that other matters would overshadow it. Senate
Resolution No. 75 attempted to make discrimination the “sole object of inquiry,” but that
door was closed.405
These efforts to determine how best to apply pressure and push for reform in the
federal government also exposed tensions between the NUL and NAACP. In January
1941, Lester Granger (NUL) corresponded with Walter White (NAACP) about the
NAACP’s public condemnation of the United States Employment Service (USES) on the
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grounds of racial discrimination. Granger argued that the progress made through the
USES had been led by NUL negotiations. Further, he issued a cautionary reminder
regarding an arrangement that had been made between the boards of the two
organizations assigning “primary responsibility for leadership in certain fields.” Granger
(NUL) argued that since the actions of the USES and employment more broadly fell “so
definitely within the scope of the Urban League program, it seems to me that our joint, as
well as our separate approaches should be very carefully discussed between us.”406 While
both the NAACP and NUL favored the more accommodationist strategy encapsulated in
the Double V Campaign, they differed on advocacy approaches. Through their work with
the USES, the NUL saw the benefit of working from within government structures and
channels, whereas the NAACP sought to generate public attention and scrutiny to
advance its goals.
But the most significant developments in this period, building off the debates
during the BSCP’s 1940 meeting, were related to efforts to apply pressure through the
executive branch. This was not an entirely new phenomenon. Political scientist Daniel
Kryder argues that during the New Deal, FDR had established a “complaint-driven race
management system,” largely operated by key appointments of Black officials who
comprised the so-called Black Cabinet. These appointees, who functioned in advisory
roles, sought to address individual complaints through adjustment and direct coordination
with offending parties. As discussed above, Roosevelt’s strategic use of several key
406
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administrative appointments in the lead-up to the 1940 presidential election earned him
the endorsement of the NAACP. Roosevelt prevailed over Republican Wendell Wilkie to
win an unprecedented third term, and his winning coalition included the majority of
African American voters.407 However, the more militant tendency had become
increasingly dissatisfied with this “complaint-driven race management system,” as it was
understood to be a largely symbolic anointing of Black elites. It was from this increasing
disillusionment that the MOWM sprung.408
In April 1941, Randolph and Frank Crosswaith, founder of the Negro Labor
Committee in New York, sent a memo to FDR asking for his assistance in ensuring that
Black workers would “share proportionally in employment from defense programs.”
They outlined three major demands: a proportional share of defense jobs, access to
defense training programs, and desegregation of the armed forces. In the letter, Randolph
and Crosswaith distanced themselves from “supporters of totalitarianism of all brands,
Nazism, fascism, and Communism,” who charged that American democracy was
incapable of securing racial equality. Instead, Randolph and Crosswaith emphasized their
“loyalty to the ideals of American democracy” and support for the Double Victory vision
of racial equality at home and abroad. Finally, they clearly articulated what role President
Roosevelt should play in addressing the conflict:
We do not expect you, Mr. President, to get rid of race prejudice. We know full
well that that task must be accomplished in the long run by the character and
conduct of Negroes in cooperation with their fellow citizens as together they
407
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strive to improve our democracy and gain greater economic security and justice
for all. But we do expect you to use your high office to prevent race prejudice
from being translated into discrimination by the government or by private
concerns or agencies which are dependent upon the government. 409
Randolph and Crosswaith embraced the accommodationist position and articulated their
hope that Black support for the war effort would inspire white Americans to end the caste
system. But further, these remarks also reveal how central the psychological phenomenon
of “race prejudice” had become in defining racial inequality. Randolph and Crosswaith
focused on reforming the “character and conduct” of Black Americans. They saw the
translation of prejudice into the systems and institutions of the American democracy and
economy.
At a June 1941 meeting with President Roosevelt, Randolph and Walter White of
the NAACP restated the core demands of the letter: desegregation of the armed forces,
military, and the federal government. Randolph and White attempted to demonstrate that
they were not fringe radicals but serious leaders of a group that planned to march 100,000
Black workers on Washington D.C. unless FDR took immediate action.410 Whether they
could have delivered a march of that magnitude has been the subject of debate.
Regardless, FDR was persuaded enough by the threat to act. Several days later, on June
25, 1941, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, which called for full
participation in the national defense program and federal government, regardless of “race,
creed, color, or national origin.” The order linked full labor force participation to the
409
Letter for President Roosevelt, “National Defense Program, March on Washington Committee, 1941,”
28 April 1941, Box I, F13, Folder 11, National Urban League Records, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC.
410
Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement, 14.

214

success of the U.S. military effort. However, the order did not encompass all the demands
put forward by racial equality advocates. Most notably, it applied anti-discrimination
requirements to the defense industry and the federal government. It did not include
desegregation in the armed services or the call for amending the NLRA to deny
protections to unions that discriminated based on race.411
While it was not the expansive statement they had hoped for, Executive Order
8802 was enough to compel the leadership of the MOWM to cancel the planned march.
Granger (NUL) argued that even though the order failed to do all of what they had called
for, it was “strong enough drawn to embarrass any plans for a March at this time.” He
argued that the public would not understand the “inside questions” if they tried to push
for a march on the grounds that the order was an incomplete response. Instead, he argued
that they should suspend the march until it was clear whether the order would “produce
or fail to produce beneficial effects.”412 Sometime after the decision, the MOWM
produced a document called “Why and How the March Was Postponed,” which
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attempted to address the culminating events that led to EO 8802 and the subsequent halt
of the march. The response likened the canceling of the march to a labor strike: workers
call off the strike when the union reaches an agreement with management.413
But not everyone was satisfied with this conclusion. There had been considerable
pushback, especially from the younger and more radical contingent of the movement.
Earlie John, a member of the NYC MOWM, argued that without an actual march, “the
majority will conclude that we are the same docile, begging, cringing, handkerchief-head
uncle Toms of yesterday."414 The MOWM was at a defining juncture in negotiating what
this new kind of mass politics would be and how it departed from the complaintadjustment and accommodationist position.
While the MOWM did not move forward with a mass march, it held three major
rallies in New York City, Chicago, and St. Louis over the summer of 1942, which drew a
total of 30,000 people to the MOWM.415 According to the leadership of the MOWM, one
goal of these events was to generate more attention in the white press.416 The largest of
these events was the June 1942 rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City.
Randolph’s keynote address at this meeting conveyed several important messages that
spoke to the issues of concern. First, he argued that the FEPC should maintain its focus
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on discrimination in the federal government and defense industries, despite calls to
expand the scope to include issues that went unaddressed issues in EO 8802. But
Randolph argued that expanding the FEPC’s mandate could lead to the agency being
“discredited with failure by taking on a bigger one and becoming a mere complaint
absorbing and buck passing agency.” Further, Randolph opposed the centralization of “all
of the problems of the Negro” into a singular federal agency, “on the grounds that it is the
essence of Jim-Crowism and segregation and accentuates, intensifies and entrenches the
very problem we are trying to eliminate.”417 These statements by Randolph reflect an
evolving strategy regarding racial equality advocacy and the federal bureaucracy. The
leaders of the MOWM were clearly hopeful about securing key victories within the FEPC
and making sure that the interests of Black Americans did not get relegated to a single
agency in the bureaucracy. Some of their efforts were more symbolic, like securing a
Black member on the War Labor Board. However, they were also adapting new strategies
for working through the federal bureaucracy.
The MOWM was developing a new set of policies on membership and coalitionbuilding that signified an important departure from the interracial organizing during the
New Deal particularly that led by the National Negro Congress. Most significantly, the
MOWM constitution included a provision restricting membership to African
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Americans.418 Randolph provided the reasoning for this decision in his speech at the
Madison Square Garden meeting:
We planned the March on Washington to be all Negroes because we wanted the
President and the country not to be left in any doubt that this March was the
symbol and expression of discontent and resentment of Negroes themselves
against discrimination in the Army, Navy, U.S. Marine, Air-Corps, defense
industries and the Government and not some outbursts artificially stirred up and
manipulated by the artful Communists.419
In part, as Randolph here indicates, restricting membership to Blacks was a way of
allaying allegations that racial advocacy organizers were a front for left radicals,
especially communists. But in defending the position later in his speech, Randolph also
appealed to a version of racial uplift mentality: “the Negro must assume the major
responsibility for the solution of his problems and must supply the money and pay the
price, make the sacrifice and lead the fight.” This did not mean that there could not be
interracial alliances and coalitions. Instead, the MOWM leadership embraced the idea
that as women, workers, and religious groups all had organizations fighting their
“specific problems,” so too was there a need for an all-Black movement to address the
needs of African Americans. Randolph acknowledged the need for interracial alliances
bringing all these groups together to fight for joint problems in “common civic
moments,” but that these interracial movements had to be “supplemented by an all-Negro
movement.”420

418

Constitution of the MOWM, “MOWM Minutes of Meetings 1941-1943,” 14 January 1942, Box 28,
Folder 11, A. Philip Randolph papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC.
419
Randolph’s Keynote Address, MOWM at Madison Square Garden, “MOWM,” 16 June 1942, Box 1,
Folder 4, Jessica B. Davis Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Collection.
420
Randolph’s Keynote Address, MOWM at Madison Square Garden, “MOWM,” 16 June 1942, Box 1,
Folder 4, Jessica B. Davis Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Collection.

218

Randolph’s position reflected both a strategic and ideological calculation. In
terms of strategy, these were the early days of red-baiting by conservative factions in
Congress and other levels of government and society. Organizations and individuals,
particularly those embracing more radical calls for economic restructuring, were singled
out as communists and sympathizers with foreign enemies. Indeed, as indicated above,
much of the militaristic rhetoric put out by the MOWM and key racial advocacy leaders
positioned included communism with fascism and totalitarianism as the triple threat to
American democratic ideals. Randolph and the other leaders of the MOWM sought to
distance themselves from communists by limiting their membership to Blacks.
Ideologically, the all-Black membership policy and the stated political agenda of
the MOWM, outlined in the “8 Point Program” in Table 5.1 below, also represented an
emerging tension around understanding and interpreting Black economic inequality. The
MOWM and other racial equality advocates understood that EO 8802 and the FEPC were
not a comprehensive answer to racial inequality. Thus, the MOWM’s role was to
continue pushing for a comprehensive response. What is striking about this list is the
relative absence of demands centered on economic reform or job creation by the federal
government. Except for the call for a permanent FEPC, the program focused on these
“specific concerns” of African Americans: eliminating segregation in public facilities,
ending the poll tax, passing the antilynching law. Although it was a consistent issue
brought to the FEPC by the MOWM, NAACP, and NUL, the list contains no mention of
addressing discrimination in trade unions. Considered together, this list of demands did
not address underlying political-economic conditions as a source of racial inequality.
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Table 5.1: 8 Point Program of the March on Washington Movement
Preamble: Therefore, 13,000,000 Negroes representing one-tenth of the population
demand of our national government this 8 point program for winning democracy for
the Negro and thereby winning the war for democracy.
1. We demand in the interest of national unity, the abrogation of every law
which makes a distinction in treatment between citizens based on
religion, creed, color, or national origin. This means an end to “Jim Crow”
in education, in housing, in transportation and in every other social,
economic, and political privilege; and especially we demand in the capital of
the nation, an end to all segregation in public places and in public institutions.
2. We demand legislation to enforce the 5th and 14th amendments
guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law so that the full weight of the national government
might be used for the protection of life and thereby end the disgrace of
lynching.
3. We demand the enforcement of the 14th and 15th amendments and the
enactment of the Geyer Poll Tax Bill so that all barriers in the exercise of
the suffrage are eliminated.
4. We demand, in the capital of the nation, an end to all segregation in public
places and in public institutions.
5. We demand the abolition of segregation and discrimination in the Army,
Marine Corps, Air Corps, and all other branches of national defense.
6. We demand that the F.E.P.C be made a permanent administrative agency
of the U.S. government by legislative sanction and that it be given power to
enforce its decisions based on its findings so that segregation and
discrimination in industry, vocational training, and in government may be
abolished.
7. We demand that federal funds be withheld from any agency which
practices discrimination in the use of such funds.
8. We demand a cabinet member of a minority racial group in the U.S. and
also representation of racial minorities on all administrative agencies so
that these groups have recognition of their democratic right to share in
formulating policies affecting public welfare.
Source: MOWM Fundraising Letter, “MOWM 1942 – March on Washington
Movement,” 21 April 1942, Box 1, A28, Folder 1, National Urban League Records,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Emphasis added.
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However, Randolph’s keynote address at the June 1942 Madison Square Garden
meeting placed the “8 Point Plan” in a slightly different light, one that was more
reflective and critical of the political-economic conditions. Randolph argued that Jim
Crow had been a political creation intended to reinforce particular political-economic
structures:
Thus, in order to break the spirit of the Negro and force him to acquiesce in and
accept the status of a half-man in the American economy, the lynch rope and
faggot, segregation and Jim Crow were invented as an engine of persecution,
oppression and terrorism against him. And like creeping paralysis, Jim-Crow,
which is a moral, spiritual and intellectual insult to the very soul of the Negro, and
also the basis for his economic subjection, has spread all over America in some
form or another.421
Randolph made clear that segregation and discrimination were not amorphous forces that
existed in a vacuum; Jim Crow was the result of a set of political-economic conditions
and interests. But the interest in highlighting the “particular” concerns of Black
Americans that the MOWM had also embraced meant that in terms of political and policy
prescriptions, the political agenda proposed to address segregation and discrimination
disaggregated from economic fundamentals. It was an indirect approach. Randolph
identified Jim Crow as the product of a particular set of political-economic relations.
Rather than strike at that root, he and the MOWM proposed a set of plans that aimed to
stamp out what they viewed as the primary effects of that system: prejudice and
discrimination. This rendering served to create a new set of targets in terms of policy
aims. Coupled with the decision to limit membership to African Americans, what may
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have begun as a strategic and tactical decision had, in effect, shifted the focus from the
underlying political-economic system and settled on a compromise position.
The June 1942 meeting also revealed tensions that were emerging within the
coalition. While the NAACP and NUL sponsored the Madison Square Garden, both
organizations were beginning to distance themselves from the group’s work. Lester
Granger of the NUL opened his remarks to the assembly by stating that there were points
of agreement and points of disagreement among those assembled. He argued that it was
quite “natural” for these types of disagreements to occur, given that “this audience is
composed of Negroes of many political and religious beliefs, or different economic
circumstances, temperaments and past circumstances. Our reactions to a common
problem will differ as our experiences, temperaments and personal opinions differ."422
While Granger did not elaborate on the content and significance of those differences in
this statement, he would clarify his position in the next major meeting of the MOWM
during the fall of 1942.
September 1942 MOWM Policy Conference
Following the mass events held in the summer, the MOWM leadership began
planning for a National Policy Conference in Detroit, Michigan, in the fall of 1942. The
stated objectives of the meeting were to draft a constitution, develop an organizational
structure, elect officers, and consider the “goals, policies, strategy, methods and tactics”
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of the organization.423 These were important steps in establishing the MOWM as a
permanent organization. However, the planning for this event made the fissures that had
begun to emerge among participating organizations even more apparent.
In response to an invitation to take part in the 1942 Detroit conference, the NUL’s
Lester Granger not only declined to participate in the event but also stated his intentions
to withdraw his personal and organizational support for the MOWM. He listed both
logistical constraints, namely that he was already overcommitted with NUL work, and
concern over the principles and responsibilities that the MOWM was forming. He
thought the plans for the Detroit meeting were premature and argued that more attention
to the goals and tactics of the group was needed before such a mass meeting could take
place.424 Randolph replied that his vision for the Detroit meeting was precisely what
Granger laid out: an opportunity to plan for the direction and goals of the MOWM.425 The
NAACP similarly opted not to send a delegate to the Detroit policy meeting, based on
concerns that the MOWM had “gotten away from its original plan of a federation of
Negro organizations working jointly on the program of the Negro.” Anna Hedgman
(NYC YWCA) articulated these concerns to Randolph in a letter, calling upon the
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MOWM to clarify in its mission statement that it was not intended to “eliminate or
nullify” the work of either the NUL or the NAACP.426
One of the core committees, the Program and Strategy Committee, attempted to
clarify the relationship of the MOWM to other movements The committee’s report
argued that the MOWM was not to be seen as a rival organization, an apparent effort to
allay the NUL and NAACP's concerns, and highlighted the differences between MOWM
and the Black Nationalist movement.427 The MOWM aimed to “demonstrate the
technique of militant mass pressure in the field of minority problems where other
techniques have broken down.”428 But it was precisely these more militant tactics that
were the cause of dissent, particularly from the NUL. One recommendation of the Detroit
Policy Meeting was to picket the White House. When the MOWM announced the picket
the following spring, Granger wrote an angry letter to Randolph asking why his name had
been included as a signatory on a memo to the White House without his consent.429
The NUL and NAACP were not quite so specific as to their reasons for abstaining
from the MOWM’s 1942 Policy Conference, but these reservations would continue to
develop over time. That meeting, which took place without any NAACP and NUL
representatives, included 66 delegates from a variety of racial and social justice
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organizations. Attendees established several working committees and built upon the 8
Point Plan in defining the work and goals of the MOWM. Broadly, the MOWM framed
its long-term goals as securing “economic equality, political equality, social equality, and
racial equality for the ultimate attainment” and further pointed to an “immediate goal the
abolition of discrimination, segregation in the armed forces, defense and peace time
Industries, Government, Trade Unions, education and recreation.”430 Randolph’s keynote
address to the assembly affirmed this idea that the long-term goal was political,
economic, and social equality. However, the short-term goals he identified were
discrimination and segregation. As in the June meeting at Madison Square Garden, the
MOWM was working to articulate a strategy that maintained the centrality of the
economic program and accommodated the emerging focus on “race-specific” issues. In
his address, Randolph also reaffirmed the MOWM’s commitment to their Black-only
membership policy.431
The MOWM’s Committee on Program and Strategy articulated this position in its
final report. This committee built on the original points of the 8 Point Program and
expanded it in several important ways. The final report included a call to develop a
“Technique for Breaking Down Discrimination in Restaurants, Hotels, Busses, Movies,
etc.” a priority that connected race prejudice with economic standing:
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Though failure to secure jobs and placement opportunities may strike at the core
of the Negro’s economic status and thus determine his social status, yet racial
tensions reach a crescendo at the point of inter-racial contact where the Negro is
arbitrarily assigned to an inferior status.
While economic status was still identified as the “core” of Black inequality, highlighting
the influence of “inter-racial contact” signaled that a new explanation for racial inequality
was gaining prominence. Here “inter-racial contact” and race prejudice, which were
highly individualistic and largely psychological phenomena, were portrayed as
contributing factors to Blacks’ inferior social, economic, and political status. Focusing
on political, economic, and psychological causes of racial inequality created a clearer
picture, but the ordering of the central and contributing causes was significant. In the
coming years, as psychological and individualist explanations for racial inequality came
to the fore, it was more difficult to incorporate structural analyses and articulate demands
for political-economic reform. These individualist explanations for the “race issue” were
better-suited for the legal path, foreshadowed by the Program and Strategy’s concluding
recommendation calling for test cases against segregation laws in all states.
Conclusion
The developments outlined in this section point to three important shifts among
labor unions and organizations working to secure racial equality in the late 1930s into the
World War II period. Organized labor’s growing reticence to federal intervention in
collective bargaining indicates the fractures that eventually led to the defeat of a
corporatist model for industrial relations. Unfortunately, this reticence was short-sighted.
The concerns over federal intervention in collective bargaining were rooted in concerns
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over the competition between the CIO and AFL and concern over intervention that would
address specific measures, like racial discrimination. But without a stronger bureaucratic
state, labor would come to lose much of the ground gained. And it was this weaker
bureaucratic framework that ultimately leaves room for collective bargaining to end back
up in the courts – which was the least friendly terrain for labor.
Among racial advocacy organizations, as is best indicated by the NAACP and
NUL, fractures were forming among these organizations when it came to defining a
broad agenda for a racial advocacy network. The reservations of the NAACP and NUL
speak both to an interest in carving out specific terrain on which particular organizations
would operate and also a general reticence to engage in the MOWM’s mass militant
actions. Further, careful attention to how Randolph and other MOWM leaders were
articulating the economic and racial goals of the movement reveals that these goals had
come to be in tension. While Randolph continued to link Jim Crow segregation to the
underlying economic conditions and structures of capitalism, the all-Black membership
policy and prioritization of the eradication of Jim Crow segregation as the end goal
reflected that race-centric visions for racial justice. These new priorities began to eclipse
political-economic analyses within the MOWM and other organizations. Finally, before
discussing the FEPC and their work against discrimination in the defense industries and
federal government, it is also important to note that the MOWM viewed the FEPC as a
victory, but an incomplete one. They continued to push for a permanent FEPC and to
support the work of the agency, but it was understood to be a compromise.
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CHAPTER 6: WARTIME ADVOCACY AND THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES COMMITTEE
In January 1943, tension over the escalating war and racial inequality on the
domestic front had reached a boiling point. One of President Roosevelt’s top war
department officials had announced the cancellation of a major public hearing on racial
discrimination in the powerful railroad industry. For organizations like the NAACP, the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), and the National Urban League (NUL), this
decision sounded the death knell for the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC),
a new federal agency in which they had staked great hopes. Railing against the
cancellation, BSCP president A. Philip Randolph, who organized the first Black union to
gain affiliation with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), proclaimed that “there is
only one conclusion Negroes can reach, namely, that FEPC is useless and that it can no
longer be looked to for help.”432 Leaders from organized labor joined racial advocacy
organizations. John Lewis of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) published an
editorial similarly decrying the cancellation of the hearings, in which he accused
administration officials of “gagging” the agency.433
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The events that led up to Randolph and Lewis’s pronouncement are important
developments in civil rights organizing that targeted the federal bureaucracy. Scholars
have argued that the fight for the FEPC served as connective tissue between the early
twentieth century and the heyday of civil rights organizing in the 1960s.434 Most
centrally, the FEPC played an essential role in changing the political environment for
state-level battles for fair employment legislation and served as an important catalyst for
future grassroots mobilization.435 However, scholars who emphasize the importance of
the FEPC are far outnumbered by those who highlight the agency’s limitations and
minimize its significance, pointing to the relatively short existence and the lack of
significant enforcement powers.436
This chapter highlights another important legacy of the FEPC, arguing that its
historical importance is related to the contributions to the development of coalitions
working towards racial and social democracy in this period. The FEPC represented the
most extensive discussion to date of how the federal government could work to increase
economic opportunities for Black workers, what in this period came to be called “fair
employment.” More so than in the Public Works Administration (PWA) and in the series
of debates over anti-discrimination clauses and New Deal legislation, this agency
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facilitated a robust discussion of implementing a fair employment program. Most
significantly, the FEPC moved away from race-conscious efforts, like the quota system of
the PWA and auxiliary union structures, and towards more race-blind assessments that
rejected differentiation of workers based on race.
The FEPC also facilitated closer alignment between racial advocacy organizations
and labor unions than had come under previous legislative and administrative efforts. To
start, for much of the FEPC’s existence, both racial advocacy organizations and labor
unions had representatives on the FEPC board who participated in the agency’s decisionmaking. Experiences with the FEPC helped transform the loose coalitions of labor unions
and racial advocacy organizations that emerged to press for more social-democratic
approaches to the NLRA and SSA into more concrete in efforts to both establish and, on
many occasions, save the FEPC from conservative opposition. However, while the
coalitions were robust, the FEPC aims and fair employment more generally were racial
democratic goals, not social democratic ones. As they had during the New Deal debates,
racial advocacy organizations, most prominently the NAACP and the National Urban
League (NUL), continued to argue that discriminatory practices of labor unions posed the
most significant barriers for securing racial equality.
But the major limitation of these coalitions, and ultimately of the FEPC, was not
precisely rooted in unions’ defense of their discriminatory practices. On the contrary, as
is clear from the opening anecdote, organized labor (particularly the CIO) was committed
to the agency’s work to secure fair employment for Black workers and, at many points,
was a staunch defender of the FEPC against this opposition. But on some more
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operational issues, the AFL and CIO once again worked to limit federal intervention in
collective bargaining processes. Crucially, not all stakeholders held equal influence over
the FEPC’s operations. Across the agency’s short history, the FEPC’s leadership showed
great deference to the preferences and interests of organized labor, often over the interests
of racial and social justice organizations. In sum, analysis of the FEPC provides a basis
for understanding the development of fair employment efforts and their connection to
later civil rights organizing and for understanding a pivotal moment in which organized
labor was redefining its relationship to the state.
In addition to calling attention to a frequently overlooked phase of organizing for
racial and labor equality, focusing on this period also highlights the benefits and
challenges of working through the federal bureaucracy. Organizing through Congress, the
courts, and the federal bureaucracy involved distinctive challenges and opportunities for
Black workers. The declaration that a federal agency would seek to enact antidiscrimination measures for Black workers, while a significant and challenging task, was
only part of the battle. The task of overseeing and implementing that mandate involved
considering a broad set of solutions proposed by unions, employers, and racial advocacy
organizations: auxiliary unions, quota systems, changes in training and hiring processes,
and many others.
This chapter will examine two of the agency’s most significant and politically
charged cases and consider how they served to forge coalitions of labor and racial
advocacy organizations. These two cases sought to address the exclusionary practices of
the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and the Southern railway industry. The
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review and negotiation of these cases through an administrative channel allowed for
racial and labor equality advocates to be more connected to a relatively rapid and iterative
process of adjustment of industrial practices. However, it certainly did not lead to clear
and conclusive victories in every case. Perhaps most significantly, the FEPC’s cases were
frequently slowed by changes in political appointments and the fluctuating support of the
president.
The FEPC was the next iteration of a style of New Deal agency that attempted to
foster voluntaristic industrial relations between labor and industry and, for the first time,
included racial advocacy organizations in those discussions. Thus, while it fostered rapid
ideological development for those pursuing anti-discrimination politics, the challenges of
the bureaucratic process and the FEPC’s allegiance to organized labor ultimately
frustrated racial equality advocates. In both significant FEPC cases considered in this
chapter, the courts presented themselves as an alternative venue to press for fair
employment and one more willing to intervene in union’s collective bargaining,
foreshadowing the later turn to the courts for civil rights organizing more broadly.
The Creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee
With the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), the
Roosevelt administration had capitulated to the demands of the MOWM, creating space
for new negotiations between the administration and racial advocacy organizations, but
only up to a point. The FEPC was the most explicit government attempt to address racial
inequality and discrimination in employment since Reconstruction. On June 25, 1941,
President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, which outlawed discrimination on
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account of “race, creed, color, or national origin” in the war industries and called for full
participation in the war effort. Nested within the Office of Production Management, this
new agency was authorized to investigate racial, religious, and nativist discrimination in
defense industries and government agencies and mediate changes to hiring and promotion
practices. The order applied to the federal government, federal defense contractors and
sub-contractors, and unions and companies engaged in defense industries. And while the
agency was given reasonably significant investigatory powers, its enforcement
mechanisms were notably vague.
The FEPC was authorized to initiate investigations and “take appropriate steps to
redress grievances which it finds to be valid.” In most cases, the FEPC reported that it
could negotiate effective solutions directly with the charged company, union, or federal
agency. But the FEPC had no means of compelling unwilling parties; the last resort was
to refer cases to the president. During its short lifetime, the FEPC only referred one case
to the president, that of the Southeastern railroad industry, which will be discussed later
in this section.437 Racial equality and other FEPC advocates often cited this lack of
independent enforcement power as a main limitation of the agency.
Moreover, despite an initial mandate from FDR, the work of the FEPC was also
constrained by its institutional design and by significant oppositional forces. First, the
agency did not have authority over the entirety of industrial production, it was restricted
to oversight of wartime defense industries and the federal government. Second, the FEPC
437
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came into being when Roosevelt was significantly expanding his bureaucratic apparatus
and shifting many wartime and industrial functions and responsibilities to new agencies.
The rapidly changing administrative environment and frequent reorganizations and
changes in leadership and membership affected the FEPC’s ability to operate effectively.
In the time between leadership transitions, the agency frequently had to put much of their
work on hold. Third, the FEPC faced significant opposition from the business sector and
the anti-labor coalition within Congress, particularly from southern Democrats. Finally,
the agency did not become an enduring feature of the bureaucracy; instead, it had a
relatively short-lived existence, only truly operating from 1942-1945. Efforts to create a
permanent FEPC through legislation failed. Numerous bills were defeated, and ultimately
no permanent structure was adopted to continue working towards greater integration of
the federal government and industry.
Despite these challenges that limited the FEPC’s ability to meet its aim, it is a
crucial historical episode for understanding the unmaking of the labor and racial
advocacy coalition that had loosely formed in the New Deal. As the previous chapter
outlined, leaders of the MOWM had grown increasingly skeptical of alliances with white,
liberal organizations. They voted to restrict membership in the MOWM to African
Americans. These discussions informed racial advocacy organizations’ engagement with
the FEPC. However, the MOWM did work alongside labor unions and other white social
welfare organizations at critical moments. While both broad groups of actors had been
part of the MOWM push for establishing an entity like the FEPC, for different—but
related—reasons, their support for the agency fluctuated throughout its existence.
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The FEPC was a culmination of the administrative strategy that political scientist
Daniel Kryder calls the “complaint adjustment” strategy for addressing Black grievances
through Black cabinet appointments.438 But the two most prominent FEPC cases dealing
with organized labor led racial advocacy organizations and many Black workers to see
that this strategy was largely symbolic and did not translate well to concrete material
gains for employment. These cases were investigating the West coast International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers and the southern railroad industry. The most significant
factor was that the FEPC did not break with the anti-interventionist attitude the federal
government had developed regarding collective bargaining. Unions, particularly the more
conservative AFL, resisted FEPC intervention in union operations and stressed the need
for union autonomy. Racial advocacy organizations were engaged in concurrent efforts to
intervene in collective bargaining on behalf of Black workers through the courts. Unlike
the FEPC, which was largely deferential to unions’ desire for the federal government to
stay out of internal union affairs, the courts broke with the federal non-interventionist
tendency and sided with Black workers. The following sections will trace the conflict and
compromise over these two significant union cases before the FEPC: those of the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and the southern railroad industry. Before
doing so, however, the following section will situate these two cases within the case
profile of the agency.
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Case Profile of the FEPC
While the cases of the West coast International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and
the Southern railroad industry defined the agency’s development and efficacy, they were
far from typical for the FEPC. The vast majority of the FEPC’s caseload and work dealt
with racial discrimination by companies or employers. In May 1945, the Committee
released a report documenting and analyzing over 6,000 cases it adjudicated between July
1, 1943-December 31, 1944. The FEPC reported reaching “satisfactory adjustments,” or
resolutions, in 1,723 of these cases, which was about one-quarter of the total.439 The vast
majority of these cases (81%) were concerning discrimination based on race; however,
roughly 20% of the caseload considered discrimination against religious minorities and
foreign workers. About one-third of cases came from the industrialized East, with an
exceptionally high number of cases from New York and Philadelphia.440 The Midwest
and West were the second and third most significant sources of cases, with the South
having the fewest cases before the FEPC. However, the committee reported that
geographic region was of secondary importance and was often merely a reflection of the
duration of FEPC operation in an area or the activity of supporting organizations.441 The
regional spread of cases was also not surprising given the concentration of wartime
industries in the industrial northeast.442
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The majority of FEPC cases (69.4%) dealt with discrimination by employers;
24.5% concerned the federal government, and only 6.1% considered trade unions.443
Charges against unions were most common in the South, which the report attributed to
lower levels of integration in unions. The report also stated that cases against businesses
were “received, closed, and satisfactorily adjusted” much faster than those concerning
government agencies and labor unions.444
Although cases involving unions only comprised roughly 6% of the FEPC’s total
caseload, they were a particular target for racial advocacy organizations seeking to
influence the FEPC. At the July 1941 meeting of the March on Washington Movement,
the leadership agreed that “one of the most serious problems of the committee would
hinge around Labor Union activities."445 In their interactions with the FEPC committee
leadership and members, representatives from the NAACP, NUL, and BSCP consistently
called on the FEPC to consider complaints against labor unions. In October 1941, Walter
White of the NAACP wrote to the Secretary of Labor, Francis Biddle, calling his
attention to the federal government's contracts to closed shop unions in the building
trades industry that openly discriminated against Black workers. White argued that these
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contracts violated the federal government’s “definite responsibility to facilitate”
employment of African Americans under the EO 8802.446
Not all members of the FEPC leadership board shared the interpretation that the
FEPC should actively facilitate the employment of Black workers in trade unions. Some
FEPC leaders were, in fact, quite resistant to focusing on labor and showed considerable
deference to union autonomy over their own procedures and operations. Across each
iteration of leadership, the FEPC maintained a position of non-interference in union
affairs. This was even true in cases centered on labor union practices, as will be discussed
in this chapter. The FEPC’s position of deference toward labor’s autonomy did not mean
that it avoided cases that concerned unions. However, it did make clear that the real
targets of the agency were employers and the federal government while it maintained a
position of significant deference to organized labor.
The report also described how the FEPC established the validity of discrimination
claims (see Table 6.1 for the complete list). Making determinations about what
constituted discriminatory actions was one of the central problems Robert Weaver had
identified with the PWA (see Chapter Three for further discussion). Through its
casework, the FEPC developed a more robust set of criteria than the PWA ever had for
establishing federal commitments to fair employment. In essence, the FEPC was
navigating what political scientists Desmond King and Rogers Smith have described as a
long-standing tension between color-blind and race-conscious policy proposals. While
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they argue that these two racial policy alliances crystallized much later in the twentieth
century, the FEPC’s evaluation are clear evidence of the two approaches: for equality
based on the content of character (color-blind) versus those that advocated for more
explicit consideration and allocation of resources based on racial characteristics (raceconscious).
This consideration of the FEPC confirms that the debates over these policy
proposals are not always between opponents and proponents of racial equality, as King
and Smith contend, but rather are sometimes a reflection of “deep, sincere, and
understandable disagreements over genuinely difficult questions of how and how far
persisting material racial inequalities can best be addressed.” The FEPC, a critical part of
what King and Smith term the racial policy alliance, was evaluating a variety of
approaches taken by those with varying commitments to pushing for racial integration in
the workplace based on a set of ideas about how best to promote fair employment for
African Americans.447
On the whole, the FEPC’s evaluation in its 1945 report promoted a color-blind
system that focused on the merit and credentials of Black workers and rejected plans and
policies that differentiated workers based on race. The FEPC’s guidelines emphasized
that equal and commensurate training should prevail over considerations of race. For
example, they encouraged employers to hire minority applicants trained in the same
technical schools as white applicants. Further, they rejected plans and policies that
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restricted minority workers to particular job classifications based on assessments of racial
or religious groups’ innate “skills.” These evaluations stress the importance of the quality
and caliber of individual job candidates as being the best vehicle to correct discriminatory
practices.
Further, segregating Black workers, either into particular job categories (i.e.,
custodial), relying on employment quotas, auxiliary or separate unions or locals, and
creating segregated workspaces were also deemed unlawful. This was a significant shift
from earlier administrative standards. Perhaps most importantly, the FEPC rejected the
quota systems that had been a preferred vehicle for racial integration in the New Deal
employment programs (see discussion of the PWA in Chapter Three). The explanation
given for rejecting the use of quota systems based on population metrics was that they
function “to the disadvantage of individuals in both minority and majority groups by
permitting considerations of race rather than those of qualifications and availability to
operate.”448 Similarly, the report rejects the use of auxiliary unions and segregated
facilities for minority workers.
Interestingly, having very few, or even no, workers of a particular racial or
religious group or requiring applicants to a specific position to list their race, religious
creed, or national origin were not conclusive factors for establishing discrimination.
However, those factors, when combined with other more concrete methods of exclusion
of Black workers that the FEPC outlined, would be deemed discriminatory practices. The
448
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variety of circumstances considered by the FEPC encompassed in these standards reveals
that a key consequence of their work was advancing particular understandings of
discrimination.
These standards reveal that efforts to define and alleviate discrimination in
employment were dynamic and iterative negotiations among racial advocacy
organizations, unions, employers, and state actors. Agencies like the FEPC that operated
largely through intense coordination with the groups they were overseeing had in-depth
knowledge of employers' and unions' practices and experience negotiating for changes to
these policies and procedures. But even while these standards conveyed a relatively
explicit endorsement of the criteria the FEPC was using to reach agreements in individual
cases, the application of standards to cases and reaching settlements was not
straightforward. Most importantly, although these standards included discriminatory
practices of unions, the FEPC joined the prevailing attitude from the New Deal period
shared by Congress and the courts that the federal government should avoid intervention
in collective bargaining and allow for the autonomous union governance. Applying these
standards to unions was complicated, as will be explored in the following sections.
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Table 6.1: FEPC Standards for Establishing Discrimination
Facts which do NOT
establish discrimination
outright:

1. Having few (or no) minority workers
2. Requiring applicants to state their race, creed
or national origin

Facts which DO establish
discrimination:

Employers:
1. Justifying hiring decisions by claiming that
certain skills are concentrated in certain races,
creeds, or nationalities
2. Policies or practices of hiring minority
applicants only to custodial jobs
3. Hiring only white applicants from technical
schools with minority students
4. Soliciting applicants through advertisements
with racial specifications
5. Submitting requests with racial, religious, or
national origin specifications to the USES
6. Requiring minority applicants to obtain
permits from unions which bar them from
membership
7. Quota systems for minority employment
Unions:
8. Policies or practices (not just constitutional
provisions) which bar minority members
9. Agreements between unions and employers
barring minorities from employment or
promotion
10. Refusing to hire minority workers if there are
unemployed white union members
11. Maintaining separate facilities for black and
white workers
12. Auxiliary unions and closed shop agreements
that bar minority workers from union
membership
Source: First Report, 1 May 1945, RG 228, Box 432, 34, Folder 1: Division of Review
and Analysis, First Report, 1944-1945, Drafts, Workpapers, Proofs, National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 55-57.
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The AFL and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers Case
While the vast majority of the FEPC’s work focused on employer-based
discrimination, two of the most visible and consequential cases targeted trade unions.
The first case considered the legality of auxiliary union structures for Black workers in
locals of the West coast International Brotherhood of Boilermakers (IBB). The second
case was focused on discriminatory hiring and promotional practices in 23 railway carrier
companies and 14 railway unions in the South. These two cases consumed an outsized
portion of the FEPC leadership’s time and attention, and both culminated in major public
hearings in November and December of 1943. But there was also an important difference
between the two cases: the IBB was an affiliate of the AFL, while most railway labor
unions were not affiliated with either the AFL or CIO. This difference helps to frame the
importance of the adjustment and negotiation process The IBB case reveals how the
process of negotiation and adjustment of discriminatory practices took place among the
complex web of IBB union officials and the two labor representatives on the FEPC—
Boris Shishkin of the AFL and John Brophy of the CIO Since the IBB was an affiliate of
the AFL, Shishkin and other members of the FEPC were able to apply some, albeit
limited, leverage in negotiations with the international union. This was not the case for
the Southeastern railroad case, for the main unions under review were not affiliated with
either the AFL or CIO. However, this potential for negotiation should not be overstated,
for regardless of the affiliation status, ultimately, both the IBB and the railroad cases
were stymied. These two cases reveal that the available processes for negotiation and
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adjustment were limited most significantly by the FEPC’s position of deference to trade
unions and unwillingness to intervene in agreements reached through collective
bargaining.
In the late 1930s, the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers (IBB), an AFL
affiliate, organized a closed-shop, closed-union contract with major shipbuilding
companies on the West coast. The new contract a successful attempt to lock the CIO out
of the industry, which meant that all shipbuilders on the West coast in the World War II
period belonged to the IBB.449 In early 1942, the war effort escalated the need for
production in the shipbuilding industry, leading to a significant personnel shortage. The
IBB began recruiting workers from the East coast, primarily from New York City.
However, Black workers who migrated found a different reality than was advertised. At
its 1937 convention, the IBB had resolved to establish separate, or auxiliary, unions for
Black workers rather than allowing Black workers to join existing locals. As part of the
auxiliary unions, Black workers paid full dues, but they had virtually no representation or
power in the union. As historian Merl Reed documents, the auxiliary unions were
“subservient to the local white lodges, lacked such basic union functions as membership
in the international, the right to have independent business agents and grievance
committees, the universal transfer of members seeking employment in other cities, and
the right to advance in status.” With the help of the Portland Urban League, Black
shipyard workers filed a complaint with the FEPC in December 1942.450
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The FEPC sent an investigation team in July of 1942, but the conflict had rapidly
escalated by that time. Several hundred Black workers had stopped paying their union
dues in protest of the auxiliary union structures. As a result, they were discharged from
the IBB. In response to the initial investigation, FEPC Chairman Francis Haas determined
that the primary issue was the existence of the auxiliary union, not the terminated
employees. This distinction was important for establishing whether the case came under
the FEPC’s purview. The FEPC had accepted labor’s argument that the agency’s mandate
did not extend to interference in the master contract between the IBB and Kaiser
company. Thus, it would constitute an overreach of authority to rule on terminations,
whose terms and limits were stipulated in the master contract. Sidestepping the
terminations meant that the FEPC case would be focused solely on the IBB and the
auxiliary union structures. But the Committee was reticent to train the spotlight on trade
union practices, so in November 1943, the FEPC reversed its position on the issue of
discharges and expanded the case to include the employer, Kaiser. This move caused a
great outcry from the employer and led to accusations of “union favoritism” on the part
of the FEPC.451
There was considerable truth to the accusations, for communications during this
period reveal that the FEPC leadership was actively signaling a position of deference to
representatives of organized labor. In November 1943, Malcolm Ross, then the executive
director of the FEPC, wrote to AFL executive Frank Fenton regarding recent events in
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the Boiler Makers case. Ross sought to assure Fenton that the FEPC maintained its
commitment to minimal intervention in union affairs:
Our support of trade unionism is and should be above question and that in every
situation into which we are drawn we are going to stick to our jurisdiction and to
avoid, as nearly as possible, any involvements where we seem to interfere with
internal union affairs.452
In the same month, Ross also wrote to Bartley Crum, the attorney for the railroad case, on
the same subject. Ross stated that the FEPC’s approach to the Boilermakers case was “in
no way making attacks on labor agreements, but on the contrary we are sticking to our
knitting.”453 This assurance did not lead the FEPC to rule in the IBB’s favor. On the
contrary, in December 1943, the Committee issued its findings that the auxiliary union
structure of the IBB was “discriminatory and illegal.”
The case and the tensions that arose over interference in the master contract
prompted FEPC officials to appeal directly to organized labor to do more to shift their
discriminatory practices internally. In November 1944, Malcolm Ross wrote to AFL and
CIO leaders and asked them to appeal to their local affiliates to implement antidiscrimination measures. Ross argued that "one of the most effective and permanent ways
of solving this problem is for trade unions themselves to take the initiative to eliminate
such practices.” Within days, William Green replied that the AFL had adopted such a
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position at their 64th Annual Convention in New Orleans.454 These exchanges underscore
the FEPC’s persistent belief that union leadership should be responsible for reformulating
trade union practices from within.
The FEPC’s handling of the IBB case closely adhered to this philosophy.
Between December 1943, when the ruling on the IBB case was handed down, and
February 1944, the FEPC attempted to negotiate with the IBB to come to a satisfactory
adjustment. Shishkin and Brophy, the AFL and CIO representatives on the FEPC, were
the primary facilitators of those negotiations. But despite their efforts, the IBB and Kaiser
Company were unwilling to make any changes. This meant the FEPC’s only option to
pursue the case further was to send the case to President Roosevelt to decide further
action. Another factor influencing the Committee’s actions and decisions were several
cases in the California and Rhode Island federal court system, considering the legality of
the auxiliary union function. In February 1944, a California court sided with the Black
shipyard workers, granting an injunction against the IBB for discrimination and
segregation on the grounds that such practices were “contrary to the public policy of
California.” In these cases, the courts in both states sided with the Black workers, ruling
the auxiliary union structures unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause and similar provisions in the state constitutions. However, there is little
evidence that these rulings put any pressure on the IBB. They were largely a symbolic
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victory, albeit one that created legal grounds to challenge union practices at the state and
federal levels. 455
Even with the 1944 state court decisions reinforcing their ruling, the FEPC was
“pathetically helpless in dealing with the IBB.”456 The FEPC decided not to elevate the
case to the president, meaning that there was no real resolution. Most centrally, this case
highlights the limits of the FEPC’s authority when faced with parties that were unwilling
to adjust their practices in line with the agency’s directives. However, an important
secondary cause of the impasse was the FEPC’s deference to organized labor and the
challenges that deference presented in effectively negotiating agreements with trade
unions. Despite the failures to resolve the IBB case, the FEPC continued to maintain its
position that the collective bargaining process was outside the purview of the agency’s
authority. Although it is difficult to document and chart the progress made by
negotiations with the FEPC committee members Shishkin and Brophy, having labor
executives on the FEPC allowed for direct negotiations. This was a notable difference
between the IBB and railroad cases. In the latter, the lack of national affiliate status for
many railway unions removed this avenue for negotiation.
The Southeastern Railroad Case: Defining an Agency
The Southeastern railroad case defined several critical junctures for the FEPC and
nearly brought the entire agency to a grinding halt in 1943. As in the IBB case, the FEPC
tended to defer to union leaders’ preference to address matters internally. However, the
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railroad case was broader and more significant both for the fate of the FEPC and for
coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and labor unions. Perhaps most importantly,
the lack of concrete resolution of the railroad case in the FEPC coincided with the
success of parallel efforts in the courts on behalf of Black railway workers. For the longterm development of racial equality organizing, this episode represents the final chapter
defining a period of attempts to organize for racial and economic justice within the
federal bureaucracy. This section will trace the overall trajectory of this case, focusing
on the consequences of organizing efforts targeting racial and economic justice.
As with the IBB case, the first step in the railroad case was establishing that it fell
within the FEPC’s mandate. In January 1942, the General Counsel of the Office of
Production Management (OPM) ruled that railroads were part of the defense industry,
bringing them under the FEPC’s jurisdiction.457 In addition, the Committee once again
considered whether and to what extent railway unions would be part of the case and
ultimately decided that the case would serve to make a more extensive determination
about the role of organized labor in the agency:
It was agreed that no request should be made for a general counsel's opinion as to
whether refusals of membership in a labor union, is a violation of Executive Order
8802. This matter will be considered by the Committee in connection with the
Railroad hearings.458
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In other words, more was at stake in the railroad case than the fates of Black railroad
workers. The FEPC was also using it as a testing ground for the reach of the Committee’s
authority into union operations.
Within several months, however, changes in bureaucratic structure posed
challenges for all FEPC operations and signaled reduced support for the agency from the
administration. Executive Order 8802 established the FEPC as an independent body that
reported directly to the president. However, in May 1942, the FEPC was subsumed under
the War Manpower Commission (WMC) and was directed to report directly to WMC
Chairman Paul McNutt.459 The WMC was created in 1942 and charged with allocating
scarce labor resources to particular sectors of the economy.460 The NAACP and NUL
both opposed this reorganization of the FEPC under the WMC. In the months following
the reorganization, Lester Granger of the NUL and Walter White of the NAACP
communicated with Director McNutt about their hope that the FEPC would maintain an
independent budget and more control over the field staff.461 McNutt responded that the
consolidation would reduce duplicative efforts between the WMC and FEPC by
consolidating the field staff into one unit.
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Earl Dickerson, one of the most radical members of the FEPC, also opposed the
decision to move the agency into the WMC. In a letter to Granger in October 1942,
Dickerson stated that the reorganization would mean the end of the “vigorous
prosecution” enabled by the executive order. Further, Dickerson considered it a
significant step backward in racial advocacy organizations’ efforts to pass legislation that
would establish a permanent FEPC whose authority extended beyond the war efforts:
I had once hoped that out of the Committee's activities would develop legislation
creating a permanent Committee on Fair Employment Practice, dealing with
problems of discrimination by industries engaged in interstate commerce, but now
that cannot happen if we are to be under the supervision of the Manpower
Commission throughout the period of duration.462
The most concerted push for legislation to secure a permanent FEPC took place in 1944
and 1945. However, the WMC reorganization sparked concerns that the move was a way
of scaling back the power of the FEPC and the administration’s commitment to racial
egalitarianism. In sum, racial advocacy organizations, among the most committed to the
agency’s work, saw this as a near-fatal development.
This bureaucratic push and pull, then, was the backdrop for the start of the
railroad hearings. Further complicating the case was the sheer size and scope of the
railroad case. The railroad case was one of the FEPC’s most prominent cases. It involved
23 railroad companies and 14 railway unions. By contrast, the FEPC’s other cases
generally involved single unions or companies. Sometimes they were even contained in
an individual worksite. It was so significant that in November 1942, the FEPC hired
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Henry Epstein, former solicitor general of New York, to lead the FEPC’s external legal
team, in addition to significant staff support.463
Furthermore, the railroad industry represented a formidable target for the nascent
agency. Railway labor had made some of the most significant advances in collective
bargaining, meaning it had considerable power in industrial relations. But it also had
some of the most explicit racial exclusionary practices of all the labor unions. The “Big
Four” railroad brotherhoods (The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of
Railway Conductors, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and the
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen) all maintained constitutional provisions that restricted
their membership to white workers.464 Further, of the 32 unions (not limited to the railway
industry) that discriminated either in constitutional provision or practice, 19 were railway
unions.465
Railway labor also sat in a unique position among the terrain of organized labor
more broadly. The “Big Four” brotherhoods and a number of the other 19 unions that
excluded Black workers in principle or practice were not affiliates of the AFL or the CIO.
As evidenced by the correspondence in the previous section, the FEPC staff were
applying pressure to the national leadership of the AFL to push for anti-discrimination
measures to be implemented within its own ranks. This was an attempt to further an antidiscrimination agenda while at the same time respecting the AFL’s autonomy over its
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members. As discussed in the previous case of the West coast IBB, the AFL and CIO
leaders on the FEPC facilitated the process of negotiation and adjustment. However
limited that strategy proved to be in the case of the IBB, the fact that the most powerful
railway unions were outside of the AFL’s purview further limited the possibility for
adjustment and negotiations to occur. This also meant that these Big Four railroad unions
did not have a central body internal to their unions to settle broad disputes. Instead, they
had to turn to the Mediation Board that had been formed by the 1934 amendments to the
Railway Labor Act.466
Racial advocacy organizations and groups of Black workers had been trying for
decades to use the federal courts to recognize and challenge racial exclusion practices in
railway unions. The example of A. Philip Randolph and the BSCP’s fight for recognition
provides a clear example of the limits of the courts and the opportunity found in new
arms of the federal bureaucracy for workers seeking recognition.467 One of the greatest
hurdles was the courts’ adherence to the majority rule protection for collective bargaining
set out in the Railway Labor Act, which enabled even slight majorities to act on behalf of
the whole. This meant that the majority-white unions were given the power to set
working conditions for all workers, including Black workers. With support from racial
advocacy organizations, Groups of Black workers continued to fight these provisions in
the courts.468 The core issues that Black workers were fighting against were differential

466

Northrup, 56.
Chapter Four contains a full discussion of the BSCP’s struggle for recognition.
468
Eric Arnesen, Brotherhoods of Color: Black Railroad Workers and the Struggle for Equality
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 201.
467

253

wage scales (which amounted to lower pay than their white counterparts), lack of training
and promotional opportunities, and separate auxiliary unions of Black workers.469
The railroad industry had grown significantly during World War I, but in the
aftermath, many jobs disappeared. For the two largest groups of railway workers, the
firemen and train men, employment numbers were cut in half from 1920 to 1940.470
Economic historian Herbert Northrup argued that at the same time these drastic
reductions were taking place, white workers were also seeking to entirely exclude Black
workers through various legal and institutional mechanisms. For example, at the urging
of unions, twenty-four states passed “full crew laws,” which stipulated the positions
included in a complete crew. However, the crew consisted of positions that were only
open to white workers. These laws served a dual purpose: first, they were “make work”
laws designed to create more jobs. And secondly, by defining the crew in terms of
specific restricted to white workers, they provided a formal mechanism to exclude Black
workers.471
The most flagrant example of racial exclusion in this period, and the real
centerpiece of the FEPC’s railroad investigation, was the 1941 Southeastern Carriers
Conference Agreement. In 1940, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen (BLFE), one of the Big Four brotherhoods, issued a notice to twenty-one
railroad companies that the union would be changing promotional requirements for diesel
jobs. The agreement was intended to remove all Black workers from the payroll of those
469
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companies, and it almost immediately led to demotions and furloughs of many Black
workers. This agreement was the primary target of the FEPC’s investigation. However, it
was not the only one. The FEPC investigated a total of 23 carriers and 14 unions (see
Table 6.2 for a complete list, bolded entities are those included in the Southeastern
Carriers Conference).
The first hearings for the railroad case were set for November and December
1942. But in November, Roosevelt and the Democrats suffered considerable electoral
losses, which led to intensified pressure from southern Democratic members of Congress
to push the hearings back indefinitely.472 In January 1943, Chairman McNutt of the WMC
attempted to pressure the FEPC’s Executive Director Lawrence Cramer to cancel the
hearings officially. Cramer, acting on the wishes of the full committee to hold hearings
on the railroad case, refused to make the announcement.473 So instead, on January 11,
1943, McNutt, backed by President Roosevelt, announced that the railroad hearings were
canceled. McNutt claimed that the railroad case was out of the FEPC’s scope and that the
FEPC needed more time to gather evidence, but he was relatively vague about his
reasoning and grounds for these claims.474
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Table 6.2: The FEPC’s Southern Railroad Case
Railroad Companies (23)
1. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company
2. Atlanta Joint Terminals
3. Baltimore and Ohio
4. Baltimore and Ohio Chicago
Terminal
5. Central of Georgia Railway
Company
6. Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company
7. Chicago and Northwestern
8. Georgia Railroad
9. Gulf, Mobile, and Ohio
Railroad Company
10. Illinois Central
11. Jacksonville Terminal
Company
12. Louisiana and Arkansas
13. Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company
14. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
15. New York Central
16. Norfolk Southern Railroad
Company
17. Norfolk and Western
18. Pennsylvania Railroad
19. St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway Company
20. Seaboard Air Line Railway
21. Southern Railway
Company
22. Pennsylvania Railway
Company
23. Union Pacific and Virginia
Railroad Company

Railway Unions (14)
1. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers
2. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen
3. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
4. Order of Railway Conductors
5. System Federation No. 105
6. System Federation No. 103
7. International Association of
Machinists
8. International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders
and Helpers
9. Sheet Metal Workers International
Association
10. International Brotherhood of
Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers and
Helpers
11. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers
12. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen
13. Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers
and Station Employees
14. Brotherhood of Railroad Shop
Crafts

Source: Press Release “Office of War Information, President's FEPC,” 5 September
1943, RG 228, Box 508, Entry 64, Folder: Information and Public Relations Division,
Press Releases, 1941-1945, P-R, National Archives and Records Administration, College
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Park, MD. Bolded entities are those included in the 1941 Southeastern
Conference.

Carriers

McNutt’s announcement sparked a massive outcry from committee members,
racial advocacy organizations, and organized labor (especially the CIO). In response to
the cancellation of the hearings, the entire railroad legal team, including Henry Epstein,
resigned in protest. In Epstein’s view, the “sudden cancellation of the hearings without
warning or opportunity for discussion by the President's Committee is, in my judgment,
an irreparable blow to your Committee's prestige and must result in loss of public
confidence in its effectiveness.” Further, Epstein disputed McNutt’s claim that the
postponement would give the FEPC more time for a full investigation:
The evidence at hand…presents a picture of grievous discriminatory practices
against Negro citizens in the railroad industry that cries out for public attention.
Without such public hearings I seriously question whether any appropriate redress
ever will be made possible.475
Epstein pronounced this the death knell for the FEPC, a claim that the press echoed. With
their signature case gutted, and the power to manage investigations clearly vested in the
WMC and McNutt, there was little the FEPC could do. Charles Houston, who had been
part of the railroad case legal team, also resigned. He claimed that:
Mr. McNutt's action followed the traditional pattern of sacrificing the Negro
whenever an attempt to do him justice antagonizes powerful reactionary forces in
industry and labor. The railroad industry, the railroad unions, and government

475
"CIO Assails McNutt for Gagging FEPC" by James A. Wechsler and "Epstein, FECP Council, Quits,"
originally published in PM, 13 January 1943, Part 13: NAACP and Labor, Series B: Cooperation with
Organized Labor, 1940-1955, 001434-019-0261, 001434-012-0295, Papers of the NAACP, History Vault.

257

itself are afraid to permit these public hearings because they know the charges of
discrimination are true.476
Houston argued that the cancellation revealed the fragility of President Roosevelt’s
commitment to the FEPC’s autonomy and activities following the reorganization under
the WMC.
Racial advocacy organizations also registered their outrage and connected the
postponement with a broader inability to affect national-level policy change. In an
internal NAACP memo from Walter White to Roy Wilkins, White listed the cancellation
of the railroad hearings among other significant policy defeats, including the resignation
of former FEPC Chairman MacLean, who was very popular among the leadership of
many racial advocacy organizations; the blocking of Representative Vito Marcantonio
(R-NY), an outspoken labor and civil rights advocate, from joining the House Judiciary
Committee; and the resignation of William Hastie, who was one of President Roosevelt’s
Black appointees to the War Department. Wilkins also interpreted these defeats as the
result of African Americans’ reliance on white liberals. He claimed that the list of defeats
“all add up to the fact that a great section of the country (among white people) has been
won over to the idea that the Negro’s cause is only incidentally connected to the task of
winning the war, and that the race should shut up and keep quiet until the main task is
accomplished.” Wilkins argued that “the Negro has to stand on his own two feet and do
his own slugging.” Failing to consolidate a Black response and instead letting the outcry
over defeats come from white liberals would weaken the effect “because our enemies can
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always say that this does not represent what the Negroes really feel and want, but only
what some of their liberal, radical, socialistic, communistic friends want them to have.”477
Lester Granger communicated similar sentiments on behalf of the National Urban
League (NUL). In a telegram to the editor of the Pittsburgh Courier on January 15, 1943,
he argued that McNutt’s actions proved that Black Americans “must not depend
exclusively on governmental intervention to solve their racial problems.” Instead, he
claimed that action would only result when it came from “the ranks of Negro and liberal
groups.”478 Randolph made a similar proclamation on behalf of the March On
Washington Movement:
But if the hearings on discriminations in the railroad are to be summarily and
indefinitely called off after months of careful preparation for them, then there is
only one conclusion Negroes can reach, namely, that FEPC is useless and that it
can no longer be looked to for help.479
As discussed in detail in a previous section of this chapter, the MOWM adopted an allBlack requirement for membership, which was a significant development in racial
advocacy coalition building at this time. While the MOWM was clear that white liberal
groups could be allies, there was a need for a group to promote the particular interests of
African Americans.
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Although the rationale for the all-Black membership requirement of the MOWM
shifted the focus away from building coalitions with white liberal groups, including labor
unions, the AFL and CIO were vocal critics of the railroad hearing cancellations. AFL
president William Green asked AFL executive and FEPC member Boris Shishkin to
request an immediate meeting of the FEPC to reschedule the hearings. An even stronger
condemnation came from the leadership of the CIO. Secretary James Carey called the
cancellation a “serious blow” to Black workers’ morale and a setback for the war effort
overall.480 On January 12, 1943, just a day after the announcement, John P. Lewis (CIO)
published an open letter to Paul McNutt in the liberal publication PM. Lewis called on
McNutt to reverse course and pointed to progress made to integrate Black workers into
war efforts, notably with “little or no friction.” Lewis argued that victory abroad
necessitated action for all workers at home and called the actions of the southern
Congressional Democrats antithetical to the war efforts.481
“Save the FEPC:” Rallying Around the Agency
Racial advocacy organizations quickly organized a “Save the FEPC” Conference
in Washington D.C. in February 1943. Roughly 150 delegates representing 42
organizations convened in the nation’s capital to protest what they perceived as a pivotal
juncture for the FEPC. They argued for its mandate to be reaffirmed and expanded.482 A
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subset of these groups also participated in a February 1943 meeting called by Chairman
McNutt and Attorney General Francis Biddle on the “Conference on Scope and Powers
of Committee on Fair Employment Practice.” The participants included the major racial
advocacy organizations (NAACP, NUL, BSCP, MOWM) as well as representatives of
the AFL and CIO, religious and civil organizations, and many others.483 The meeting was
an opportunity for groups with a vested interest in the FEPC to share their thoughts about
the direction of the agency. The major issues considered were the independent status of
the FEPC, the necessary sanctions and use of public hearings, the question of payment for
committee members, trade union’s practices, rescheduling of the railroad hearings, and
the need for a permanent FEPC.
Many of the groups argued for the FEPC to be removed from the WMC’s
oversight and made an independent committee.484 They articulated different arguments
for the need for an independent FEPC, pointing most centrally to the problematic
oversight of the WMC. However, the AFL was the one group at the meeting that did not
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push for a more independent FEPC. Instead, the AFL representative at the meeting
argued that the FEPC should defer to President Roosevelt.
Related to the question of oversight was whether the FEPC required enhanced
sanctions or improved ability to enforce directives. The AFL took an even firmer stance
and opposed “any sanction which requires legislative action and we will not even
approve sanctions so far as governmental contracts are concerned until we have an
opportunity to look into it and have all the facts before us in a public hearing.”485 On the
other hand, the NAACP, CIO, Southern Conference on Race Relations, and National
Lawyers Guild all pointed to the need for greater enforcement power and sanctions.
Notably, the NAACP and Southern Conference on Race Relations proposed specific
measures to increase government sanctions against discriminatory unions.486 Again,
drawing attention to the discriminatory practices of unions was intended to highlight that
the FEPC’s caseload had been primarily focused on employer-based discrimination.
Following Ornburn’s statements, Granger (NUL) issued a direct challenge to the AFL, to
which Ornburn responded that the FEPC shouldn’t have greater power than other
administrative agencies.487 Granger also challenged the AFL’s commitment to eradicating
discrimination in its internationals. While the AFL had officially adopted a position
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opposing discrimination, Granger claimed that it was doing very little to push locals to
adhere to that principle.
Other issues discussed by the members exposed relatively more heterogeneous
sets of preferences, like committee compensation and the need for permanent FEPC
legislation. The meeting attendees were very much divided as to whether the committee
members should be paid. Some argued payment would make them beholden to the
administration, while others argued that payment need not be considered undue influence.
Interestingly, those who raised the question of permanent legislation for the FEPC argued
against it. The NAACP, NUL, and Southern Conference on Race Relations all pointed to
the “reactionary” influences in government, particularly Congress, as impossible hurdles
to overcome, thus making any push for legislation a lower priority concern.
The conference concluded with a lackluster pronouncement by Fowler Harper, an
official in the WMC. Harper pleaded with attendees of the meeting not to issue individual
statements on the proceedings or future of the FEPC. When pressed by Walter White of
the NAACP, Harper denied that the administration had reached any backdoor agreements
on the future of the FEPC. White countered that the FEPC had clearly been the subject of
too many backdoor appeals, exposing a lack of faith that the meeting discussion would
translate to positive outcomes for the FEPC.
This conference and the positions staked out by racial and labor advocates provide
a clear example of growing tension between organized labor and racial advocacy
organizations. The most ardent defenders of the FEPC were those arguing for increased
autonomy and more administrative sanctions. Racial, religious, and social justice
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organizations had the greatest stake in the FEPC’s successful operations. Further, an
important division in organized labor was increasingly evident. While the CIO fell on the
side of the racial and social justice organizations in arguing for a stronger FEPC, the AFL
argued for the need for bureaucratic restraint. Despite the work of the CIO to organize
Black workers in industrial settings, the heated exchanges in the meeting make clear that
the leadership of some racial advocacy organizations saw labor unions as a significant
hurdle in establishing an effective FEPC.
A Committee Reconstituted
Despite the skepticism of many racial advocacy organizations, President
Roosevelt intervened to reconstitute the FEPC. As was the case for the initial executive
order, President Roosevelt capitulated to the calls from racial equality organizations and
the CIO. Following the meetings, Roosevelt called McNutt to the White House in late
February 1943 and asked him to reorganize the FEPC and place the railroad hearings
back on the table. The president also indicated what he believed to be the shortcomings of
the committee: the part-time and voluntary status of the committee members, not the
sanctions or independent status.488 Racial advocacy organizations continued organizing
events and sending letters to Roosevelt and McNutt over the following months as the
committee reorganization took shape.489 Although these measures signaled the
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administration’s renewed interest, the FEPC had come under fire as an example of
executive overreach. The national and local branches of the FEPC were targets of redbaiting propaganda, which used communist allegations to mask anti-labor and anti-Black
sentiments. Even a renewed mandate could not fully combat the effect of these public
smear campaigns, as detailed below.
In May and June 1943, President Roosevelt made several major announcements
about the FEPC. First, he released Executive Order 9346. FEPC leadership and members
had been working on a revised executive order since the spring of 1942. The new order
was nearly identical in scope and mandate but had two significant changes. The FEPC
was granted independent status and placed in the Office for Emergency Management, the
catchall coordinating agency for war efforts in the White House. Additionally, committee
leadership and members would receive modest compensation. However, they were not
granted additional sanctions beyond conducting hearings and the same vague reference to
“appropriate steps.”490 The new order was a partial capitulation to the attendees of the
“Scope and Future” meeting. However, it also reflected Roosevelt’s belief that the
administrative status was the main feature hampering the committee’s effectiveness.
Roosevelt also appointed new leadership and members to the FEPC. The new
head of the FEPC was to be Father Haas, with Malcolm Ross as executive secretary. The
reorganization breathed life back into an agency that had been presumed dead, but
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changes in the committee composition indicated a significant break with racial advocacy
organizations. While Walter White of the NAACP and Lester Granger of the NUL
expressed reservations about the first FEPC chairman, southern liberal Mark Ethridge,
racial advocacy organizations had, on the whole, relatively favorable impressions of
him.491 They had been even more enthusiastic about the second chairman, Malcolm
MacLean.492 Under the leadership of both Ethridge and MacLean, representatives of
various racial advocacy organizations had been invited and included in the committee
meetings, despite not being on the committee rosters.493
All of this shifted quite dramatically when Haas and Ross came into power. First,
despite calls for his reappointment, racial advocacy organizations’ leading champion,
Earl Dickerson of the BSCP, was not reappointed to the board.494 This was a significant
move, considering his involvement with the FEPC. Dickerson had served as interim chair
for many months after MacLean stepped down and had been intimately involved with
union affairs, frequently clashing with other committee members. Milton Webster of the
BSCP was reappointed to the FEPC; but his relationships with the committee leadership
became increasingly strained. The NAACP, NUL, and BSCP petitioned Haas and Ross
to add additional representatives from racial advocacy organizations. Chairman Haas
491
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responded that committee members had been appointed according to a “strictly labormanagement basis” in its new composition.495 Haas’s reorganization meant that the
committee would be limited to representatives of industry and organized labor, with
fewer members from racial and social justice organizations. The exclusion of Dickerson
and the indication that representatives from racial advocacy organizations would no
longer be on the committee was a significant shift. Haas did seek to convene the NAACP,
BSCP, NUL for a meeting on the “Present and Future Work of the FEPC” in June and
August of 1943, but there is no record of whether such a meeting ever took place.496
Shortly after being appointed, Haas named the railroad cases as one of the top
priorities of the new committee. The committee invited Epstein to return as head of the
legal team, but he declined, and Bartley Crum was hired as the lead attorney instead.497
The hearings proceeded without further delay in September 1943. The railway unions
opted not to attend the hearings. Other than opening remarks and a brief crossexamination of the railway companies, the hearings were primarily consumed by the
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testimony of Black railroad workers and witnesses. The investigation targeted southern
firemen, brakemen, and switchmen most affected by the Southeastern Carriers
Conference.498 By October 1943, the committee was ready with its “Findings and
Directives,” which indicated that the union and carriers involved in the Southeastern
Carriers Conference agreement, in addition to twelve other carriers and six unions, had
violated EO 9346.499
But the rollout of the “Findings and Directives” was anything but smooth. In the
October 1943 board meeting, Webster (BSCP) pushed to make them public immediately.
However, the board voted and agreed to give the parties charged seven days to review
and craft a response to the “Findings and Directives” before they were made public.500
Despite these efforts to keep them out of the spotlight, the “Findings and Directives”
were leaked to the Black press. Ross (FEPC) appealed to several of the railroad
executives and claimed that this had been an accident and was not the intention of the
FEPC.501 This early release upset the railway executives and cut short the period of
adjustment and negotiation that was the FEPC’s main enforcement tactic. But the
significance of this early release should not be overstated. It was clear from the lack of
participation of the unions and the subsequent response of the carriers that they took issue
with the ruling itself, not the way it was released.
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In response to the “Findings and Directives,” six railroads and three of seven
unions indicated a willingness to work with the FEPC. However, the core contingent of
the Southeastern Carriers Conference issued a response on December 13, 1943, declaring
their inability to comply with the FEPC’s directive. The joint letter pointed to the
preeminence of the Railway Labor Act in structuring the relationship between railroads
and their employees. It indicated an absolute interest in maintaining “peaceful and
harmonious” relations with their union partners and customers. In that vein, the carriers
claimed that any attempts to address the directives of the FEPC would constitute a
violation of the autonomy of the union’s collective bargaining arrangements. In a final
flourish, the letter also challenged the FEPC’s jurisdiction in issuing such directives.502
The carriers shifted the entire burden of compliance with the FEPC onto the
unions in their letter, yet the BLFE had no response to the “Findings and Directives.”
Racial advocacy organizations once again signaled concern over union practices and the
limited capacity to rely on the Railway Labor Board to arbitrate cases concerning Black
workers fairly. In a letter to President Roosevelt in December 1943, Lester Granger of the
NUL argued that the Railway Labor Board could not be relied upon to be a neutral
arbiter, “dominated as it is by representatives of the railroads themselves and their
partners in racial discrimination, the railroad brotherhoods.”503 The lack of response from
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most of the carriers and the BLFE forced the FEPC to use its “last resort” enforcement
mechanism and refer the case to the president for further action.
Rather than enforce the FEPC’s recommendation, Roosevelt opted to convene a
new committee to consider the case. The Stacy Committee, headed by Judge Walter
Stacy from North Carolina, attempted to resolve the “impasse” between the FEPC’s
findings of discrimination and the refusal of carriers and unions to comply.504 The Stacy
Committee met with the railroad carriers and brotherhoods in early 1944 and released a
report in May 1944. The meetings were quite different from those held by the FEPC, they
were not publicized, and they were uncontroversial. Perhaps most critically, no Black
railroad workers were called to testify.505 The FEPC continued to raise the issue of
inaction by the Stacy Committee throughout 1944, but decisive action was never taken.506
Members of Congress also formed the Smith Committee to resolve the railroad
case impasse. This committee was sharply critical of the FEPC and its primary argument
was that the agency had overstepped its authority in the railroad cases. Led by an antilabor Republican Congressman from Virginia, Howard W. Smith, the Smith Committee
formed in January 1944 as part of a broader investigation into executive overreach.507 The
FEPC had come under fire in Congress for being a communist front organization, and
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red-baiting tactics were used by Smith’s Committee as well. Ultimately, the Smith
Committee found that the FEPC was within its mandate to investigate the railroad
industry. However, it did irreparable damage to the FEPC by engaging in a very public
red-baiting campaign.508
Indeed, by the time the Smith Committee formed, the FBI had communicated
with the national FEPC staff about communist activities in the branches in Pittsburgh,
Indianapolis, and Michigan. Memorandum shared with the FEPC, written by J. Edgar
Hoover of the FBI and addressed to the Attorney General, alleged that Black workers
were propagating false discrimination complaints that could be raised to the FEPC.509
Ross and Haas (FEPC) did not provide extensive replies, aside from claiming they had
not heard of such allegations. However, in April 1944, Ross wrote to J. Edgar Hoover to
request a meeting. Ross had been impressed with a speech Hoover gave to the Daughters
of the American Revolution that month and cited their shared aims of addressing racial
discrimination.510 Labeling the activities of racial advocacy and labor advocacy groups,
particularly the CIO, as communist-front efforts was a frequently used tactic meant to
508

Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement, 140–43.
Memorandum from John Edgar Hoover, 2 September 1944, RG 228, Box 61, Entry 6, Folder H: Office
of the Committee, Office Files of the Chairman, Carbon Copies of Letters sent, February 1943-May 1945,
A-I, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; Letter from Chairman Haas to
John Edgar Hoover, 5 July September 1943, RG 228, Box 61, Entry 6, Folder H: Office of the Committee,
Office Files of the Chairman, Carbon Copies of Letters sent, February 1943-May 1945, A-I, National
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; Memorandum for the U.S. Attorney General
from John Edgar Hoover, 17 September 1943, RG 228, Box 62, Entry 6, Folder R: Office of the
Committee, Office Files of the Chairman, Carbon Copies of Letters sent, February 1943-May 1945, J-Z,
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
510
“The dangers of disturbances in racial tension areas this summer are, I know, a matter of great concern
to you. I am endeavoring to collect what information I can on tension areas. Our sources are quite good and
I hope to have information which may prove of value in the handling of difficulties if they arise.” Letter
from Malcolm Ross to John Edgar Hoover, 20 April 1944, RG 228, Box 61, Entry 6, Folder H: Office of
the Committee, Office Files of the Chairman, Carbon Copies of Letters sent, February 1943-May 1945, AI, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD
509

271

discredit the efforts and alarm the public. These efforts to discredit federal agencies based
on charges of anti-communism coincided with efforts to undermine fair employment.
Decisive Action in the Courts
Neither the Stacy Committee nor the Smith Committee had any clear impact on
the outcome of the railroad case. Instead, they were both relieved of their responsibilities
by more conclusive action in the courts. The Stacy Committee was ultimately able to
excuse its inaction as a deference to the courts. As mentioned previously, Charles
Houston of the NAACP was involved in resolving both the FEPC’s Boilermakers case
and the railroad case through the courts. Houston had been working since the 1930s to
challenge racially discriminatory workplace practices on the grounds that they violated
Black workers’ Fifth Amendment due process rights. Up until a major reversal in late
1944 by the Supreme Court, lower courts refused to hear these cases because seniority
rights were “contractual, not federal” in nature. The court distinguished wrongful acts
committed by railway unions and railroads from injuries under federal law.511
In December 1944, however, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in the
lower courts in two decisive cases that challenged white bargaining units under the
Railway Labor Act.512 In both the Steele and Tunstall cases, Houston represented Black
railroad workers who charged that changes to the promotional and seniority systems in
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (BLFE) with respect to two
different railroads (the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company and the Norfolk
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Southern Railway Company) violated their Fifth Amendment rights. 513 In both cases,
Black workers challenged practices put into place in 1940-1941, which resulted in the
plaintiffs’ demotions. Both Steele and Tunstall had been removed from higher-paying,
less arduous positions and replaced by white workers with less seniority. It was a slightly
more complicated case and argument since the plaintiffs were not fired or refused
employment outright.
The Court considered two main questions in both cases. The first was whether the
Railway Labor Act required unions to represent their employees without discriminating
based on race or creed. The second question was whether courts had the authority to
protect minority workers being discriminated against by their union. The Alabama
Supreme Court’s ruling in Steele endorsed a view of industrial relations that opposed
state intervention into bargaining negotiations and agreements:
[The Alabama Supreme Court] construed the [Railway Labor Act], not as creating
the relationship of principal and agent between the members of the craft and the
Brotherhood, but as conferring on the Brotherhood plenary authority to treat with
the Railroad and enter into contracts fixing rates of pay and working conditions
for the craft as a whole without any legal obligation or duty to protect the rights of
minorities from discrimination or unfair treatment, however gross.
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the Railway Labor Act. It argued that
the law imposed on unions the duty to “protect equally the interests of the members of the
craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the
interests of those for whom it legislates.” In some cases, the Court was clear that a
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contract had undesirable effects for some represented, but the treatment of Black workers
in the BLFE was not legal.
On the second question, whether the Court had the authority to intervene, the
Court pointed to the “absence of any available administrative remedy” for Black workers.
The Railway Labor Act established the Adjustment Board to hear disputes from workers
and employers, yet this body had declined to entertain grievances in over 400 individual
cases. Further, the majority opinion in Steele pointed to the fact that the composition of
the board was determined by labor and industry, meaning that “the Negro firemen would
be required to appear before a group which is in large part chosen by the respondents
against whom their real complaint is made.” This was precisely the argument that Lester
Granger of the NUL made in his 1943 appeal to President Roosevelt regarding the
outcome of the railroad hearings.514 This reversal in the Supreme Court provided a
significant precedent on which Black workers could challenge the railroad industry. But
more significantly, it represented a significant shift in the willingness of the courts to
intervene in collective bargaining on behalf of minority workers. However, this
intervention came at a steep price for labor unions. The Steele decision also became “a
prolific source of litigation in cases having nothing to do with race discrimination.” The
ruling became a major component of the “Duty of Fair Representation” law, which has
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been the primary tool by which courts justify intervention in internal union affairs.515
These cases underscore some of the incompatibilities of the labor rights and civil rights
legal regimes, which legal historian Reuel Schiller and political scientist Paul Frymer
have both carefully documented.516
The Court’s decisions in Steele and Tunstall were major victories for racial
equality advocates. However, they also pointed to some concern as to whether the FEPC
could function as an effective agency. Following the inability to force any action in the
railroad hearings and the Boilermakers case, the FEPC made one last attempt to grasp
power and authority through legislation to establish itself as a permanent agency. The
Coalition for a Permanent FEPC, an organization loosely related to the March on
Washington Movement and maintained significant contact and coordinated with
Randolph, pressed for this position more earnestly in 1944 and 1945. Racial advocacy
organizations, particularly the NAACP and NUL, initially favored the formation of the
FEPC as a permanent agency. But by March 1944, internal FEPC communications
indicate that obtaining the support of the NAACP and NUL was unlikely, attributed to
the fact that the organizations were “playing politics.”517 Strangely enough, by March
1945, the staff and committee members of the FEPC itself had decided to refrain from
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taking an official position on legislation to create a permanent FEPC.518 Thus, the agency
sputtered out much in the same way the two cases discussed in this section concluded:
without a decisive conclusion.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored efforts to combat racial discrimination through a new
federal agency: the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). The FEPC was the
most extensive effort at fair employment up to that point. It shaped both racial and labor
advocates’ approaches to political change through the federal government, particularly
the federal bureaucracy. Most significantly, the agency rejected the ideas of quota
systems and segregated, or auxiliary, locals that had been implemented through agencies
like the Public Works Administration (PWA) during the New Deal. In doing so, the
FEPC embraced a set of race-blind measures for assessing discrimination cases and
rejected those race-conscious measures that had guided past actions.
And for the first time, racial advocacy organizations had a seat at the table for
those agency discussions. Their presence led to the formation of more significant
partnerships, particularly between the CIO and racial advocacy groups. As is clear from
the two cases discussed in this chapter, that of the International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers and the Southern railway industry, the AFL and CIO supported the agency
at critical moments and attempted to mediate progress within their local affiliates. At the
same time, representatives of organized labor who served on the FEPC continued to limit
518
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federal intervention into internal union processes, which meant limiting federal efforts to
change union’s racial practices. In sum, while they made significant progress and laid the
groundwork laid for future collaboration, some limits to the partnerships between racial
advocacy organizations and labor unions became clear in this period.
Ultimately, however, the resolution of both major cases of the FEPC indicated
one of the most significant limitations for these coalitions in the future. In the Steele and
Tunstall cases, concerning discrimination by railway unions, labor and racial advocacy
groups found themselves on opposite sides in legal battles. In administrative battles, the
complex and messy business of adjustment and mediation allowed for the
experimentation with different ideas and approaches, which fostered collaboration in
ways that the legal arena did not. While racial democratic claims began to find more
support in the courts, their willingness to supersede union autonomy also reflected and
foreshadowed the difficulty of working through the courts toward social democratic or
redistributive ends.
Finally, it is important to note that while the FEPC reflected significant progress
for fair employment, this was a racial democratic demand that stopped short of making
any concrete social democratic demands for more jobs. Instead, racial advocacy
organizations settled for taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the war to
ensure equitable access to existing jobs. This would change in the next years, during the
transition out of World War II. The process of reconversion, which entailed transforming
the wartime economy back to a peace time economy, prompted those who remained
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committed to a left version of New Deal social democracy to call for full employment
and racial advocacy organizations joined these calls.
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CHAPTER 7: FIGHTING FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT
At the 1944 Convention of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), A.
Philip Randolph articulated one of his and the organization’s primary goals for the
postwar period: maintaining high levels of employment and economic security. “If full
employment can be maintained in a war for destruction,” said Randolph, “it can also be
maintained in peace for construction.” 519 Randolph’s call for full employment signaled
support for massive federal efforts to guarantee employment for all Americans. Fair
employment also remained a central goal in this period, for although the FEPC had its
own limitations and there were important cases that the agency was not able to resolve, it
had become a significant indicator of what federal intervention could mean for racial
advocacy organizations. But in the postwar and reconversion period, these broader
economic issues, which loomed large as the nation was on the edge of another major
political-economic transformation, took center stage.
The postwar period was a significant moment in which the New Deal order, and
particularly the political commitments of the social democratic and more centrist
reformers, was reshaped. As political scientist Margaret Weir has argued, the
reconversion period, and particularly the defeat of the Full Employment bill, signified the
final defeat of social Keynesianism, a version of economic planning in which deficit
spending was used to fund social welfare programs. The primary opposition to social
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Keynesianism was from big business, whose position had been re-energized by their
significant role in the war efforts.520 As Ira Katznelson has argued, this was the last gasp
of the social democratic reformers from the New Deal period.521 The political terrain was
largely transformed in this period, and the pendulum swung toward the centrist reformers
and a version of commercial Keynesianism more focused on stimulating consumption
than on public spending.
The account provided in this chapter very much confirms these broader politicaleconomic developments. In particular, it substantiates the argument that reinvigorated
business and industrial representatives effectively thwarted efforts to pass the Full
Employment bill. But this chapter seeks to draw out an important shift in the coalitional
politics of racial advocacy organizations and labor unions that also took place during this
time. In the postwar years, racial advocacy organizations joined with labor unions and
other social welfare organizations to press for an expansion of New Deal liberalism to
include commitments to full employment. Their focus during the war had been on
securing fair employment for Black workers, which was a largely racial democratic
project. However, the prospect of reconversion and the need for structural assurances that
the gains of wartime employment would not be lost led them to prioritize full
employment and a broader social democratic program. This commitment to prioritize
social democratic over racial democratic priorities persisted through the fight against the
Taft-Hartley in 1947, which is the subject of the next chapter. But in many ways, the Full
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Employment bill was a dress rehearsal for the kinds of arguments that would be lodged
against organized labor and successfully deployed to curb union power.
The Fight for the 1945 Full Employment Bill
This section focuses on two important features of the debate over the Full
Employment bill. First, it brings to the fore the social-democratic agenda that liberal,
labor, racial, religious, and civic organizations had coalesced around, with full
employment as the core grounding principle. Second, debates over the Full Employment
bill of 1945 included anti-union arguments for the “equalization” of labor regulations that
mirrored those that would become entrenched in law in the 1947 Taft Hartley Act, which
will be discussed later in this chapter. In debates over the Full Employment Act,
employers and corporate representatives argued that U.S. labor law afforded “special
privileges” that allowed organized labor to engage in the same unfair labor practices that
were rendered unlawful by the Wagner Act for corporations. By seizing and manipulating
popular ideas about industrial pluralism and industrial harmony, businesses established
grounds for a new version of industrial relations that masked an all-out attack on
organized labor in the guise of “equalization” of labor principles. Before introducing
these debates, the next section will give a brief overview of the origins and content of the
Full Employment Bill.
What Was the Full Employment Bill?
The Full Employment bill of 1945 was an outgrowth of efforts of the New Deal
reform coalition and an attempt to carry forward the prosperous wartime economy to a
peacetime commitment to full employment. Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats had
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run on full employment in the postwar economy, in addition to a broader program of
social democratic reforms. Republicans, on the other hand, offered the more carefully
crafted “fullest stable employment through private enterprise.”522 The 1942 and 1944
elections reshaped the Congressional landscape tremendously, strengthening the wartime
coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats, with Republicans making
particularly significant gains and a majority in the House.523 These electoral shifts meant
that the limited social democratic content of the law that resulted from the debates over
full employment, the Employment Act of 1946, was a clear retreat from earlier New Deal
economic policies.
The idea of full employment had first been introduced as an amendment to the
1944 Kilgore Reconversion Bill, which would have expanded postwar unemployment
benefits. This bill died in the Senate; however, the idea was carried forward by a social
democratic coalition spearheaded by the Union for Democratic Action (later renamed the
Americans for Democratic Action) and the progressive National Farmers Union. While
other liberal and progressive groups came to endorse and argue forcefully for full
employment, there was some reticence, particularly on the part of organized labor, to the
idea in the early phases.524
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Roosevelt had endorsed the idea of full employment as part of his 1944 State of
the Union address and his economic bill of rights, which argued for “the right to a useful
and remunerative job.” Proponents of full employment frequently used this language in
support for the bill.525 Due to fears that de-escalating the war would lead to a contraction
in the labor market, full employment was very popular with the public.526 Even with
President Roosevelt’s endorsement, the bill that Senator James E. Murray (D-MT)
introduced in 1945 attempted to appeal to more moderates by including a clear
endorsement of “free competitive enterprise” as crucial to full employment.527 The
Senate’s report on the bill and in many of the testimonies provided by proponents
attempted to make clear that the bill was not a spending or deficit bill. In fact, it did not
call for a single penny in appropriations by the federal government. Instead, the bill
proposed that the government should monitor production and employment and only seek
to intervene as a backstop when private enterprise failed to reach full employment.
While the bill included reference to public works programs as a means of
stimulating employment through the central government, authors of the Senate bill tried
to make clear that it was not like the employment programs of the New Deal. For
example, they often presented the Works Progress Administration as a counterpoint.528 As
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Margaret Weir has argued, Roosevelt and the New Dealers in Congress considered two
main economic management models throughout the New Deal reforms. Those she calls
social Keynesians argued for massive public, or deficit, spending for public programs and
government services. This view had been substantiated by the FLSA and also was the
primary vision held by those working in the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB),
as both Weir and historian Robert Collins have argued. But the emphasis on the private
market and free competitive enterprise in the Full Employment bill signaled the rise of
those who favored a more limited role for government in economic management, what
Brinkley has called commercial Keynesianism.529 While the bill itself reflected this new,
more moderated position on economic management, there were still those who were
fighting for a more robust version of full employment, more in line with the social
Keynesian view.
Because the Full Employment bill grew out of these wartime reconversion efforts,
especially the Kilgore Bill of 1944, it followed the same route through Congressional
committees. 530 It originated in the Senate in the Full Employment Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, which spent six extensive weeks hearing
testimony from July through September 1945. The Full Employment Subcommittee,
chaired by Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY), was a natural champion for the cause of full
employment. However, the House version of the bill was assigned to the same minor
committee that had overseen reconversion efforts. This House Committee on
529
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Expenditures in Executive Departments was “a venerable but relatively minor standing
committee.” Even so, conservative opponents on the seemingly small and insignificant
committee succeeded in gutting the bill.531
The tone of debate on the bill also reflected the stark contrast between these two
committees. Members of the Senate welcomed the social democratic coalition, praised
their testimony, and accepted their central arguments with minimal discussion. However,
Senators took a much more critical approach to businesses and employers, particularly
the groups like the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), who were leading and
coordinating the opposition to the bill. The inverse was true in the House. Members of
the social democratic coalition were alternatively dismissed and met with hostility by
members of the House Committee. As will be discussed extensively in this section,
organized labor came under particular fire for its support of the Full Employment bill.
The substance of the attack was less an indictment of full employment than an aggressive
repudiation of the labor movement and existing labor law. For the other coalition
members, however, the House Committee was relatively disengaged. For example,
Russell Smith of the National Farmers Union (NFU), one of the key advocates of the bill,
did not even testify in person and was instead asked to submit a written version of his
comments to the House Committee.532 Similarly, the NAACP and NUL were not invited
to testify before the House but instead submitted written testimonies. The partisan
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realignment was largely the reason for the hostile reception in the House. The 1942 and
1944 elections had left Democrats in a weakened position, and, particularly in the South,
allegiance and support for Roosevelt’s agenda were waning.533
Differences in opinion over what fell within the federal government's purview
were at the heart of the debate over the bill, which largely concerned whether industrial
planning was a feasible endeavor. Some proponents attempted to underscore the
importance of private enterprise in the bill, in a quite clear appeal to a more commercial
Keynesian economic philosophy. However, the Senate version of the bill still contained
language and principles that endorsed a right to employment and sought to extend the
kind of economic planning (especially price controls and inflation) that had been
managed by wartime agencies like the WLB, NRPB, and the OPA.534 Liberals and
conservatives disagreed most centrally about the extent to which the government should
be responsible for ensuring full employment. The Senate’s vision of the bill safeguarded
the right to employment in the federal government. The House bill stipulated that
government should promote employment through private enterprise and only intervene
directly in moments of crisis.535
In addition to disagreeing on ensuring employment, proponents’ and opponents’
ideological differences also manifested in debates over the feasibility of economic
planning and forecasting, both by the government and by private industry. Most centrally,
533
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opponents balked at the proposal to create a National Production and Employment
Budget. This yearly budget would be crafted by the president and submitted to Congress
for further action. Opponents argued that this level of planning was infeasible and pointed
out the many flaws in government and industrial attempts to project production and
consumption. Underlying these concerns was also a worry about ever-expanding
administrative power. Proponents of the bill countered with a more tempered defense of
economic planning, arguing that the failure of private industry to plan effectively should
not discount planning entirely. In response to the overreach argument, they pointed once
again to the fact that the budget in no way entailed government expenditure, that power
remained with Congress.536
The final overarching issue worthy of mention is that businesses and large
corporations attacked national labor policy because it afforded “special privileges” to
organized labor. In essence, groups like the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM), who represented large corporations, felt that the restrictions placed upon them by
the designation of unfair labor practices under the Wagner Act had created an unbalanced
industrial relations framework. In their view, unions were allowed to commit all the same
536
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offenses (like intimidation and pressuring of workers) without regulation. They linked
this issue to the topic of full employment by highlighting the infringement upon
individuals’ right to work and by arguing that union activities were impeding maximum
production and creating unemployment.537 The role that large corporations played during
the war had helped to restore large parts of their power and influence, meaning that they
could garner more support for this view in Congress than they had in previous years.538
As will be discussed later in this chapter, these ideas were quite popular with the
legislature’s more conservative members and represented an alternative, more
individualistic interpretation of the “right to work” idea championed by FDR and
progressive New Dealers. Those members of the House Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments drilled into these issues during the testimony by
representatives of organized labor in almost a preview of the battle to come over TaftHartley. The following two sections will highlight the foundation and core of the social
democratic coalition and the role that labor and civil rights groups played in advancing
full employment as part of a social democratic agenda.
The Social Democratic Coalition
On the whole, the social democratic coalition supported the Senate bill in its call
for massive government investment in social democratic programs. However, it did not
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challenge or attempt to dismantle the free enterprise system. The majority of the coalition
that backed the Full Employment bill coalesced in the summer of 1945, as the bill was
being prepared for discussion in the Senate. The groups that were most invested in the
bill’s passage were the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the Union for Democratic Act
(UDA). The UDA had formed in 1941 to organize liberal and labor groups to fight for
full employment. To coordinate the lobbying and organizational efforts supporting the
Full Employment bill, the UDA organized a Continuations Group, which met at least two
times in the fall of 1945. This group included the UDA, NFU, both the AFL and CIO, as
well as the NAACP, the National Lawyers Guild, the American Veterans Committee, the
Young Women’s Christian Association, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and
the National Council of Jewish Women.539
The primary function of the Continuations Group was to build support among this
liberal-labor coalition for full employment and mobilize their constituencies behind the
bill. Their testimonies also point to a comprehensive set of legislative priorities that
reflect a real commitment to social democratic policy to support the working class. The
core priorities of this liberal-labor coalition were: passing the Full Employment bill (the
Senate version, S. 380), increasing unemployment compensation and social insurance
(the Kilgore-Foreland bill), raising the minimum wage from 40 to 65 cents (the Pepper
amendment to the Wage and Hour Act), increasing pension programs and creating a
national health insurance system (the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill), creating a permanent
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FEPC, creating a national housing program and agency, and revisions to the system of
taxation towards more redistributive ends.540
Despite having a clear and comprehensive agenda, and clarity of purpose around
the Full Employment bill, the Continuations group also had to contend with significant
fractures. For one, the continuing contests and disputes between the AFL and CIO meant
that both were somewhat lukewarm in their support. The AFL, on the one hand, saw the
act as a left-wing plot favoring the CIO. The CIO, on the other, was still wary about
Senator Murray’s approach to reconversion in the Kilgore bill. It was not until the late
summer of 1945, a full six months into the UDA and NFU’s campaign for the bill, that
labor and civil rights groups began participating in the Continuations group and
aggressively lobbying for the bill.541
In their testimony, the AFL and CIO also put forward distinct ideological
arguments for full employment. The AFL portrayed full employment as a means of
increasing purchasing power and stimulating productive markets. In essence, they argued
that the government should work through industry to promote full employment and only
rely on government-run public works programs in the event that private employment fell
short. But the CIO’s position was much more combative toward private industry and the
capitalist system that it perceived as working more for business than for workers. For
example, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, argued that wealthy citizens and large
540
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corporations had been insulated against the costs of reconversion and that their interests
had been prioritized over the needs of working people. As such, one of the CIO’s
additional policy demands was for a revised and more redistributive tax code, a call that
the AFL did not join.542 Ultimately, these differences did not significantly impact their
reception among members of Congress. Both the AFL and CIO’s messages were
celebrated by allies in the Senate, who did not question Philip Murray of the CIO or
William Green of the AFL.
However, the attitude toward both the AFL and CIO representatives in the House
Committee was anything but friendly. Conservative members of the House committee
were openly antagonistic with Lewis Hines of the AFL and Nathan Cowan of the CIO.
Other than Representative Cochran (D-MO), there were no other defenders of organized
labor in the House. In fact, during NAM testimony, it is almost as if Cochran was on the
stand as a witness. He underwent questioning from NAM affiliates and members of his
own committee.543
Although these differences between the AFL and CIO positions did not change
their reception by members of Congress, there were implications for the Continuations
group. Labor did not put their full support behind the measure in the late summer of
1945, around the same time racial advocacy groups made it a priority. When the measure
542
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was proposed in 1944, labor had been somewhat cool on the proposal for several reasons.
First, major unions, particularly the CIO, were still invested in the rival Kilgore
reconversion proposal. Second, the CIO was also concerned that the Full Employment
Bill had the potential to be so popular with the rank-and-file membership that it could
detract from their other legislative goals. For the AFL, which maintained an even cooler
position than the CIO, the primary issue was that they had become concerned that the
legislative measure was set up to benefit the CIO over the AFL.544 This was partially
rooted in the AFL’s experience with competitive unionization struggles under the
Wagner Act. In several significant cases in the late 1930s, the NLRB sided with workers
seeking to change their bargaining agent from the AFL to the CIO. 545
These tensions speak to the broader changes in the labor movement at the time.
Up to that point, the AFL had relied on the philosophy of “exclusive jurisdiction” along
craft lines. The CIO challenged this philosophy by organizing industrial workers across
shop lines. The labor leaders who broke away from the AFL to form the CIO in the mid1930s saw the Wagner Act and the increasingly militant working class as an opportunity
to build power by organizing workers that had traditionally been outside the AFL’s craft
model. But as the above suggests, jurisdictional disputes over which union could
represent certain workers were causing significant friction between the CIO and AFL.
The NLRB had initially attempted to avoid interference in jurisdictional disputes, which
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it argued would be interference in internal union affairs. But by the early 1940s, this was
no longer a tenable position and so the board accepted that “some such disputes could not
be solved without intervention.”546
This new model for union organizing under the CIO also ushered in significant
social, cultural, and racial transformations. As Nelson Lichtenstein has argued, “the New
Deal made shop-floor citizens of Eastern European Catholics, African Americans, French
Canadians and migratory Appalachians whose relationships to the old German, Irish, and
Northern Protestant elite had been one of deference and subordination.”547 The halfmillion Black workers who joined the CIO “were in the vanguard of efforts to transform
race relations,” which made unions a central site of civil rights struggle in these
decades.548
Civil Rights, Labor, and the Full Employment Coalition
Turning back to the Continuations group, coherence around several key measures
reflected a commitment to both racial and social democratic priorities: a permanent
FEPC, anti-lynching and anti-poll tax legislation, and broadly including antidiscrimination planks as part of major legislative and administrative efforts. In its
testimony on the Full Employment bill, the AFL did not include these measures in their
broader agenda, reflecting its more conservative approach to pushing for civil rights.549
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On the other hand, the CIO did include calls for a “Fair Employment Practice Act to
abolish discrimination from our midst” in addition to an anti-poll tax measure.550
Organized labor began making direct appeals to African Americans to garner
support for full employment and jobs programs through their contributions to major
Black publications like the National Urban League’s journal Opportunity. Starting in the
summer of 1945, Opportunity featured frequent essays about African American job
prospects in reconversion. The April-June and the October-December editions of the
publication in 1945 also included essays written by labor leaders Philip Murray of the
CIO, William Green of the AFL, and Walter Reuther of the UAW-CIO.
Most notable were Green’s contributions on behalf of the AFL, which signaled
that the AFL was at least willing to go on record supporting racial equality measures in
an attempt to build trust among Black workers. In his 1945 piece “Postwar Jobs for
Negro Workers,” Green argued for the tripartite efforts of labor, management, and
government in “assuring full employment opportunities to Negro workers.” Green also
called for affirmative action, equal access to jobs, and eradication of racial pay
disparities. He highlighted the responsibility of the government in establishing a
permanent FEPC.551

550

Statement of Phillip Murray, CIO, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Full Employment, Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 79th Congress, "Full Employment Act of 1945," ProQuest
Legislative Insight, HRG-1945-BCS-0010, July 30-31, August 21-24, 28-31, and September 1, 1945, 224.
551
“No less important is the need for affirmative action on the part of labor, management, and the
government to safeguard the Negro worker’s rightful claim to equality in hire and job tenure. The doors to
union membership for mutual aid and protection to them and to all workers must be opened to all qualified
Negro wage earners willing and able to work.” William Green, “Postwar Jobs for Negro Workers,”
Opportunity: A Journal of Negro Life, April-June 1945, 80.

294

Philip Murray, president of the CIO, spoke more directly to the path toward
assuring equal employment of African Americans. He warned that unemployment and a
tightening labor market would increase job competition and spark race riots.552 Murray
endorsed the social democratic agenda, and he made clear that the fight over full
employment had to come before the fight against anti-discrimination:
This need for a full employment program must be satisfied before we can answer
the question of what will happen to the more than a million Negroes in the armed
services and the more than a million and a half Negroes employed in war
industries.553
Here, Murray appealed to racial advocacy organizations and African Americans and
asked them to rally around the full employment program as a precursor to addressing
discrimination in major industries. In essence, labor was appealing to racial advocacy
organizations and their constituents, asking that they prioritize social democratic over
racial democratic goals during the reconversion period.
Walter Reuther of the UAW-CIO also endorsed this same vision for racial
progress in his contribution to Opportunity. He called the “partial integration” a “war
phenomenon.” He further argued that Black workers should not let their “special
problem” blind them for the “wider implications of a return to business as usual.” Instead,
he urged Black workers to consider the specific plight of Black workers as “an
intensification of the general predicament of all workers.” He also forcefully endorsed the
idea that “the Negro’s future is linked with that of the new unionism and its drive for full
552
Philip Murray, “Postwar Jobs for Negro Workers,” Opportunity: A Journal of Negro Life, April-June
1945, 80-1.
553
Philip Murray, “Modernizing Postwar America, Opportunity: A Journal of Negro Life, OctoberDecember 1945, 202-203.

295

employment.” He urged Black workers not to let painful experiences of discrimination
with the AFL and CIO disillusion them to the whole union enterprise. While there were
certainly “outcroppings of prejudice on the local level,” Reuther assured Opportunity’s
readers that the UAW was pursuing an aggressive non-discriminatory policy, most
notably through the UAW-CIO’s Fair Practices Committee established in October
1944.554
These were not new arguments for trade unions – the idea that a jobs program
needed to be secured before the particular remedies to address racial anti-discrimination
could be put in place had been a common refrain. But what had changed was racial
advocacy organizations’ acceptance of these arguments. Major organizations like the
NAACP, National Urban League, and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters also
framed full employment as a necessary first step for African American workers. While
they had been resistant to these arguments in debates over New Deal legislation, both the
changes within the trade union movement and the experience under the FEPC led these
major organizations to focus on economic claims over anti-discrimination measures. This
moment represented the closest alignment between labor and racial advocacy groups on
social democratic change, as will be detailed below.
This shift can be attributed, at least in part, to the experience under the FEPC,
which had been a transformational experience for racial advocacy organizations. Both the
NAACP and NUL thought the agency represented a “heartening development” in
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industry and trade unions, where progress had been made integrating Black workers. 555
But they also recognized that businesses were not likely to continue promoting fair
employment practices without government pressure, so they were more positive about
government intervention. Further, there was also the much bigger concern that the end of
the war would lead to an overall contraction in the number of jobs. As leaders of racial
advocacy organizations frequently (and pithily) declared, Black workers were always the
“last hired and first fired.”556 In Congressional and organizational debates over the Full
Employment bill, racial advocacy organizations aligned with this social democratic
vision for economic redistribution and staunchly defended labor in these debates. Labor
unions, however, had emerged from the FEPC years with a different perception of
government influence, or intrusion, as will be discussed in the next section.
But more significant than the inclusion of these racial justice planks in the overall
liberal-labor coalition’s agenda was the position of racial advocacy organizations on the
broad economic agenda put forward by full employment advocates. Walter White of the
NAACP endorsed the full program laid out above, with the central additions of a
permanent FEPC and federal anti-lynching and anti-poll tax legislation. Notably, White
also highlighted that the Pepper amendment to the Wage and Hour Act should extend the
minimum wage to agricultural and domestic workers and that a national housing policy
should include anti-discrimination protections. Related to these final two priorities, White
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emphasized that “even if a man has a decent job and house to live in, life will still be
precarious for him if, because of his race, creed, color, national origin, or other
circumstance he is denied the democratic right to physical security and trial by jury…”557
As had been the case in New Deal debates, the NAACP argued that social programs
should have strong anti-discrimination provisions attached to them.
Whereas the NAACP’s focus in the New Deal debates had centered around antidiscrimination measures in ways that were quite antagonistic toward labor union
practices, the organization seemed to have shifted its outlook. During the Full
Employment bill debates, it now brought the importance of economic restructuring
through social democratic programs to the fore, reminiscent of the 1934 report written by
Abram Harris for the organization. For example, an NAACP resolution endorsed the
Senate’s version of the Full Employment bill in June 1945, and the fundamental right for
every person to have “full-time, remunerative, employment in a useful occupation,” but
did not point to the specific plight of Black workers in the endorsement. The need for
anti-discrimination clauses and specific protections had been a recurrent refrain from the
organization in the New Deal debates. At this juncture, however, they appeared to also
have, at least in part, accepted the CIO’s orientation that full employment and tying Black
workers’ needs in with the broader issues of the working class was more strategic.558
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The NAACP’s endorsement of this idea is further supported by private
deliberations about legislative strategy related to the Full Employment bill. Leslie Perry,
who was the head of the NAACP’s Washington Bureau and who led much of the
organization’s advocacy work on the Fair Employment bill, shared this view in a memo
to Walter White in July 1945. Following a meeting with Senator Murray’s staffer
Bertram Gross, Perry wrote to Walter White and described a discussion of this very
subject. Gross argued that calling full employment a right of “all Americans” meant that
no specific reference to particular racial groups was required. Perry strongly affirmed the
position:
I heartily agree with him inasmuch as the bill will probably have tough going at
best. If we put in it any provision which can be construed as a little FEPC its
chances of enactment will be greatly lessened. Frankly, in my judgment any such
provision in the enactment clause would be completely meaningless in so far as it
confers any positive benefits on minority races.559
At this point, the FEPC and many of FDR’s other executive agencies had come under
attack by conservative forces in Congress. While the NAACP was still lobbying and
pressing for a permanent FEPC, Perry’s comments here reflect an awareness that
centering the debate on racial groups could be a liability in an already beleaguered battle
for the Fair Employment bill.
However, Walter White’s testimony before the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee in August 1945 still included racial democratic arguments that conveyed the
NAACP’s reticence towards organized labor during the earlier New Deal period. Similar
559
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to the NAACP’s June resolution endorsing the Full Employment bill, White’s testimony
named full employment as one of its “major interests” in the postwar period and called it
“fundamental to the well-being and development of this Nation and every community in
it.”560 As already alluded to, White also argued that African Americans were not “being
altruistic” in calling for full employment. Rather, they were “merely facing the fact that
traditionally he has been the last hired and the first fired.”561
Unlike their previous testimonies before Congress, where racial advocacy
organizations had been stymied by lack of data and information about Black
employment, White was armed with figures obtained from the War Manpower
Commission outlining wartime changes in employment. One million African Americans
had secured private employment through the war, another million through the armed
services, and 210,000 had gotten other jobs working for the federal government. As
White said, “for the Negro worker, war has always been an important factor in shaping
his economic destiny.”562 But the fact that these new jobs were concentrated in the war
industries and armed services meant that Black workers would be disadvantaged by
seniority rules, which was a major point of contention in negotiations with unions over
desegregating locals.
Perhaps the most powerful segment of White’s testimony was when he linked
racial antipathy to widespread unemployment: “If there are no jobs, there will be hatred
and fear; where there is hatred and fear there can be and probably will be, riots.” White
560
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argued that it was important for white Americans to have jobs so that they would “not be
tempted to gang up on Negroes who have employment.”563 White traced the root of
industrial strife, or at least a significant part of it, to racial divisions among workers,
which ultimately hurt workers of both races. This led to the conclusion that a strong
commitment to full employment was a necessary step toward equal employment for
African Americans. In line with Leslie Perry’s assessment that the FEPC would create a
target on the back of any legislation associated with it, White did not stress or underline
the role the FEPC played in increasing Black employment in war industries and the
federal government in his testimony. However, his focus on shifts in these employment
opportunities for African Americans during the war was a more subtle reference to the
FEPC’s effect on Black employment.
Over the next several months, the NAACP continued to stress the overall
economic imperative behind full employment. In a memo to all NAACP branches in
November 1945, Leslie Perry claimed that no minority groups would be secure unless
there were sufficient jobs, decent wages, housing, education, health services, and
unemployment compensation for all. In addition, civil liberties and the ability to work
without discrimination were required. 564 Perry called attention to the fact that Congress
had “declared war on organized labor” and pointed to two bills introduced in the House
that were direct assaults on unions. First, the Smith bill (HR-3937) made federal election
563
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contributions illegal and also would strip bargaining rights from unions who violated “nostrike” clauses in their contracts. Second, the Hobbs bill redefined extortion and robbery
under the law, making any interference with strikebreakers impossible.565 Perry’s
insistence that both of these measures be defeated reflects quite a departure from the New
Deal debates of the past decade when the NAACP and other racial equality organizations
understood themselves to be representing many Black strikebreakers from unions.
The NAACP was not the only racial advocacy organization to engage in the
national policy debate over the Full Employment bill. While they did not participate in
the Continuations group discussions, the NUL released a statement outlining its position
on social and economic problems in very similar terms as the NAACP. In a memo and
report delivered to President Truman on August 27, 1945, the NUL outlined the set of
social welfare issues “in which racial factors are deeply involved.”566 These broad issues
were migration, employment, housing, education, health, veterans, post-war military
forces, and race relations. Within these categories, the organization stated support for
specific measures like full employment, expanded unemployment and social insurance, a
permanent national housing agency, a federally-financed compulsory medical care
program, and a permanent FEPC.567 These were the same issues that united the core of
the Continuations group.
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Similar to the NAACP’s policy agenda, the NUL called for broad social welfare
programs buttressed by anti-discrimination principles to ensure Black Americans had
“equal opportunity” to access them. But they opposed creating a federal board to deal
with minority-specific issues, arguing instead that minority concerns should be embedded
within all agencies and programs.568 The NUL saw that the FEPC had garnered
increasingly favorable public support for addressing racial discrimination in employment:
It has been conclusively demonstrated by the President’s Committee on Fair
Employment Practices, that the will of the people can be both directed and
supported by administrative agencies which guard the American people against
social and economic discrimination which is recognized as injurious to the
common welfare.569
The experience of the FEPC, and the clear demonstration that government intervention
would promote Black Americans’ employment prospects, pushed the NUL to embrace a
fuller program for racial empowerment than the racial uplift ideology it had been
championing for the previous decade.570
Randolph and the BSCP took a similar position on full employment and linked it
to the FEPC. As the introduction of this chapter indicated, Randolph had begun
promoting full employment at the BSCP Convention in September 1944. In that meeting,
Randolph, like other members of the social democratic coalition, maintained that
“cyclical periods of destructive industrial and financial depressions follow when the
workers are impoverished and pauperized by low wages.” Unemployment and low wages
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were not, he argued, inevitable outcomes. Randolph argued that the need for higher
wages and full employment were the primary reasons to support the “development,
growth, and increasing power” of the trade union movement He also linked the need for
full employment to the FEPC and employment discrimination. Discrimination in
employment, according to Randolph, was a partial response to a job scarcity mindset
among many workers:
Because of the keen rivalry for jobs, when the country is afflicted with
unemployment, Negro workers, because of job visibility, promptly become
objects of persecution and oppression. This is based on the false assumption that,
excluding one group of workers from jobs…creates jobs for other workers.
But this belief was a fallacy, and Randolph concluded that the solution was to increase all
workers’ wages and purchasing power. What was needed was both full employment and
a permanent FEPC.571
These debates make clear that racial advocacy organizations and trade unions
forged a social democratic alliance in support of the Full Employment bill in 1944 and
1945. Both organized labor and racial advocacy organizations had shifted in their
orientation since debates over the New Deal. These shifts point to the progress that had
been made by leveraging new administrative and legal frameworks at the federal level
and by changes made within labor unions, particularly the CIO, to bring Black workers
into the fold. But the alignment on the issue of full employment also points to the fact
that trade unions were increasingly coming under fire from conservative opponents,
571
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which threatened progress for civil rights and labor rights. Understanding how these
arguments played out in debates over the Full Employment bill helps make sense of this
realignment.
Organized Labor Under Fire
While the Full Employment bill did not set out any specific provisions impacting
or benefitting trade unions, businesses and employers were concerned that if the bill
passed, it would strengthen organized labor.572 Representatives of organized labor were
subjected to questioning that, in some cases, fell outside of the primary concerns of the
Full Employment bill. Ultimately, the debate over the bill was a clear sign that the tides
had begun to turn for organized labor. Newly empowered conservative forces in control
of the House made arguments for “equalizing” labor law that were essentially a dress
rehearsal for the Taft Hartley Act. The stark differences between the House and Senate
Committees that considered Full Employment bill are clear from the radically different
reception of representatives of organized labor and industry in each.
While the sections above have emphasized important differences in the organizing
tactics of the AFL and CIO, there were important common threads in their testimony on
the Full Employment bill. Labor leaders called on Congress to prepare for postwar
unemployment by implementing a full employment program. Representatives of
organized labor also connected full employment to their broader political agenda.573 As
Philip Murray of the CIO stated before the Senate Committee, “we want this Senate bill
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380 passed, but it is only a part of the legislation we know is necessary.”574 Testifying for
the AFL before the Senate, William Green called for a “national economic environment
favorable to full employment.”575
Despite their original lukewarm positions on full employment, labor leaders who
testified before the House now defended that goal. However, they found themselves
answering questions about industrial relations and the state of American labor law that
extended far beyond the purview of full employment. Conservative opponents of full
employment in the House used their questioning of labor representatives to advance three
central arguments. One was that labor law needed to be “equalized” to eliminate “special
privileges” and bring unions under the same restrictions applied to employers. Second,
conservative members claimed that the federal government should not be responsible for
providing unemployment for those out of work due to illegitimate strikes, including
jurisdictional disputes between unions, wild cat strikes, and secondary boycotts. Finally,
some members contended that the “right to work” should designate the rights of
individuals to refrain from joining labor unions, rather than the kind of substantive
economic equality Roosevelt and Truman called for.
These ideas were introduced by corporate representatives, like the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), but they were most stridently pursued by
conservative members of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
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Departments.576 Ira Mosher, NAM’s president, focused on objections to making “right to
work” a legal principle and not just a moral guidepost. But a significant thread of his
testimony also raised the issue of equalization of labor law, appealing to the principles of
industrial harmony that had become popular with some progressives.577 Near the start of
his testimony, Mosher called for a clear government response to three central
developments that had the potential to bring prosperity to a halt and “throw our economy
into a depression with mass unemployment:” the mismanagement of the financial system,
especially increasing debt and inflation, preventing private capital from flowing into
productive, job-making activities, and granting special privileges to some segments of the
economy. Specifically, Mosher argued that these special privileges would “prevent the
flow of goods and services at reasonable prices, thereby creating a lack of balance
between various groups or various sections of the country.”578
Mosher called for a national policy grounded in the “elimination of all special
favors” and pointed directly to organized labor as the primary beneficiary of such
privileges under existing labor law. These special privileges, he argued, had the effect of
slowing production and reducing jobs while rendering the overall system of labor
relations “unworkable.” Thus, NAM called for labor legislation that would “correct
existing labor laws to provide specific responsibilities and obligations for labor as well as
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management.” Crucially, Mosher justified these protections as necessary to maximize
efficiency in production and protect the individual rights of workers.579
His entire argument was carefully crafted as an endorsement of a particular
version of freedom and equality in the realm of industrial relations. Labor, like
management, should be held equally accountable to the legal parameters set out in the
NLRA. In addition, they argued that employees should be “free” in selecting their
representatives. This was an attempt to argue that management could provide viable
alternatives to labor unions, a similar line of defense to the one they offered to defend
company unions in the NLRA debates. These arguments signified the fomenting ideas
that would come together in Taft Hartley. But they are also confirmation of the labor
historian Jean-Christian Vinel’s argument that the Progressive era “industrial harmony”
ideology was easily co-opted by the right in the 1940s, as they were looking to retract
labor’s gains in New Deal labor policy. Even so, progressives and even representatives of
organized labor had accepted this “industrial harmony” version of labor relations as a
way to embrace the role of private industry and also sidestep associations with class
solidarity.580
This was a rather ingenious strategy on the conservatives’ part and further showed
that the “industrial harmony” position put both the AFL and CIO in a weak position. Both
Cowan and Hines tried to distance themselves from strike tactics – Cowan specifically
said that he had never been an avid supporter (distancing himself from John Lewis and
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the United Mineworkers). In an exchange with the outspokenly anti-labor representative,
Representative Clare Hoffman (R-MI), Hines defended labor legislation on its own
grounds and challenged the conservatives’ equalization principle. In response to
Hoffman’s insistence that Hines explain why labor principles should not apply to both
unions and employers, Hines drew the focus back to the fact that “the law was set up to
give the worker the right that he always had—to protect the right he always had, namely,
to join a union and bargain collectively with his employer.” Hines pointed to the growing
infringement of worker prerogatives by those “who denied him that right in various ways,
through intimidation, through discharging him when he was active in union affairs.”
Employers and businesses hoped that equalizing the law would penalize workers and
“nullify the good purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.”581
Labor struggled to defend their version of industrial harmony while also
responding to attacks by conservative members of the House of Representatives. This is
most clear in the questioning of two national labor representatives before the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Nathan Cowan, the CIO’s
Legislative Director, and Lewis Hines, national legislative representative of the AFL.
Representative Hoffman, who sharply pursued labor union representatives in full
employment and other hearings, challenged Hines to explain why there should not be a
provision in labor law requiring labor unions to abide by their agreements in the same
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way the NLRB held employers accountable.582 The core of Hoffman’s complaint was that
there was nothing preventing unions from striking over issues that, in his calculation, had
been addressed in negotiated agreements. Cowan answered that he had never been an
avid proponent of the strike tactic but that they seemed to be straying far from the
legislation at hand.583 Outside the Full Employment bill, conservatives like Hoffman had
been pushing for amendments to the NLRA that would limit the right to strike and
“equalize” labor law in other ways that would benefit employers. This was one more step
in building the case for the major overhaul that would come in Taft-Hartley.
Conservative representatives also argued that strikes and work stoppages, the
mechanisms that would come to be more tightly regulated under Taft-Hartley, were
primary contributors to unemployment. Conservative committee members asked both
Hines and Cowan to explain why the government should increase its unemployment
securities for workers who were out of a job due to secondary boycotts, jurisdictional
disputes, and wild cat strikes. Particularly in his questioning of Hines, Representative
Hoffman attempted to make the case that jurisdictional disputes and secondary strikes
should be considered a significant source of structural unemployment. Hoffman was
registering a complaint that was also common among employers and management. They
were frustrated by strikes and work stoppages resulting from disagreements between
582

Representative Gossett (D-TX) asked Hines: “So, if we are going into the business of full employment,
wouldn't it be logical and reasonable to offer an amendment to this bill, for example, some legislation
similar to the Ball-Burton-Hitch bill, to require compulsory arbitration and require unions to incorporate
and be responsible for their acts, and require obligations from those to whom we extend these privileges?”
Ibid, 415 and 428-9.
583
Statement of Nathan Cowan, CIO, Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in Executive
Departments, 79th Congress, "Full Employment Act of 1945," ProQuest Legislative Insight, HRG-1945EXD-0005, September-November 1945, 370-374.

310

labor representatives, not in response to conditions of the collective bargaining
agreement. Hines countered that all of these circumstances, including the jurisdictional
disputes, were considered temporary unemployment and would rarely result in any
registration with the United States Unemployment Service (USES) or other
unemployment relief.584
Hines and Representative Hoffman’s exchange also raised an important source of
disagreement about the term “right to work.” The Senate bill extended a version of
progressive New Dealers’ vision for substantive economic rights.585 But employers and
businesses were also arguing that individuals needed to be protected against union
malfeasance, which was a different version of a “right to work.”586 In his questioning of
Hines, Hoffman asked whether striking workers should have a right to prevent others
from working by violent or other means. Hines’s response was the closest to a vision of
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collective group rights to be articulated in the Full Employment bill debates, but it was
still relatively muted. He argued that the right to obstruct individual workers “would be
contingent upon breaking down conditions that would take the bread out of the mouths of
the wives and children of the members of my union.” Hines insisted that the right to
strike was a “moral right” and not one that justified violence or force, which was one part
of Hoffman’s objection.587 But this was a relatively weak defense of the need for
collective bargaining rights. Ultimately, this debate exposed the underlying
disagreements about the object of industrial relations legislation and also the power that
individual rights arguments had to undermine collective bargaining, an argument that
Nelson Lichtenstein has advanced effectively in his work. Further, it highlights how
seamlessly conservatives had adapted their strategy in the postwar period away from
Lochner-style freedom of contract claims to those that focused on individual rights.588
The President’s National Labor Management Conference
In the brief period between the introduction of the Full Employment Bill and that
of Taft-Hartley, President Truman attempted to recreate a voluntaristic-style labor
management accord to resolve some of the major issues in industrial relations through a
meeting of labor and management leaders. In November 1945, the president and the
Department of Labor convened a National Labor-Management conference to address an
increasing number of strikes in the wake of the war. President Truman also intended the
convening to be a “great experiment in democratic processes.” He argued that the time
587
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had come for “labor and management to handle their own affairs in the traditional,
American, democratic way.”589 The group was composed of leaders from the largest and
most influential labor unions (the AFL, the CIO, the United Mine Workers, and the
Railroad Brotherhoods) and key leaders from industrial associations (like NAM and the
National Chamber of Commerce) as well as industrial managers from the automobile,
railroad, steel, and other key industries.590 Several social welfare organizations and
independent unions were invited to testify before the Public Hearings Committee (PHC)
of the Labor-Management Conference. The PHC heard testimony from 18 groups not
represented in the conference and made five proposals to the Executive Committee based
on the hearings.591
The chairman of the committee was Walter P. Stacy, the chief justice of the North
Carolina Supreme Court. Stacy had also served as the head of one of the committees that
investigated the FEPC, so he was not unfamiliar with the operations of executive
committees. Truman stressed that while Stacy was the chairman and the federal
government was the convener of the meeting they would observe, not participate. The
goal was to offer labor and management the opportunity to resolve major issues in
industrial relations themselves. Unlike the FEPC, which had some measure of
investigative and adjudicatory power, Truman made clear that the government would
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oversee but would not attempt to broker any negotiations in this case. It was reminiscent
of the voluntarist style of industrial relations that President Hoover had pioneered.592
The Conference was organized into six working committees (listed in Table 7.1),
each composed of equal numbers of labor and management representatives, tasked with
adopting resolutions to address particular facets of industrial strife. To pass a resolution
required support from three-quarters of the working committee, which meant that no
resolutions could pass without a combination of support from members of both labor and
management. In the end, the Executive Committee only approved resolutions from
working committees IV, V, and VI. The first three working committees, charged with
considering the most critical issues, could not agree on a single report and instead
submitted separate reports from labor and management.593
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Table 7.1: Working Committees of the Labor-Management Conference of 1945
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Collective Bargaining: to create measures that would ensure that both
labor and management lived up to the “spirit” of collective bargaining.
Managements’ Right to Manage: to determine the “inherent right and
responsibilities of management.”
Representation and Jurisdictional Questions: to determine whether
the NLRA and NLRB had appropriate means to settle disputes,
particularly those resulting from inter-union disputes.
Conciliation Services: to recommend measures for improving and
strengthening conciliation services under the Department of Labor.
Initial Collective Agreements: to establish standards to reduce labor
disputes in new organizing efforts.
Existing Collective Agreements: to establish standards to reduce labor
disputes in existing contracts.

The same issues animating debate over the Full Employment bill also prevented
the first three working committees from reaching a consensus on a joint resolution. The
report from the management representatives from Working Committee I on collective
bargaining pointed toward the need for “equity” in the creation and application of labor
agreements – resurrecting the call for equalizing labor relations and placing restrictions
on labor unions. The labor statement from Working Committee I, on the other hand,
emphasized that management, in many instances, was still failing to live up to the
promise of fair and unbiased negotiation in the “spirit” of collective bargaining.594
It is perhaps unsurprising that Working Committee II, which had been charged
with composing a list of specific management functions, was not able to reach any
consensus. According to the management report, labor representatives were not been
willing to agree on any specific tasks that should be reserved for management, leaving
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them to conclude that labor was “convinced that the field of collective bargaining will, in
all probability, continue to expand into the field of management.”595 Labor members of
Working Committee II themselves reported that it would be “unwise to specify and
classify the functions and responsibilities of management” given the complexity of labor
relations.596 Importantly, Working Committee II had also been tasked with considering
the question of foreman unionization. Management’s statement argued against foreman
unionization for two primary reasons. First, it argued that foremen were essential
resources for executive management, and having management be partially unionized
would present a conflict of interest in collective bargaining. Second, they argued that a
further conflict of interest would emerge because foremen, who were frequently the
management officials to receive and hear grievances, would be placed in an unworkable
position. The labor statement refrained from commenting on foreman unionization and
instead recommended that the group wait until the NLRB decided a pending case. The
Foreman’s Association of America was one of the groups to testify before the Public
Hearings Committee and were strong advocates for allowing foremen to unionize.597
The Executive Committee reviewed and approved the reports of the working
committees, and it also included a discussion of three additional questions in its final
report: wages, fact-finding efforts in labor disputes, and discrimination on employment.
While the Executive Committee did not ultimately pass resolutions dealing with
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standards for wages or the need for fact-finding efforts to better understand labor
disputes, they did adopt a resolution concerning racial discrimination in employment.
Philip Murray of the CIO proposed that the conference pass a resolution requiring
that all collective bargaining agreements include an anti-discrimination clause that would
“protect the interests of all persons regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, and
ancestry” in employment. When the committee considered Murray’s resolution on
November 27, Ira Mosher of NAM and a key representative for management on the
Executive Committee proposed softer language that did not require a provision in
collective bargaining agreements, but instead “urged on labor and management tolerance
and equality of economic opportunity in employment and union membership.” Mosher’s
alternative also asserted that “individual ability, merit, and achievement should remain
the measure of individual recognition and reward.” Murray and other labor
representatives opposed Mosher’s qualification because it would contradict seniority
clauses. According to the executive summary, the discussion over this proposal elided the
central question of whether discrimination was an appropriate subject for a workplace
grievance and should be included in collective bargaining agreements. However, it was
clear that there were “divergent views” on that question.
Ultimately, labor compromised and accepted a resolution that looked much more
similar to Mosher’s proposal:
Resolved, That the Labor-Management Conference urge on all elements of labor and
management the broad democratic spirit of tolerance and equality of economic
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opportunity in respect to race, sex, color, religion, age, national origin, or ancestry in
determining who are employed and who are admitted to labor union membership.598
The final resolution did not include Mosher’s provision privileging individual merit and
ability, an instance of management’s preference to think in terms of human capital and
break down group solidarity in favor of a highly individualistic version of industrial
relations.
This resolution seemed to defer further action by racial equality advocates. In his
capacity as president of the BSCP, A. Philip Randolph formally petitioned the Public
Hearings Committee concerning employment discrimination. He was invited to testify if
the Executive Committee resolution did not adequately satisfy his request. In the end,
Randolph did not testify before the Public Hearings Committee.
The President’s Labor-Management Conference underscores the extent to which
real economic planning, which had been the driving force behind full employment, was
far from central to the president’s agenda. The corporatist model for industrial relations
and social welfare provision, which was emerging in Europe in the same context, where
government played a more active role in mediating industrial disputes, had been
eclipsed.599 Further, it spotlights the contours of debates over addressing racial
discrimination within collective bargaining which would continue to animate debates
over the Taft-Hartley Act.
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Conclusion
The utter defeat of full employment advocates is evident from the truncated title
of the resulting bill: The Employment Act of 1946. The final law included major
concessions to the House conservatives, and the core of the bill was more similar to the
House version than the Senate. Most critically, the final bill replaced the term “full
employment” in favor of “maximum employment.” Further, the language “maintain and
assure,” which had been crucial to the Senate version of the bill, was replaced by the
weaker “foster and promote.”600 The final bill also did not create the Production and
Employment Budget, which would have enabled the administration to engage in
economic forecasting and planning for unemployment. It failed to enact new public
works programs or expand loan provisions found in the Senate version of the bill.
Instead, it included the House bill’s proposal for an economic report on conditions
affecting employment and the creation of an economic council.601 In essence, it contained
a set of monitoring principles that paled in comparison to the affirmative employment
program it had started as.
Conservatives were effectively able to gut the core provisions of the Full
Employment bill, signaling the waning influence of the New Dealers in the Senate and
the concrete shifts that had taken place in the House. Business groups like NAM did not
have to be as forthright as critics like Representative Hoffman and other anti-labor
members of Congress. Labor’s only real remaining defender in the House was
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Representative Cochran (D-MO), whom himself came under fire from his own committee
members when he tried to question Mosher, who was attempting to defend labor in the
House hearings. The clear focus on challenging core union tools, like strikes and
secondary boycotts, was a harbinger of the restrictions that would be ushered in by TaftHartley. Finally, labor’s opponents began rallying behind a highly individualized “right
to work” and calls for the “equalization” of labor law.
The social democratic coalition was well aware of these ominous and serious
threats. And in some ways, this threat may have strengthened the coalition. The looming
possibility of postwar unemployment, in addition to the positive example of the FEPC,
led many racial advocacy organizations to publicly endorse the need for a strong labor
movement and full employment, even in some cases prioritizing full employment over
the fight for a permanent FEPC. While calls for a permanent FEPC and antidiscrimination principles were still present, this was a period of significant alignment
between labor and racial advocacy groups around social democratic goals, which would
continue into debates over the Taft-Hartley Act.
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CHAPTER 8: TAFT-HARTLEY AND THE FINAL STAND
In February 1947, Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP appeared before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and called for “industrial peace” and “harmony
between labor and management.” The postwar period had ushered in a strike wave that
had led to widespread public disapproval of organized labor, couched in these calls for
industrial harmony and peace. This shift in public sentiment led to significant electoral
victories for Republicans and conservative Democrats in the 1946 midterm elections.
And they used their newly won majorities to usher in a radically new framework for
industrial policy – one that significantly curtailed unions and their organizing abilities.
Even President Truman joined calls for new industrial policy and measures that would
reduce the number of strikes.602
But Mitchell argued that this new conservative Congressional majority was taking
the wrong approach. He boldly asserted that the bill before the committee, what would
later become the Taft-Hartley Act, was not the solution to industrial strife, rather:
It is our conclusion that these measures represent a throw-back to a period of
industrial strife which would gravely affect the welfare of all of our people. These
bills are an invitation for management to renew espionage systems and physical
attacks upon both the organized employees and those seeking to form labor
organizations.603
This ringing support for organized labor set the NAACP apart not only from much of the
country in 1947 but also reflected a significant shift from the NAACP’s testimony on the
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1935 Wagner Act. NAACP official William Taylor had testified at that time that the
NLRA “conceals more danger to the future welfare of the colored citizens of this country
than any bill seriously considered by Congress in the last 75 years.”604 Just over ten years
later, the NAACP, among other racial advocacy organizations, placed their critiques of
organized labor, along with their other racial democratic and anti-discrimination goals, on
the backburner and fought alongside their union allies.
This chapter explores how the coalition of racial advocacy organizations and
labor unions that emerged to push for full employment continued to fight together against
the Taft-Hartley Act. Despite these significant moments of opportunity and alignment
among racial advocacy organizations and labor unions, labor’s bitter defeat in TaftHartley ultimately led both labor and racial advocacy organizations to the courts.
Concurrent with these legislative efforts, racial advocacy organizations had also been
coalescing around a court-based strategy. As previous chapters have highlighted, this
legal work focused on a set of racial democratic goals, most prominently considering fair
employment and discrimination. Ultimately, this chapter highlights how the race and
labor alliance, that formed to fight for full employment, took a final stand against TaftHartley.
This account also intervenes in important scholarly debates over the legacy of the
Taft-Hartley Act and its influence on the New Deal political order. Scholars who consider
the Taft-Hartley Act focus on the extent to which it eroded the New Deal political order.
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At one end of the spectrum, Christopher Tomlins argues that Taft-Hartley’s impact was
minimal, claiming that more than anything else, the law consolidated principles that had
their roots in the NLRA.605 David Plotke stakes out a more moderate position. He argues
that the consequences for labor were less drastic than they made out during debates,
particularly because one major consequence of the law was that employers and business
associations accepted that labor unions were verified features of the political-economic
arrangement that they would have to bargain with. Plotke also claims that labor’s failure
to articulate a clear vision and reason to oppose Taft-Hartley contributed to its passage.606
Others have argued that the consequences of Taft-Hartley were more significant,
particularly for organized labor. Nelson Lichtenstein argues that the importance of TaftHartley was more than the immediate impact of the law. It signified a critical shift in the
relationship between business, government, and labor—one where labor’s power was
significantly diminished. Along with historian Judith Stein, Lichtenstein also points to the
law’s significant impact on labor’s ability to organize new unions.607 Despite his
ambivalence on the overall legacy, Plotke also concedes that the years following TaftHartley union membership did not swell as it had in the 1930s and early 1940s.608
Existing unions were able to grow for a time, but the barriers to forming new unions were
significant and durable. While Taft-Hartley did not have the effect of immediately stifling
labor organizing, it did prove to be a durable legislative development. The Republicans
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did not manage to hold the same majorities beyond the 80th Congress; however,
subsequent Democratic majorities proved incapable of fulfilling their campaign promise
of overturning Taft-Hartley, which remains the prevailing industrial policy in the U.S.609
This account seeks to build on those accounts that emphasize Taft-Hartley’s more
devastating consequences for labor. One of the primary consequences of Taft-Hartley
was re-establishing the use of injunctions through the courts and minimizing the role of
the NLRB and the federal bureaucracy, which meant an increasing number of labor
disputes would be fought in the courts. In addition, conservatives began to adopt the
language of “equalization” of labor relations and embrace arguments for individual,
rather than collective, rights that mirrored arguments gaining traction in the courts. This
continuation of the “equalization” debates from the Full Employment bill and the
resurgence of labor injunctions both contributed to the breakdown in racial advocacy
organization and union coalition-building. Both developments served to steer industrial
disputes back to the unfriendly terrain of the courts, where racial advocacy organizations
and unions were rivals rather than partners.610 The equalization arguments, which
increasingly privileged individual rights over the collective or majority rights that labor
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advocates depended on, further weakened labor unions. Thus, the law’s passage signaled
a turning point for coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and labor unions.
The Taft-Hartley Act: Forging New Industrial Policy
The major changes ushered in by Taft-Hartley had been foreshadowed in the
debates over the Full Employment bill and at the President’s National LaborManagement Conference. Conservatives extended and expanded their arguments for an
“equalization” of labor law – bringing organized labor under the same restrictions and
penalties that had been applied to business by the Wagner Act—and in some cases
extending them even further. And while the arguments were similar, both among
opponents and defenders, the major electoral shifts in the 1946 midterm elections gave
conservatives in the 80th Congress the necessary votes to override Truman’s veto of the
measure. The long-term consequences of the Taft-Hartley were devastating in many ways
for organized labor. The NLRB was gutted and restructured, union officials were required
to sign Communist affidavits, and the ability for unions to strike and boycott was
significantly curtailed.
While the act’s consequences were far-reaching, this section will focus on two
particular shifts that had their roots in the full employment debates. First, Taft-Hartley
codified an individualized version of industrial relations by placing an outsized focus on
labor’s coercion of individuals who did not wish to join unions. Second, Taft-Hartley
complicated the federal bureaucratic oversight of labor relations and pushed contestation
over labor law into the courts.
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One new development in the debates over Taft-Hartley was that proponents of the
bill attempted to build support among African Americans and racial advocacy
organizations. Proponents falsely claimed that the bill contained a “little FEPC” that
prohibited racial discrimination and argued that the closed shop was largely responsible
for employment discrimination. While these claims served to rally some African
Americans, it had the opposite effect on racial advocacy organizations. The NAACP and
BSCP, in alliance with many labor unions, forcefully challenged these claims. Labor and
racial advocacy groups were most unified ideologically at this moment when unions were
most under assault.
The Case Bill: Prelude to Taft-Hartley
Between the failure to pass the Full Employment bill and the passage of TaftHartley, there were several other failed attempts in Congress to implement measures that
would curb union power. One important precursor was the Case bill, which had been
introduced in 1946, during the 79th Congress, as a measure to “provide for the
appointment of fact-finding boards to investigate labor disputes seriously affecting the
national public interest.”611 It contained many of the central components that would later
be codified in Taft-Hartley. Notably, it called for reducing the size of the NLRB and
shifting authority over the board from the Department of Labor to the courts. It also made
unions subject to the same unfair labor practices and expanded the circumstances in
which workers and employers could bring suits against labor unions.
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In June 1946, despite having called for temporary legislation addressing labor
unrest the month before, Truman vetoed the Case bill. This was not due to his lack of
concern over labor unrest. The incredible strike wave in 1945 and 1946 led lawmakers
from both parties to call for emergency and permanent legislation to reduce industrial
strife. In Truman’s May address, which was called the most “dramatic event of the year,”
the president called for temporary legislation to create an “emergency power” enabling
strikers from basic industries to be drafted into the armed services in the event that other
efforts to avoid strikes failed.612
In the message accompanying his veto of the Case bill, Truman made clear that
his interest was in legislation that struck at the sources, rather than the effects, of labor
unrest. While he maintained that labor legislation was important, Truman argued that “the
solution of labor-management difficulties is to be found not only in legislation dealing
directly with labor relations but also in a program designed to remove the causes of
insecurity felt by many workers in our industrial society.” To this end, the president
endorsed a more social democratic vision: expansions to social security, a fair minimum
wage, national housing programs, and a comprehensive national health program.613
Further, Truman argued that many of the provisions of the Case bill were, in fact,
detrimental to efforts to resolve industrial tensions. The modifications to unfair labor
practices meant that individual workers and unions would be subject to far harsher
penalties than their employer counterparts, in effect creating a wholly inequitable set of
612
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penalties.614 Ultimately, Congress failed to reach the two-thirds of necessary votes in the
House to overturn Truman’s veto.615
The Republican sweep in the 1946 midterm elections meant the 80th Congress
was able to override President Truman’s veto of a very similar measure: the Taft-Hartley
Act. Truman and the Democratic Party platform called for an interventionist economic
policy, warning of inflationary spiral and unemployment collapse. But when this
economic crisis failed to materialize, tens of millions of working-class voters stayed
home on election day 1946.616 This created a window for the Republican Party, which
harnessed the unpopular labor unrest into a viable campaign strategy in the 1946 midterm
elections and gained control of 75% of Congressional seats outside of the South. In the
House, they secured an additional 54 seats, bringing them to a 59-seat majority. In the
Senate, they gained 13 seats and took control of the chamber, 51 to 45.617 This electoral
shift was also a sign of the Democratic coalition’s vulnerability. Even when they regained
seats in the 1948 election, the new Democratic members were markedly less pro-labor
than their predecessors.618
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The Taft-Hartley Act was a “technical lawyers’ act” which transformed industrial
relations into a straight-jacket for organized labor.619 Perhaps the most damaging change
for the labor movement was that it made the closed shop illegal.620 Proponents of TaftHartley argued that the closed shop requirement that workers be union members in order
to secure a job constituted discrimination against workers who did not want to join the
union. They portrayed the closed shop as a violation of individual rights and elaborated a
reemergence of Lochner-style “freedom of contract” and individual rights-based
claims.621 This shift reflected changes in the legal landscape governing employment
cases, but these arguments also changed the terms of debate in Congress, narrowing the
focus of legislation to individual, rather than collective rights. As legal historian Reuel
Schiller has argued, the individual rights framework ran counter to labor law, which tried
to preserve collective rights and the rights of the majority.622
In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act limited and penalized the tools unions could take
in settling industrial disputes. Most notably, it outlawed sympathy strikes, jurisdictional
disputes, and secondary boycotts. This led to a much narrower interpretation of legal uses
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of strikes and other solidarity actions. Proponents of the law argued that unions should
only be permitted to strike on issues that pertained to their contract, not in solidarity with
other workers. This vision was largely consistent with the more limited notion of
industrial pluralism, in which labor’s purview did not extend far beyond collective
bargaining.623 Further, the act excluded foremen and supervisors from protected
categories, drawing lines between workers and managers, which prevented middlemanagers from organizing alongside rank-and-file workers.624 Despite the focus on
“equalizing” labor law, the act also imposed some limitations on labor that did not exist
for employers, most notably the requirement that union officials sign affidavits signifying
they were not Communists.
Finally, Taft-Hartley shifted the bureaucratic landscape significantly by curtailing
the NLRB’s authority and investigatory power and dividing responsibilities for oversight
with a newly created General Counsel. This tangled bureaucracy helped shift a great deal
of power to resolve labor disputes back to the courts. Most significantly, the law made it
much easier for employers to petition the courts for injunctions to stop strike actions and,
ultimately, to stall. In total, what seemed to some to be “seemingly insignificant
technicalities” rooted in the premise of equalizing the legal position of employers and
unions led to profound political-economic transformations.625
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The changes Republicans and conservative Democrats pushed for were largely
based on political, not empirical, charges of union malfeasance. This impetus was
abundantly clear from the testimony, and particularly the questioning, of labor leaders
before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House Committee on
Education and Labor.626 These were not the same committees that had considered the Full
Employment bill in the previous session, and the 1946 midterm election caused
significant changes across these committees. Republicans were now in the majority in
both chambers, but the defeat was particularly acute for labor advocates in the Senate.
However, there were a few significant overlapping members. Senator Robert Taft (ROH), the leading sponsor of the bill and a vocal member of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, had become chair of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee,
which considered the Taft-Hartley bill. On the House side, the outspoken Representative
Clare Hoffman (R-MI) was one of the ranking Republican members on the Committee on
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Guild), Van A Bittner (United Steelworkers), Harold Christoffel (UAW-CIO Local 248), Julius Emspak
(United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America), Hoyt Haddock (Maritime Committee),
Donald Henderson (Food, Tobacco, Agriculture and Allied Workers Union), OA Knight (Oil Workers
International Union), John Lewis (United Mine Workers), James Matles (United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers of America), Russ Nixon (United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America),
GL Patterson (United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America), Jacob Potofsky
(Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America), Moranda Smith (Food, Tobacco, Agriculture and Allied
Workers Union), RJ Thomas (Auto, Aircraft, and Ag).
Independent Unions: Harvey Brown (International Association of Machinists), AF Whitney (Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen), Edward Wilms (Independent Unions of Jew Jersey), Atwood Wynn (Confederated
Unions of America).
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Education and Labor and played the same anti-labor role he had played on the House
Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments. While organized labor had
champions in the Senate and on the Banking and Currency Committee, the Democratic
members of the Senate’s Labor and Public Welfare Committee stayed almost entirely
silent about organized labor during the questioning. The exception was the Southern
Democrat, Senator Allen Ellender (D-LA), but he was one of the most forceful critics of
labor leaders.
Republicans and conservative Democrats had taken the recent election as a
mandate to pass legislation to bring an end to the strike wave of 1945 and 1946. In 1947
alone, some estimated that 116 million days of labor had been lost to strikes. There were
also prolonged cases, like the 1945 General Motors strike, which lasted 113 days.627 But
according to Harry Millis, who served as the NLRB chairman until 1945, this broad
representation of labor unrest did not provide an accurate picture of this period of unrest.
Particularly, it did not account for the changes that had taken place in industrial relations
since the labor unrest of the 1920s and 1930s. In a major study of industrial relations
from the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley published in 1949, Millis and his co-author Emily
Clark Brown acknowledged that the number of workers involved in strikes in the years
leading up to Taft-Hartley had increased. However, they pointed out that the proportion
of workers involved in strikes in 1945-1946 was still roughly 8% lower than the
proportion of workers involved in disputes 1919, the last peak strike activity. According

627

Leuchtenburg, “New Faces of 1946: An Unpopular President. A War-Weary People. In the Midterm
Elections of 60 Years Ago, Voters Took Aim at Incumbents.”

332

to Millis and Brown, the reason for this was “more and better machinery for the
conciliation and arbitration of disputes.” Agencies like the NLRB helped to shorten the
duration of strikes and, in many cases, avoid them altogether. Millis and Brown also
offered a different interpretation of the increase in strike activity in the reconversion
period. For the duration of the war, many union agreements contained “no-strike”
provisions in order to maintain production without interruption. After the war, when these
provisions expired, many employers began to lay off workers or reduce their wages.
Combined with postwar inflation, workers went on strike to protest these significant
economic hardships.628
In short, then, the strike wave of 1945-1946 was significant and loomed large in
public perception of postwar reconversion. But the roots of the unrest were quite complex
and, in the opinion of some government officials, did not lie entirely at the feet of
organized labor. However, the strike wave and electoral upset in 1946 gave Republicans
and conservative Democrats the political opportunity to reintroduce legislation that
targeted organized labor in the same ways they had during the reconversion, Full
Employment bill, and Case bill debates. This was the successful culmination of their
argument that the Wagner Act had ushered in a profoundly unequal set of industrial
relations that had led to unions consolidating power in ways that were harmful to workers
and the American economy.
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Seizing this window of opportunity, Taft-Hartley’s proponents embraced this
interpretation that the imbalance in industrial relations should be corrected by addressing
issues of union malfeasance. And while the political context had shifted, the debates were
rooted in the same fundamental disagreements about the source of strikes and industrial
unrest that had been debated during the Full Employment bill hearings. At many
moments in the debate over the Taft-Hartley Act, members of Congress equated
organized labor’s resistance to any changes in industrial policy to a “do nothing” policy,
which they argued was an inadequate response to the election and public sentiment.629
It was true that labor opposed many of the proposed changes in Taft-Hartley. As
Plotke has argued, labor’s central failing in this period was providing an effective
counter-proposal.630 Even so, calling their response a “do nothing” proposal elided the
fact that they articulated a similar set of root causes and solutions for industrial unrest to
those Truman laid out in his 1946 message. As Walter Reuther of the UAW-CIO argued,
the goal of industrial policy should be to address the root causes of unrest, not “go down
the wrong road on what I call punitive restrictive legislation.” Instead, Reuther argued
that Congress should focus on core imperatives of the social democratic agenda,
including passing national housing and healthcare legislation, increasing social security,
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and raising the minimum wage.631 As they had argued in debates over full employment,
labor leaders continued to point toward insufficient reconversion policy, which had led to
inflation in prices and no corresponding change in wages and social programs as the
primary source of strain on American workers.632
While labor leaders sought to emphasize these points, their testimonies were
consumed by responding to claims that unions’ consolidation of power had led to
corruption, malfeasance, and trampling of workers’ rights. To this final point, proponents
of Taft-Hartley emphasized that the legislation was needed to protect workers who did
not wish to join unions, what they called “minority” opinions.633 This final concern was
the major argument used to justify making the closed shop illegal. While these arguments
in some ways mirrored those made by racial advocacy organizations in defense of Black
workers, who often found themselves holding “minority” opinions, Taft-Hartley did not
extend protections to workers facing racial discrimination. In fact, Senator Taft made sure
the law did not impact racially discriminatory practices. But this question became a
matter of some debate and propaganda, which will be addressed in a later section.
Organized Labor: Still Under Attack
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In their testimony, union leaders and officials struggled to break free from the
framework of individual rights and to advocate for the collective rights that had been core
to the Wagner Act. This debate took place most forcefully during AFL president William
Green’s testimony before both the House and Senate committees. Members of Congress
highlighted that unions seemed to be waffling between defending and attacking
majoritarian principles. For example, Senator Ball (R-MN) pointed out that, on the one
hand, leaders like Green were arguing for the rights of non-majority workers in
jurisdictional disputes between unions. On the other, labor claimed that the law need not
protect workers who did not want to join the union, if the majority of the worksite had
voted to unionize.634 Competition between the AFL and the CIO sometimes manifested in
jurisdictional disputes before the NLRB, and both associations wanted to ensure that
smaller clusters of workers in jurisdictional disputes would still be protected by labor
law. But this left them vulnerable to critics like Ball, who asked labor leaders to clarify
why these groups of workers seeking representation from a different union should be
treated differently than those who wished to have no union representative. Conservative
members latched onto this weakness and emphasized that these two positions were
incompatible when the focus was on advancing a set of individual rights rather than
collective rights.
Green countered that the government siding with non-union workers over union
ones was also a matter of discrimination. According to Green, the federal government
634
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should not make a union man work with a non-union man against his will.635 This
argument connected back to labor’s categorization of Taft-Hartley as a “slave-labor law,”
as it could impose working conditions and removed many of the tools that, under the
Wagner Act, workers had been using to improve their working conditions. This
characterization of Taft-Hartley as a “slave-labor law” will be fully explored in a later
section.
Chairman Taft (R-OH) also aimed to show that the union position in defense of
“minority,” or individual rights, directly contradicted labor’s defense of the closed shop:
If you can take away the right of a minority to be represented, you can certainly
take away their right to strike. You have either got to abandon the Wagner Act
entirely or you have to admit to limiting the power of the minority.636
Here, Green referred to a recent Alabama State Supreme Court case that found that the
right to strike could not be taken away from individual workers. While Green was using
the case to defend an unlimited right to strike, Taft connected the issue back to the
overarching discrimination frame employed to justify the regulations proposed in TaftHartley.
This section has detailed some, but certainly not all, of the important facets of the
debate over Taft-Hartley, which transformed industrial relations in the United States.
President Truman and liberal Democrats went on to win the 1948 election, and repealing
Taft-Hartley was a core component of the campaign. But the law proved durable beyond
the 80th Congress. As has been briefly mentioned, Plotke argues that even after
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Democrats regained majorities in 1948, none of the new members were strong defenders
of organized labor.637
Labor objected to many other provisions, including the increased use of
injunction, the creation of the General Counsel, the prohibition of secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional strikes, and the 90-day “cooling off” period. But what this section has
sought to emphasize is that the labor’s opponents seized on the political and electoral
window of opportunity in the 80th Congress to press for a more individualized version of
industrial relations. Individual-rights-based claims also provoked serious discussion and
debate among racial advocacy organizations as they fought against Taft-Hartley
alongside allies in the labor movement.
Racial Advocacy Organizations Respond to Taft Hartley
In March of 1949, the president of a conglomeration of African American
newspapers based in Baltimore, MD, the Afro-American Newspapers, wrote to the
NAACP. The press leader pleaded with the NAACP to stay out of issues of industrial
relations, arguing that taking on such a contentious issue would “certainly split us wide
open.”638 But racial advocacy organizations did not stay neutral in these debates. In fact,
they had been drawn into closer alliance with labor unions to combat misinformation
about the consequences of the Taft-Hartley Act for Black workers, both during debates
and in subsequent efforts to repeal the measure. Conservative proponents of Taft-Hartley
637
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employed several strategies to draw support from racial advocacy organizations and
African Americans more broadly. First, they purported that the closed shop specifically
harmed Black workers. Second, and somewhat related, some proponents gave the false
impression that the Taft-Hartley Act contained a “little FEPC” designed to address racial
discrimination and further enhance its appeal to Black workers and racial equality
advocates. As is evident from the letter to the NAACP, there was still great division over
industrial policy among racial advocacy organizations and Black Americans more
broadly. During the Taft-Hartley debates and repeal efforts, however, the racial advocacy
organizations that are the focus of this analysis had largely coalesced around organized
labor and the need to defeat the Taft-Hartley Act.
The only racial advocacy group to testify directly against the Taft-Hartley Act
was the Labor Secretary of the NAACP, Clarence Mitchell. He delivered a powerful
testimony that signaled great solidarity with organized labor, particularly with the CIO,
whose organizing was most curtailed by the act. Mitchell clearly articulated that
industrial relations had a direct bearing on African Americans:
When there is harmony between labor and management based on mutual respect,
the Nation can enjoy prosperity, and the minorities of the Nation have their
maximum opportunity for enjoying their civil, political, and economic rights.639
Mitchell argued that it was a complete misinterpretation of the will of the people, as
evidenced in the November 1946 elections, to enact a measure that significantly curtailed
the right to strike and the power of organized labor. Contrary to their position and
639
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targeting of unions in prior testimony (on the NLRA and SSA), Mitchell aimed squarely
at employers as the source of labor disputes, for white and Black workers alike. He
pointed to the 1.5 million Black workers in the AFL and CIO as proof that unions were
breaking down discriminatory barriers. The remaining challenges were rooted in the fact
that employers had “never become reconciled to the right of these people to bargain
collectively.” Further, he explicitly stated that the root cause of the large strikes, of 1,000
or more, was the result of postwar inflation and a lack of economic security for workers
and their families.640
This position alone constituted a strong endorsement of the mission of organized
labor, mirroring many of the points raised by officials of the CIO and AFL in their
testimony. But the NAACP also endorsed a central labor principle that sparked much
greater debate among Black Americans: the closed shop. In his testimony, Mitchell
pointed to the closed shop as a measure of protection for Black workers:
The colored persons in many plants have profited by union-shop contracts. Had it
not been for such agreements many of them would be consigned to
nonpromotable categories and in other cases they would have been put off the job
entirely.641
He even went so far as to insist that rampant discrimination in the railroad industry was
rooted in the lack of closed shop agreements. Mitchell also made a specific point to “go
on the record as saying that it is a delusive misstatement of fact to say that the elimination
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of the closed shop will cut down on discrimination against any minority.”642 While it is
not clear from the testimony or questioning here, the argument that the closed shop
impeded Black workers was one of several tactics used by anti-labor proponents of TaftHartley to appeal directly to African Americans.
This question about the effect of the closed shop on African American workers
sparked significant debate. In March of 1947, the Norfolk Journal and Guide, another
African American news outlet, responded to Mitchell’s testimony by publishing an
editorial decrying the NAACP for speaking in favor of the closed shop. The editorial
claimed that Mitchell had “made the NAACP an instrument for aiding and abetting a
device of union labor which has done more than anything else to liquidate the Negro
minority group as skilled craft workers.” This perspective spoke to a very different
interpretation of the legacy of the FEPC. The editorial pointed to the auxiliary unions
created in the Mobile shipyard industry as evidence that the closed shop was simply a
pathway toward segregation and second-class union membership. The editorial also
claimed that the closed shop served as an “iron curtain” between workers and jobs,
especially for Black workers in the South. In sum, the editorial closed with a harsh
admonition of organized labor:
The closed shop is considered vital to the economic and political power of union
labor by its dictatorial leaders, but not particularly so, according to recognized
national opinion polls, by the rank and file of union members who have little or
nothing to do say concerning the policies of their unions.643
642
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While the editorial did gesture toward postwar contractions in employment, it came down
squarely against organized labor. Although it did not endorse Taft-Hartley by name, it
was an indication that conservative arguments targeting African Americans were
resonating with some.
Mitchell responded to the Norfolk Journal and Guide editor, P.B. Young,
immediately after the editorial was published. He pointed to the fact that state legislation
outlawing the closed shop had not reduced racial discrimination. Further, he provided a
detailed rebuttal to the three specific cases raised in the editorial: the Mobile and West
Coast shipyards and the Southeastern Conference railroad case. As Mitchell pointed out,
only one of those cases, the West Coast case, actually had a closed shop agreement.
Mitchell reiterated his claim that the solution to discrimination was fair employment
laws—not to take “from workers —colored and white alike—the protection of various
forms of union security which have operated for their benefit.”644
During the push to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, the debate about the racial
implications of the law became even more pronounced. Both the NAACP and BSCP
passed resolutions in their annual meetings in 1948 and 1949 calling for a repeal of the
act.645 In October 1948, Mitchell also wrote a strong editorial calling for repeal in the
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NAACP’s publication, The Crisis. Mitchell highlighted the negative experiences of Black
workers under the new industrial framework created by the Taft-Hartley Act. He
chronicled several unions’ struggles that were suffering under the new law, including that
of Black cafeteria workers in Washington D.C., who were engaged in a fierce battle for
recognition. Houston pointed to the additional bureaucratic hurdles created by the
arbitrary power of the new general counsel and the massive increase in litigation spurred
by the act. He also cited the report of a committee created to oversee the implementation
of Taft-Hartley, headed by Senator Joseph Ball (R-MN).
Ball had been an outspoken critic of organized labor during testimony before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Mitchell highlighted that the Joint
Committee on Labor Management Relations report relied on stereotypes and narratives
that relied on biologically and culturally-infused racism. In Mitchell’s view, the report
betrayed an “anti-Negro bias and a lack of sympathy for the union’s point of view.” The
report alleged that African American workers at the R.J. Reynolds Company in WinstonSalem, North Carolina worked at a “leisurely and unhurried” tempo and filed grievances
that ran the “whole gamut of foibles, frailties, eccentricities, and superstitions.” But the
greatest problem Mitchell identified was that Taft-Hartley meant that unions were only
available to the brave and stalwart. This was not what it should be, for “in a free nation it
should not be necessary for a man to have courage in order to be an active member of a
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union.” And as he did when testifying before Congress, Mitchell attributed the cause of
labor unrest to resistant and hostile employers, whom Taft-Hartley significantly aided:
Without condoning the actions of persons who resort to violence in labor disputes,
one cannot forget that the employees were at best striking puny blows against
people like themselves who were chiefly interested in making a living for their
families. Management, on the other hand, was fighting both with the deadly
weapon forged by Congress in the form of the Taft-Hartley law.646
Mitchell’s public repudiation of Taft-Hartley served as a strong endorsement of the return
to a Wagner-like framework of industrial relations that strengthened unions. Further, he
effectively linked the boon in litigation and gutting of the NLRB back to concrete losses
for African American workers.
Randolph and the BSCP also continued to press for the repeal of Taft-Hartley and
a return to the framework for industrial relations established by the Wagner Act. They
also continued to develop closer ties with organized labor. William Green from the AFL
was a keynote speaker at the 1948 BSCP Annual Convention and devoted a great deal of
his speech to the problems facing organized labor as a result of Taft-Hartley. Green
argued that the law returned labor to the pre-Wagner injunction process, which meant
many workers were compelled to work while they waited for industrial disputes to be
settled in the courts. As in his congressional testimony, Green continued to depict
government interference as a primary issue: “Let them decide without government
interference whether they will work or whether they will strike.”647
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At the same convention, the BSCP passed a resolution calling for the repeal of
Taft-Hartley on the grounds that it served to discourage and hamper collective bargaining
instead of promoting industrial peace. Further, the resolution stated that the law drove a
“wedge between the workers and their unions for their mutual defense and aid by
picturing union leaders as tyrants and racketeers from whom wage earners need
protection.” The BSCP called upon members to rally and defeat all Congressional
supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act.648
Like the NAACP, the BSCP was also in favor of preserving the closed shop,
although they highlighted that it had been the source of racial discrimination. Randolph
emphasized the fact that both the Taft-Hartley Act and the Wagner Act before it had
failed to protect minority workers from discrimination. He underscored the need for
greater union security which could be achieved through closed shop agreements. But he
also warned that the power bestowed by the closed shop also meant that those unions had
a “grave responsibility.” In response, the BSCP’s resolution stated the following:
No longer should the Congress ignore the tendency of some unions to use the
closed shop as a means of discriminating against American workers because of
their race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.
Randolph and the union also called for laws to be passed that would legalize union
security and ensure that closed shops include workers regardless of race. 649

648
A. Philip Randolph, ProQuest History Vault, Folder 001548-014-0338, Records of the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters, Series A, Holdings of the Chicago Historical Society, Part 1: Records of the BSCP,
1925-1969, 150.
649
A. Philip Randolph, ProQuest History Vault, Folder 001548-014-0338, 30-31.

345

The NAACP’s Clarence Mitchell made a very similar argument in a statement
submitted to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in February of 1949,
where he advocated for the repeal of Taft-Hartley and a return to the industrial
framework in the Wagner Act. Like Randolph, he argued that the Wagner Act had been
an “ample opportunity” for the NLRB to “operate in an impartial manner.” Instead, the
NLRB handed down decisions that permitted racial discrimination in unions. The case
Mitchell and others cited to support this point was the Laurus & Brother case, which held
that segregated, auxiliary union locals, and the exclusion of Black workers entirely did
not necessarily violate the Wagner Act.650 This was not the conclusion the FEPC reached
after evaluating and considering auxiliary unions and segregated union structures, which
explains why many racial advocacy organizations were continuing to press for a
permanent FEPC to be created. But it also highlights a primary weakness of the
administrative strategy. For Black workers seeking remedies in employment disputes,
their fate was decided by agencies like the NLRB, and the FEPC for that matter, that had
been constructed on a labor-management basis. The equal balance of labor and
management representatives was intended to balance their interests evenly. However, it
meant that Black workers were often appealing to the very entities that supported the
discriminatory provisions they were contesting. Coupled with the fact that unions were
increasingly seeking to keep the government out of internal union affairs, this meant that
fragmentation and challenges internal to the agencies themselves posed challenges in
using federal agencies for anti-discrimination work.
650
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But Mitchell was clear that precedents like the Laurus case should not be seen as
repudiations of the closed shop or the union movement writ large. He once again called it
“a delusive misstatement of fact to say that the elimination of the closed shop will cut
down discrimination against any minority.” However, he acknowledged the point
Randolph raised, that it was “unquestionably true that closed-shop contracts in some
industries” had been barriers for Black workers gaining access to unions and jobs.
Nonetheless, his conclusion was clear: “the remedy for this type of discrimination is
contained in the enactment of fair employment practice legislation rather than taking
from workers—colored and white alike—the protection of various forms of union
security which have operated for their benefit.”651
In defense of this position, Mitchell also avoided categorizing unions as a
homogenous group, as the NAACP had tended to do in prior settings. Instead, he argued
that it was primarily the case that “discriminatory craft unions were being given stronger
opportunities to invade the jurisdiction of industrial type unions which may be
functioning on a non-discriminatory basis.”652 The NAACP’s view was that Taft-Hartley
was an attempt to cripple the CIO’s industrial unionism model, which had been most
active and effective in addressing racial discrimination within the rank-and-file.
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Later that year, in November 1949, Roy Wilkins asked Mitchell to craft a
statement responding to queries about the NAACP’s Taft-Hartley repeal work and stance
on the closed shop, which had been coming from some of the state NAACP chapters in
addition to the press.653 Mitchell’s response to Wilkins highlighted another false narrative
about the Taft-Hartley Act circulated in the press in order to garner Black support for the
bill. The claim was that the Taft-Hartley Act contained a “little FEPC” in Section 8 that
would combat racial discrimination in labor unions.654
Section 8, which laid out the unfair labor practices under the new law, included
many references and prohibitions on varieties of discrimination. However, it contained no
reference to racial discrimination. Instead, it was designed to address discrimination
against non-union members.655 As discussed previously, this was conservative
lawmakers’ attempt to repurpose “equalization” and “discrimination” arguments in
service of capital and employers.
But it was not just misinformation or confusion that led many to think that the
“discrimination” provisions of Section 8 might apply to Black workers. An active
653
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misinformation campaign, allegedly spearheaded by Senator Taft (R-OH), promulgated
this impression.656 One particular set of targets were the more conservative elements of
the Black press, for example, the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA),
which was under the leadership of the Norfolk Journal and Guide editor P.B. Young. The
NNPA appealed to Senator Taft in June 1947 to override Truman’s veto of the TaftHartley bill. The association was under the impression that it contained a “little FEPC”
provision that would penalize discriminatory unions. At the same meeting, the NNPA
also voted to continue to support anti-lynching and anti-poll tax measures.657
The NAACP, the BSCP, and many others had been trying to correct this false
narrative since the law was passed in 1947 and build more support for labor. For
example, in his 1948 editorial in The Crisis, Mitchell said, “it would have been more
accurate for them to say a microscopic FEPC or maybe even an invisible FEPC,” given
that “there is no instance in which a single colored person has been able to keep or get a
job because of Taft-Hartley.”658 Mitchell also wrote a widely circulated memo which
clarified that the Taft-Hartley Act did not formally change labor law with regard to racial
discrimination. To prove this, they broadcast the following statement by Senator Taft
during the debate over the bill on the Senate floor in April 1947:
Let us take the case of unions which prohibit admission of Negroes to
membership. If they prohibit the admission of Negroes to membership, they may
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continue to do so, but representatives of the unions cannot go to the employer and
say, 'You have got to fire that man because he is not a member of our union.'
Taft went on to say that Taft-Hartley would not replace or overturn the NLRB’s decision
in the Laurus case.659 Not only did the bill not include prohibitions on racial
discrimination, but it was also crafted very pointedly so that it did not challenge NLRB
precedent on the issue of racial discrimination.
Randolph also dismissed claims of a “little FEPC” as being bald-faced lies. As he
continued to press for permanent legislation for the FEPC, Randolph dismissed the idea
that the Taft-Hartley Act was a substitute for a permanent FEPC, arguing instead that
such arguments were “intended to fool race leadership into believing that effective
provisions had been made to protect Negroes in employment.”660
Throughout these debates over the broad implications of the Taft-Hartley Act and
the specific consequences for Black workers, racial advocacy organizations faced a new
challenge in addressing discrimination. While they continued to press for antidiscrimination policies to be applied to unions, they were increasingly battling
conservative allegations that Taft-Hartley and the elimination of the closed shop were
racially egalitarian aims. This experience pushed many racial advocacy organizations into
much closer alignment and coalition with labor unions, even though concerns over
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discrimination and closed shop unions persisted. But their continued frustration with
NLRB decisions like Laurus brought the weakness of the administrative strategy for
settling discrimination cases in industrial relations to light, particularly considering the
fragmented and conflicting positions taken by the FEPC and NLRB on these cases. The
lack of traction for discrimination cases under the NLRB renewed interest in a federal
mechanism that would be more amenable to their claims, ultimately leading them back to
the courts.
The “Slave Labor Law” and the Return to the Courts
Those who opposed Taft-Hartley decried it as a “slave-labor law”—a legal return
to involuntary servitude. While they were frequently accused of being hyperbolic and
overly dramatic, exploring the root of these claims helps to link the legislative legacy of
Taft-Hartley to important developments related to civil rights and labor rights in the
courts. As discussed in a previous section, Taft-Hartley allowed employers once again to
make ready use of the court injunctions to stall and delay negotiations. This meant that
industrial disputes were now dispersed across the courts and a set of fragmented
bureaucratic agencies. This section will explore how these invocations of the Thirteenth
Amendment in debates over the Taft-Hartley Act pointed to this major shift and how it
intersected with a related moment of upheaval and revolution within the courts related to
labor law. In this period, the Court moved away from Lochner-era defenses of the right to
contract, leaving open the types of arguments that would take their place. While
collective rights for workers were poised to be one outcome, the Court ultimately
embraced a renewed individual rights framework.
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Some accounts of the labor and civil rights court cases point toward a significant
strand of jurisprudence that rooted Congressional powers to enumerate collective
workers’ rights in the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protections’ clause.661 The Thirteenth Amendment’s most
significant and noted legacy was legally declaring the end to slavery for former slaves
and other Black Americans. But the amendment was also enlisted to establish a collective
set of worker rights.662 The rhetorical flare labor leaders invoked in calling Taft-Hartley a
“slave-labor law” also indicated a deeper and more substantive connection to
jurisprudential development of the Thirteenth Amendment with regard to civil rights and
labor rights.
Legal historians have noted that the Thirteenth Amendment’s rather unusual
construction created a vehicle for advancing labor rights that were not available through
other legal channels. The Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed all persons freedom from
involuntary servitude and empowered the courts (indirectly) and Congress (directly) to
safeguard that guarantee. But the amendment did not specifically enumerate the rights
included in those provisions, leaving those open to interpretation. As a result, in the
aftermath of the Civil War, southern states moved quickly to separate the right to be free
from broader economic commitments. They endorsed the rights to be free from
involuntary servitude and at the same time implemented a set of “Black Codes,” which
limited economic opportunities and mobility for workers, including many Black workers.
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In the North, on the other hand, many embraced the idea that the amendment went far
beyond abolishing the “specific conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude.” These
advocates believed that the amendment created a more positive or substantive set of
rights, some of which became law in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (including the rights to
make and enforce contracts and the right to sue). 663 But this was not only a vestige of the
Civil War-era debates. In 1944, the Supreme Court validated this Northern view in the
case of Pollock v. Williams, in which the Court ruled that a law that restricted the right to
quit was forced labor. As James Gray Pope argues, this ruling confirmed the view that the
Thirteenth Amendment “necessarily entailed the establishment of a free labor system.”664
The Pollock decision was an important point for the legal debates surrounding
Taft-Hartley, but before returning to the arena of labor law, it is important to note that the
Thirteenth Amendment was also the source of an alternative litigation strategy for racial
advocacy organizations in the 1940s. As Risa Goluboff has carefully documented, the
NAACP and the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice pursued parallel legal
strategies in defense of Black workers under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In the postwar era, the newly established Civil Rights Section took up cases concerning
Black workers, in many cases representing agricultural workers over industrial workers,
pressing the Court to broaden its narrow interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment in
favor of Black workers.
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But this Thirteenth Amendment litigation was not the NAACP’s primary focus.
They increasingly focused on using the Fourteenth Amendments’ equal protection and
due process arguments to advance civil rights. Goluboff documents that for a time, the
NAACP included workers’ complaints. But by the 1950s, the Legal Defense Fund, which
had more funding and influence than the Labor Department, had largely moved away
from workers’ cases almost entirely.665 What Goluboff highlights is an important but
ultimately brief window when a Thirteenth Amendment strategy might have taken hold
and led to a different course of civil rights battles in the 1950s and 1960s. But it is
important not to overstate the possibility of a more collectivist-minded court.
Understanding this legal context for the Thirteenth Amendment, the remainder of
this section will return to comparisons of Taft-Hartley to a “slave labor law.” This
discussion should not be seen as overstating the importance of these arguments, for they
did not feature prominently in congressional debate. But they do help understand how the
resurgence of injunctions shifted the locus of labor law to the courts in a significant way.
At the root of the “slave labor law” comparison was the assessment that the many
restrictions placed on union activities by Taft-Hartley would ultimately slow the rates of
unionization and remove the tools available to workers to combat exploitative work
conditions imposed by employers. They attempted to highlight how key provisions of the
bill would have this effect, largely focusing on the restrictions of rights to boycott and to
strike and the return to the use of injunctions and the courts for settling disputes. 666
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In his testimony before both the House and Senate, William Green of the AFL
referred to the bill as an effort to “enslave labor” or “make labor slaves in America.” He
also clearly invoked the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude in
his testimony. When asked whether the right to strike should be unlimited, Green
responded that if the Thirteen Amendment were to mean anything, then it must. In a final
exchange in the Senate, Green argued that the imposition of a “cooling off period” that
must take place before a strike could be called violated “the spirit, if not the letter, of the
thirteenth amendment prohibiting involuntary servitude.”667
As Green highlighted in his September 1948 address to the annual meeting of the
BSCP, the primary issue was that Taft-Hartley revived and returned to a model of
industrial relations that relied on injunctions and the courts:
[Taft-Hartley] revives the old injunction process and compels many honest
working men to decide whether they will go to work because the court tells that
that they have to go; whether they will accept that kind of compulsion and be a
slave, or whether they will strike and run the risk of going to jail.668
The prohibition on boycotts and strikes, as well as the cooling-off period, all had the
result of channeling industrial disputes back into the courts. In labor’s view, this all but
guaranteed victory for employers seeking to stall and delay industrial disputes.
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Without these tools, unions argued that workers would be returning to conditions
reminiscent of involuntary servitude. In a speech delivered at the Taft-Hartley
Symposium in November 1947, George Meany, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL, charted
the return to “the medieval concept of master and servant” rendered by the bill. Meany
argued that Taft-Hartley reversed the clear direction of labor law over the past three
decades. The passage of the 1914 Clayton Act had endorsed the view that “the labor of a
human being is not an article or commodity of commerce” and provided a legal
foundation for the courts to challenge “sweat shops.” Meany also acknowledged that the
involuntary servitude line had been drawn from the dissenting opinion written by Justice
Louis Brandeis in a 1927 Supreme Court case concerning a dispute between a union
(Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Association of North America) and the Bedford Cut Stone
Company in Indiana.669
The case took up the question of whether a work stoppage by the stonecutters’
union in Indiana illegally impeded the flow of interstate commerce and violated two acts
dealing with commerce and business regulation: the 1890 Sherman Act and the 1914
Clayton Act. The union had called the work stoppage in response to the company’s use of
non-union labor (in the union’s words, “men working in opposition to our organization”).
The majority on the Court found in favor of the company–ruling that the purpose of the
stoppage had been to impede the sale and distribution of goods beyond the contested
worksite. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis challenged this interpretation, arguing that if
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refusing to work could be found unlawful, then by that standard, the Sherman and
Clayton Acts could be used as instruments “for imposing restraints upon labor which
reminds one of involuntary servitude.” Brandeis countered that broad interstate
agreements and coordination among companies enabled them to amass control over
entire industries, which had been allowed under the Sherman Act. It would be a double
standard for the Court, then, to refuse the same level and type of cooperation among
workers.
In Meany’s 1947 speech, he argued that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
embodied Brandeis and Holmes’ dissents and clearly indicated Congress’s position on
the Bedford case. The Norris-LaGuardia Act severely limited the use of injunctions in
industrial disputes, particularly in cases where unions employed secondary boycotts and
other strike tactics.670 Thus, Meany argued that Taft-Hartley did more than overturn the
more recent Wagner Act. It challenged a clear progression in judicial and legislative
thought.671 It was, moreover, not only leaders in organized labor who criticized TaftHartley as backward-looking. Harry Millis, the former head of the NLRB, emphasized
that Taft-Hartley functionally repealed the Norris LaGuardia Act, which had been “rather
revolutionary” in curbing the use of injunctions in labor disputes. Further, as Millis and
Brown documented, injunctions fell with “tremendous weight upon unions and their
agents as compared with management.”672 Ultimately, one of the major and most
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significant consequences of Taft Hartley was that labor’s opponents were able to shift the
center of gravity for labor disputes out of the federal bureaucracy and to the courts.
Meany’s assessment that Taft-Hartley returned to a version of industrial relations
that existed before the Norris LaGuardia Act was apt. However, his focus on the
legislative developments did not fully capture the complex interweaving of court
precedent and legislation in this period. The legal terrain had altered quite significantly,
and the Court moved toward Brandeis and Holmes’ dissent in the Bedford Stone Co. case.
Importantly, the 1944 Pollock formalized precisely the kinds of arguments made by
Brandeis and Holmes in their dissent on the 1927 steel case. The New Deal had ushered
in a revolution in constitutional law, with the Court signaling that it was willing to
“dethrone” the right to contract and instead defend collective rights which enabled mass
unionization. But there was also a competing framework to collective rights – for
individual rights of a different variety: civil rights for African Americans.673 Further,
conservatives, as is clear from the debates over Taft-Hartley, had adapted to the Court’s
shift away from Lochner-style right to contract claims and themselves had come to
embrace the anti-discrimination framework, in defense of minority workers’ rights and
against the closed shop.674
This shift becomes clear upon further examination of efforts to pursue those
broader economic rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, exactly the legacy invoked by
references to the “slave-labor law.” The alternative pathway and the potential for legal
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precedent encompassing a broader collective rights framework were ultimately
overshadowed by competing legal efforts that focused on a new set of individual rights.
But equally significant, as should be clear from the previous discussion, was that this
shift coincided with a broader conservative shift making arguments for “equalization” of
labor law that was rooted in protections for individual “minority” workers. This focus
ultimately obscured these nascent arguments for broader collective rights.
Conclusion
Taft-Hartley was the final culmination of conservative efforts to radically alter the
framework for industrial relations in the United States and curb union power. It was
driven by conservative members of Congress who sided with business and capital against
the New Deal protections. This reversal was made possible by a significant electoral loss
in the 1946 midterms, which weakened the last vestiges of the New Deal Democrats lead
by President Truman. This chapter has argued that in considering the significance of
these debates for coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and trade unions, the antilabor forces’ cooptation of the language of equalization and anti-discrimination not only
severely restricted labor’s collective rights but also drove industrial disputes back to less
friendly terrain in the courts.
As they had during the Full Employment bill debates, racial advocacy
organizations put social democratic goals to preserve the trade union movement above
their own racial democratic or anti-discrimination claims. But the fact that Taft-Hartley
facilitated several accelerants back towards the legal strategy, both for industrial disputes
and racial discrimination claims, ultimately served to weaken this social democratic
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coalition’s work on industrial policy. Truly, this was the final piece of industrial policy of
the New Deal period and no such policy would be revisited until the 1960s, when racial
considerations dramatically altered it. Thus, the potential for any further collaboration
among labor unions and racial advocacy organizations was foreclosed by the Taft-Hartley
Act. The persistence of Taft-Hartley coupled with the rise of the civil rights legal efforts
also crucially foreclosed the kind of social democratic work that had come during these
two legislative episodes.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
This dissertation covers the short but critical period stretching from the great
rupture and emergence of the New Deal political-economic order until a significant
moment of foreclosing with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The account
provided aligns with those who have called attention to the limited potential for social
democratic reform in the wake of the political-economic order that coheres in the postwar
period.675 The immediate postwar period was the height of collaboration between racial
advocacy organizations and trade unions, but they were not strong enough to overcome
conservative hostility to labor as well as preferences within the Democratic coalition for a
more moderated version of liberalism.
Taft-Hartley is a significant stopping point because it was the last real moment
when the coalitions which have been the focus of this dissertation fought for social
democratic reform. But it was also a consequential development for the future of
coalitions of racial advocacy organizations and labor unions. This dissertation has argued
that Taft-Hartley was an important factor that pushed particularly civil rights and labor
struggles to the courts. This was a terrain that did not facilitate collaboration between
racial advocacy organizations and labor unions. Instead, in the legal arena, these groups
found themselves advocating for very different legal regimes.676 But outside of the courts,
the decades following Taft-Hartley have also been notable for the significant lack of
industrial policy development in the federal elected branches. In fact, one of the most
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striking developments, which has been noted by some political scientists and many legal
historians, is a shift from federal labor law to highly localized employment law.677
Thus, the possibility for collective rights to take shape and take hold in the courts
gave way to an ascendant individual rights framework, which became the hallmark of the
civil rights struggle in the 1950s and 1960s.678 There is, however, one period of further
national-level development that bears discussion, especially as it indicates the political
and policy effects that resulted from the breakdown of these coalitions. What follows in
this (exceptionally) brief conclusion discussion of the 1960s Great Society program and
how it bore a near reversal in the kinds of coalitional politics this dissertation has
described. In short, the fact that some limited social democratic programs were subsumed
into race-focused programs that were part of the Great Society programs speaks almost to
a full reversal in the ordering of racial and social democratic principles.
The Great Society programs have been rightly celebrated for their embrace of
civil rights and critical passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts, not to
mention the creation of a national healthcare program for the elderly, like Medicare. But
in terms of industrial policy, it bore little resemblance to kinds of measures that had been
debated and promoted during the New Deal and postwar. Jobs programs were subsumed
into the Great Society’s anti-poverty program, which served to further limit industrial
policy to job training and unemployment and other employment programs targeted at the
very poorest rungs of labor. These programs stand in stark contrast to the mass unionism
677
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and full employment bill from the 1930s and 1940s. Rather than understanding
unemployment and underemployment as broad, structural phenomena, these new
programs constructed these problems as matters of individual deficiencies.679 Historian
Judith Stein argues that the real failure of the Great Society era was the inability of the
Democratic Party coalition to offer a compelling economic program and agenda,
including concrete labor policies.680
This was a structural problem that also generated a coalitional problem. The racial
focus of the Great Society, and particularly the War on Poverty programs, drove a wedge
between core constituencies of the Democratic Party: African Americans and the white
working class. In his 1965 Howard University Address, President Johnson himself
declared, “Negro poverty is not white poverty.” And while some of the causes and cures
were similar, Johnson pointed to “deep, corrosive, obstinate differences—radiating
painful roots into the community, and into the family, and the nature of the individual.”681
Johnson’s address points to both the racialization and the individualization of the War on
Poverty. As historian Kevin Boyle argues, by specifically targeting African Americans
and ignoring the needs of the white working-class who would have substantially
benefitted from the same programs, white workers turned against Johnson and the Great
Society.682
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There was one other major development in industrial policy in the Great Society
program, and that was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII outlawed employment
discrimination and led to the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), a new commission that historian Nancy MacLean argues served to diversify the
workplace after 1955 and establish broader “participation in the economic mainstream”
for Black workers.683 MacLean argues this was a major achievement and revolution in the
struggle for Black jobs. But political scientist Anthony Chen usefully contrasts the
“court-based regulatory system” which emerged from Title VII and the EEOC with the
administrative processes that had been developed through the FEPC in the 1940s. Most
provocatively, Chen states that “by the early months of 1972, job discrimination had
come to be regulated by a set of policies that would have appeared unrecognizable to
anyone with clear memories of the original struggle for FEP.” The root of this change
was a shift from a program of equal treatment in the labor market, as the FEPC had
attempted to institute, to the types of affirmative action proposals that dominate today. In
terms of implementation, the current system now involves a “bewildering labyrinth of
federal and state statutes, administrative regulations, and executive orders” whose main
focus is to ask employers or unions to demonstrate their preemptive plans for racial
integration, rather than respond to cases of actual discrimination.684
Considered in this light, the EEOC faces more acute versions of the same
problems that Robert Weaver and others observed in trying to implement the Public
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Works Administration quota problem. It was profoundly difficult to set up standards and
thresholds for discrimination. More complicated still, the passage of Title VII and the
massive efforts to litigate employment discrimination have also led to the development of
affirmative action—which has further muddied the waters of fair employment.
Historian Nelson Lichtenstein lays out the great paradox embedded in the fact that
better protections against employment discrimination grew out of the same conditions
that have eroded collective bargaining rights for workers. In his words, “rights
consciousness subverts the mechanisms, both moral and legal, that sustain the social
solidarity upon which trade unionism is based.”685 This dissertation has demonstrated
how political contestation over racial and social democratic approaches to industrial
policy impacted the coalition-building efforts between RAOS and unions.
One central finding of this is that the turn towards the courts was fraught not only
because it led to different kinds of arguments that divided labor and civil rights
advocates, as Frymer, Schiller, and Goluboff show, but also because the courts did not
offer the same opportunities for balancing racial and social democratic goals.686 For
example, it was possible during the political fights for Full Employment and against TaftHartley for figures like Leslie Perry and Clarence Mitchell from the NAACP to prioritize
social democratic goals while continuing to press for anti-discrimination principles. This
gets to the very heart of what it means to do the complex and messy political work of
dynamic coalition-building.
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Broader Stakes of the Dissertation
In closing, this final section will outline two primary contributions this project
makes to the discipline, the field of American politics, and the American political
development subfield.
Another call for a broader, class-infused Black politics
There is a serious limitation in scholarly examinations that attempt to characterize
the political efforts and aspirations of African Americans. As Adolph Reed Jr. and a
cohort of scholars have long emphasized, the study of Black politics requires careful
attention to class dynamics.687 This should not be interpreted as taking the position that
class considerations trump racial considerations. This tired “race vs. class” formulation
has constructed a debate that has led to a version of politics and political development
devoid of much of the contingency, compromise, and messiness that actually defines
politics. To say that class considerations need to be considered in an examination of
Black politics is to acknowledge what this dissertation has sought to uncover – that racial
advocacy organizations were deeply invested in debates over some of the most major
political-economic debates of the twentieth century. Particularly, the subject of how to
press for a radical restructuring of the capitalist order was anything but tangential to the
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work of organizations like the National Negro Congress (NNC), the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), and even the NAACP and National Urban League.
The first chapter articulates the nodes of Black politics that framed early
discussions of the New Deal political order and serves to broaden our understanding of
the class politics of racial advocacy organizations, particularly drawing attention to those
who were pressing for a more economic agenda. Drawing on Preston Smith II’s useful
demarcation of racial and social democratic programs for racial equality provides a
framework for tracing the ideological development of those nodes of Black politics
across the policy and political changes in the 1930s and 1940s. Linking ideological
development to these tangible political demands and projects helps to understand the role
of race in politics in more concrete terms.
The careful consideration of industrial policy debates and the coalitions of racial
advocacy organizations and labor unions that contributed to those debates highlights the
kinds of pragmatism and compromise involved in these coalitional efforts. Considered
from this perspective, a figure who looms large in this narrative is A. Philip Randolph,
who often features less prominently in stories about twentieth-century civil rights.
Randolph, however, was at the center of many of these attempts to form coalitions
committed to economic and racial justice. He allied with unlikely figures, like George
Harrison of the lily-white railway unions, and also worked to reign in the more radical
elements of the March on Washington Movement in 1941. His pragmatism translated to
concrete political victories and real coalitions in ways that should inspire and instruct
contemporary movements for racial and economic justice.
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The need for multi-venue, coalitional political analysis
This project also seeks to fill two identified gaps that connect to new work and
recent efforts to launch an American political economy subfield.688 First is a call for
research that is not siloed in the study of single institutions but rather seeks to trace
political, and particularly political-economic, development across a variety of institutions
over longer periods of time. In this vein, this dissertation analyzes the coalition-building
efforts of racial advocacy organizations and trade unions across all three levels of federal
governance: Congress, the executive branch, and the courts. Further, this dissertation has
treated these organizations as institutions in themselves, including an analysis of internal
debates within and among racial advocacy organizations and unions. The result is not
only a less siloed study but also one that is more capable of describing the political
struggles as they occurred.
Returning to the contingency, compromise, and messiness that define politics, this
dissertation focuses on two things related to coalition building and politics. This
dissertation offers a better understanding of how coalitions of racial advocacy
organizations and labor unions were able to work together and win. And second, it offers
a more careful consideration of the context and factors that led to those victories and,
unfortunately, more often, the defeats. One question that might arise is why we should
care to understand or trace the development of coalitions that ultimately failed in their
primary objectives. But for those who see the aims of the coalitions included in this
688
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dissertation as necessary or even desirable, it is imperative that we understand the
ideational and socioeconomic grounds on which they were forged. The goal of this
dissertation has been to move closer to understanding those conditions in hopes that
future coalitions will be ready to take up that call.
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